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Institutional Ownership and Corporate Philanthropic Giving in an Emerging Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2016

Yuanyang Song ,
Peter T. Gianiodis  and
Yuanxu Li
Yuanyang Song*
Affiliation:
East China University of Science and Technology, China
Peter T. Gianiodis
Affiliation:
Clemson University, USA
Yuanxu Li
Affiliation:
Fudan University, China
*
Corresponding author: Yuanyang Song ([email protected])
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Abstract

In this study, we examine the effect of institutional ownership on corporate philanthropy in China, an emerging economy. Employing stakeholder identification and salience theory, we posit that institutional ownership positively influences corporate philanthropy, which varies for different types of institutional investors. We further argue that institutional ownership's influence is stronger when philanthropy is aligned with firm goals. Using data from Chinese publicly listed firms, we find a positive effect of institutional ownership on philanthropy, and this effect is stronger for domestic institutional owners when compared to foreign institutional owners, and long-term when compared to short-term institutional owners. We also find that the positive influence of institutional ownership is stronger in private firms and in regions with low institutional development – situations characterizing high alignment between philanthropy and firm goals. Our findings highlight the important role of institutional investors on corporate philanthropy decisions, which have implications for scholars studying and policy makers enacting corporate governance in emerging economies.

摘要:

摘要:

在本研究中, 我们探讨了机构投资者持股对企业慈善捐赠的影响。基于利益相关者识别和重要性理论, 我们认为机构投资者持股对企业慈善捐赠有正向影响, 并且这种影响的强度取决于机构投资者的类型。更进一步, 当慈善捐赠与企业目标一致时, 机构投资者持股对慈善捐赠的影响会更强。基于中国上市公司的数据, 我们发现机构投资者持股对企业慈善捐赠有显著的正向影响, 并且本土机构投资者持股的正向影响强于外资机构投资者持股、长期机构投资者持股的正向影响强于短期机构投资者持股。我们还发现机构投资者对慈善捐赠的正向影响在民营企业和地区制度发展水平低时更强——在这两种情境下慈善捐赠与企业目标更一致。本研究揭示了机构投资者在企业慈善捐赠决策中扮演的重要角色, 对学者进一步研究以及政策制定者改善新兴市场的公司治理有重要启示。

इस शोध अध्ययन में हमने चीन (एक उदीयमान अर्थव्यवस्था) के सन्दर्भ में संस्थागत स्वामित्व के कॉर्पोरेट लोकोपकार पर प्रभाव का अध्ययन किया है. हितधारक निर्धारण व प्रमुखता निर्धारण सिद्धांत (स्टेकहोल्डर आइडेंटिफिकेशन व सेलिएंस थ्योरी) का प्रयोग करते हुए हमारा तर्क यह है कि संस्थागत स्वामित्व का कॉर्पोरेट लोकोपकार पर सकारात्मक प्रभाव होता है और यह भिन्न प्रकार के निवेशकों में पृथक रूप से परिलक्षित होता है. हमारा अगला तर्क यह है कि संस्थागत स्वामित्व का यह प्रभाव तब अधिक होता है जब लोकोपकार का फर्म के लक्ष्यों के साथ तारतम्य हो. चीन की सार्वजनिक सूचीबद्ध (पब्लिक लिस्टेड) फर्मों के आंकड़ों के आधार पर हमने संस्थागत स्वामित्व का लोकोपकार पर सकारात्मक प्रभाव पाया और साथ में यह भी देखा कि यह प्रभाव विदेशी संस्थागत निवेशकों की तुलना में देशी निवेशकों पर अधिक है. इसी प्रकार यह प्रभाव अल्पकालीन निवेशकों की तुलना में दीर्घकालीन निवेशकों के सन्दर्भ में अधिक है. हमने यह भी पाया की संस्थागत स्वामित्व का प्रभाव निजी फर्मों तथा सीमित संस्थागत विकास वाले भौगोलिक क्षेत्रों में अधिक है जो कि लोकोपकार और फर्म के लक्ष्यों के बीच उच्च तारतम्य का द्योतक है. हमारे शोध परिणाम कॉर्पोरेट लोकोपकार सम्बन्धी निर्णयों में संस्थागत निवेशकों कि भूमिका परिलक्षित करते हैं जिसका निगमित प्रशासन (कॉर्पोरेट गवर्नेंस) के शोधार्थियों के साथ ही उदीयमान अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में इस विषय पर नीति निर्धारण करने वालों के लिए भी महत्व है.

