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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2024
We examine how the central government's management of subnational governments' agency influences the smartness of the latter's industrial specialization choices. Based on smart industrial specialization theory and agency theory, we hypothesize how two central government tools governing subnational governments' agency – facilitating their organizational efficacy and promoting their officials to higher ranks – explain recent industrial specialization choices by China's 31 provincial governments. We find that provincial governments with greater organizational efficacy, measured by access to better-resourced local state-owned enterprises in focal industries, make smarter specialization policies. In addition, we show that provincial governments with greater numbers of officials previously promoted to the central government make, contrary to conventional wisdom, potentially less smart specialization policies. Our research extends smart specialization theory by explaining that central government tools governing subnational agency problems can have knock-on effects making subnational governments' industrial specialization choices smart or unsmart.
本文研究了中央对地方政府代理权的管理如何影响后者产业专业化的选择。基于产业专业化理论和代理理论,本文讨论了中央管理地方政府的两种工具,即促进地方政府的组织效能和地方官员升迁,如何影响省级政府产业专业化的选择。本文发现,组织效能较高的省级政府会制定更明智的专业化政策。此外,本文还发现,与传统观点相反,有更多官员得到提拔的省级政府,其制定的专业化政策可能存在偏差。本研究通过解释中央对地方政府代理权的管理工具会产生连锁效应,并影响地方政府产业专业化的选择,从而拓展了产业专业化理论。