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Corporate Philanthropy After Fraud Punishment: An Institutional Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2019

Lin Zhang ,
Yuehua Xu ,
Honghui Chen  and
Runtian Jing
Lin Zhang
Affiliation:
South China University of Technology, China
Yuehua Xu*
Affiliation:
Shandong University, China Sun Yat-sen University, China
Honghui Chen
Affiliation:
Sun Yat-sen University, China
Runtian Jing
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
*
Corresponding author: Yuehua Xu ([email protected])
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Abstract

This study examines corporate philanthropy in the context of corporate wrongdoing punishment in emerging markets. Building on institutional theory, we propose that in emerging markets, after being punished for fraudulent behavior by the government, which is collectively the largest institution, convicted firms tend to use corporate philanthropy as an institutional strategy to regain legitimacy. Using data of Chinese-listed firms that were punished for financial fraud in the ten years from 2004 to 2013, our findings show the subsequent growth of corporate philanthropy to be positively related to punishment severity. Furthermore, convicted firms’ media visibility, dominant state ownership, and national political appointment strengthen the effect of punishment severity on corporate philanthropy increase. Our institutional perspective offers new insights into why firms engage in corporate philanthropy after fraud punishment.

摘要

摘要

本研究检验了在新兴市场背景下企业因财务舞弊而受到惩罚对企业慈善捐赠的影响。基于制度理论，我们提出在新兴市场中，因财务舞弊被政府处罚的企业会使用慈善捐赠这一制度战略来修复其合法性。以中国在2004年到2013年间因财务舞弊而受到处罚的上市公司为样本，本研究发现企业受到财务舞弊的处罚程度正向影响处罚后企业慈善捐赠的增长，而被处罚企业的媒体可见度、国有控股以及政治关联会强化上述效应。本研究以制度理论为视角构建的理论框架，对企业为何进行慈善捐赠提供了新的解释。

Аннотация

АННОТАЦИЯ

В данном исследовании рассматривается корпоративная благотворительность в контексте наказания за корпоративные правонарушения на развивающихся рынках. Опираясь на институциональную теорию, мы предполагаем, что на развивающихся рынках после наказания за мошенническое поведение, наложенное правительством, которое является в собирательном значении крупнейшим институтом, виновные компании склонны использовать корпоративную благотворительность в качестве институциональной стратегии для восстановления легитимности. На основании данных из китайских компаний, зарегистрированных на фондовой бирже, которые были наказаны за финансовое мошенничество в течение 10 лет, в период с 2004 по 2013 годов, наши выводы показывают, что последующий рост корпоративной благотворительности зависит от суровости наказания. Кроме того, внимание к виновным компаниям со стороны средств массовой информации, преобладание государственной собственности и национальное политическое управление усиливают влияние строгости наказания на рост корпоративной благотворительности. Наша институциональная перспектива предлагает новое понимание того, почему компании занимаются корпоративной благотворительностью после наказания за мошенничество.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Este estudio examina la filantropía corporativa en el contexto del castigo por haber obrado mal en mercados emergentes. Basándonos en la teoría institucional, proponemos que mercados emergentes, después de haber sido castigados por comportamiento fraudulento por el gobierno, el cual es colectivamente la institución más grande, las firmas condenadas tienden a usar la filantropía corporativa como una estrategia institucional para conseguir legitimidad. Usando datos de empresas chinas listadas en bolsa que fueron castigadas por fraude financiero en los 10 años desde 2004 al 2013, nuestros hallazgos muestran que el crecimiento posterior de la filantropía corporativa esta positivamente relacionado a la severidad del castigo. Además, la visibilidad en medios de comunicación de las firmas condenadas, la propiedad dominante del estado, y el nombramiento político nacional fortalecen el efecto de la severidad del castigo en el aumento de la filantropía corporativa. Nuestra perspectiva institucional ofrece nuestros conocimientos sobre por qué las empresas participan en filantropía corporativa después del castigo por fraude.

Keywords

corporate philanthropyemerging marketfraud punishmentinstitutional theorylegitimacy regaining strategypolitical embeddedness企业慈善捐赠新兴市场财务舞弊惩罚制度理论合法性修复战略政治嵌入корпоративная благотворительностьразвивающийся рынокнаказание за мошенничествоинституциональная теориястратегия восстановления легитимностиполитическая вовлеченностьfilantropía corporativamercado emergentecastigo por fraudeteoría institucionalestrategia para ganar legitimidadarraigo político
Type
Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , February 2020 , pp. 33 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

The first two authors make equal contributions.

Accepted by: Senior Editor Xiaowei Rose Luo

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