Neste estudo, nós examinamos o efeito da propriedade institucional na filantropia corporativa na China, uma economia emergente. Empregando a identificação das partes interessadas e a teoria da saliência, postulamos que a propriedade institucional influencia positivamente a filantropia corporativa, que varia para diferentes tipos de investidores institucionais. Nós ainda argumentamos que a influência da propriedade institucional é mais forte quando a filantropia está alinhada com as metas empresariais. Usando dados de empresas chinesas de capital aberto, encontramos um efeito positivo da propriedade institucional na filantropia, e esse efeito é mais forte para proprietários domésticos, quando comparado com proprietários institucionais estrangeiros, e para proprietários de longo prazo, quando comparado a proprietários institucionais de curto prazo. Nós também achamos que a influência positiva da propriedade institucional é mais forte nas empresas privadas e em regiões com baixo desenvolvimento institucional - situações caracterizando alto alinhamento entre filantropia e metas empresariais. Nossos resultados destacam a importância do papel dos investidores institucionais nas decisões sobre filantropia corporativa, que têm implicações para acadêmicos que pesquisam e formuladores de políticas que legislam sobre governança corporativa em economias emergentes.

Аннотация:

Аннотация:

В данной работе, мы исследуем влияние институционных инвестиций на корпоративную филантропию в Китае, в стране с развивающейся экономикой. На основании теории идентификации и взаимодействия заинтересованных сторон, мы предполагаем, что институционные инвестиции положительно влияют на корпоративную филантропию, с определенными отличиями для разных типов институционных инвесторов. Более того, мы утверждаем, что влияние институционных инвестиций сильнее в том случае, если филантропия совпадает с интересами компании. Используя данные китайских публичных компаний, мы демонстрируем положительное влияние институционных инвестиций на филантропию, и это влияние сильнее в случае национальных, а не иностранных институционных инвесторов, а также в случае долгосрочных, а не краткосрочных институционных инвестиций. Мы также делаем вывод, что положительное влияние институционных инвестиций сильнее в частных компаниях и в регионах с низким институционным развитием – в этих случаях филантропия значительно совпадает с интересами компании. Наши результаты свидетельствуют о важной роли институционных инвесторов в корпоративной филантропии, и это создает предпосылки для исследователей и руководителей в сфере корпоративного управления в странах с развивающейся экономикой.

En este estudio, examinamos el efecto de la propiedad institucional en filantropía corporativa en China, una economía emergente. Usando identificación de partes interesadas y la teoría de la prominencia, postulamos que la propiedad institucional influye positivamente en la filantropía corporativa, la cual varía entre los diferentes tipos de inversionistas institucionales. Adicionalmente argumentamos, que la influencia de la propiedad institucional es más fuerte cuando la filantropía está alineada con las metas de la empresa. Usando datos de empresas chinas que cotizan en bolsa, encontramos un efecto positivo de la propiedad institucional en la filantropía, y este efecto es más fuerte para dueños locales cuando al compararse con dueños institucionales extranjeros, y dueños institucionales de largo plazo cuando se compara con corto plazo. También encontramos que la influencia positiva de propiedad institucional es más fuerte en empresa privadas y en regiones con bajo desarrollo institucional – que caracterizan las situaciones de alta alineación entre filantropía y las metas de la empresa. Nuestros hallazgos resaltan el importante papel de los inversionistas institucionales en las decisiones de filantropía corporativa, la cual tiene implicaciones para académicos estudiando y los responsables de promulgar políticas de gobernabilidad corporativa en economías emergentes.

Keywords

Chinacorporate philanthropyemerging economiesinstitutional investorstakeholder salience
Type
Articles
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 357 - 385
Copyright
Copyright © The International Association for Chinese Management Research 2016 

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