This study aims to explore the dynamics of leadership reconfiguration within emergent state-owned enterprises (SOEs), i.e., privately owned enterprises (POEs) that have been acquired by SOEs. From an institutional logic perspective, we argue that the emergence of these SOEs reflects a process in which POEs, previously dominated by market logic, incorporate state logic and transition to a hybrid form. However, this process presents a paradox for emergent SOEs: while a greater extent of reconfiguration of leadership helps them gain greater legitimacy in front of state-related institutional referents, it also results in greater conflicts between members adhering to different logics. To address this paradox, we theorize on the differences in the reconfigurations of the board and top management team (TMT) by respectively connecting their functions to institutional control and agency, two typical forms of institutional power. Our analysis reveals that emergent SOEs tend to experience reconfiguration more in the board while less in TMT. Furthermore, we find that these main effects are moderated by the industrial state-ownership density and acquirees' preacquisition political connections. Our study contributes to the SOE and M&A literature by highlighting the uniqueness of emergent SOEs arising from POE-to-SOE acquisitions. Additionally, we propose a strategy to reconcile legitimation and internal stabilizations during logic hybridizations, thereby contributing to the institutional logic literature.

本研究旨在探索新兴国有企业（即原民营企业通过被国有企业收购而形成的国企）的领导层重组。基于制度逻辑的视角，我们认为新兴国有企业的产生反映了 一 个原先由市场逻辑主导的民营企业整合国家逻辑并转变为混合型组织的过程。这 一 过程为新兴国有企业带来了 一 个悖论：尽管更深程度的领导层重组有助于新兴国有企业获得国家逻辑下的更高合法性，但这也会在遵循不同制度逻辑的企业成员之间引起更大的冲突。为了解决这 一 悖论，我们对董事会和高管团队重组的差异进行了理论化，分别将其与两种典型的制度权力形式 —— 控制和能动性 —— 联系起来。我们的实证分析表明，新兴国有企业倾向于对董事会进行更多的重组，而对高管团队的重组则较少。此外，我们进 一 步揭示了行业层面国有股权密度和收购前企业政治关联的调节作用。本研究强调了国企收购民企这 一 现象以及新兴国有企业本身的独特性，进而为国有企业和并购研究做出了贡献。此外，我们提出了 一 种制度逻辑混合过程中兼顾外部合法性和内部稳定的策略，从而为制度逻辑研究做出贡献。