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Institutional Systems for Equitable Wealth Creation: Replication and an Update of Judge et al. (2014)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2020

William Q. Judge*
Affiliation:
Old Dominion University, USA
Stav Fainshmidt
Affiliation:
Florida International University, USA
J. Lee Brown
Affiliation:
Fayetteville State University, USA
*
Corresponding author: William Q. Judge ([email protected])

Abstract

This replication study was invited by the Editor in Chief of Management and Organization Review, Arie Y. Lewin. The original study by Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown (2014) spanned the global financial crisis (2005–2010), and as such, this anomalous time period may not have been representative of most economies, or even the overall global economy. In this replication study we refine and extend Judge et al. (2014) which explored the provocative question – which form of capitalism works best in terms of ‘equitable wealth creation’? Similar to the earlier study, we find that there are multiple paths to macro-economic success. Notably, effective institutional configurations tend to combine high-quality regulatory institutions, effective skill development systems, and social cultures largely unaffected by corruption so there is some commonality amongst effective configurations. In contrast, ineffective institutional configurations tend to be relatively weak in one or several of these three critical sets of institutions. Importantly, we find some novel patterns emerging from the most recent data, including potentially new forms of capitalism associated with equitable wealth creation. In addition, we find that effective credit market institutions are more important, and collective bargaining institutions are less important than the original study suggested. We discuss implications for the comparative capitalism literature, policy makers, and the future of capitalism in the global economy.

摘要

摘要

这项复制研究是应Management and Organization Review杂志的主编Arie Y. Lewin邀请的。Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown (2014)的研究是在全球金融危机期间(2005-2010)开展的,这个反常的时间段并不能代表多数经济甚至全球经济。在这项复制研究中,我们提升并拓展了Judge等人(2014)的研究,探讨一个非常具有争论性的问题—就“公平财富创造”而言,哪种形式的资本主义最好。与早先的研究一样,我们发现存在多种导致宏观经济成功的路径。但是,有效的制度结构倾向于结合高质量的监管制度、有效的技能培养体系以及不大受到腐败影响的社会文化,这些都是有效结构中的共性。相反,无效的制度结构倾向于在这三套关键制度中的某个或几个方面相对薄弱。重要的是,我们发现了最近数据中出现的新模式,包括与公平财富创造有关的潜在的新式资本主义。此外,我们发现有效的信用市场制度更为重要,而集体谈判制度没有原来研究显示的那么重要。我们讨论了这项研究对于比较资本主义文献、政策制定者以及全球经济中资本主义的未来所具有的意义。

Аннотация

АННОТАЦИЯ

Данное исследование по репликации было предложено Ари Левином, главным редактором журнала Management and Organization Review. Первоначальное исследование, которое провели Judge, Fainshmidt и Brown (2014), охватывало период глобального финансового кризиса (2005–2010 гг.), и, таким образом, этот аномальный период времени, возможно, не был репрезентативным для большинства рынков или в общем для мировой экономики. В данном исследовании по репликации мы уточняем и расширяем работу Judge et al. (2014), которая изучала провокационный вопрос – какая форма капитализма работает лучше всего с точки зрения «справедливого создания богатства». Как и в предыдущем исследовании, мы приходим к выводу о том, что существует множество путей достижения макроэкономического успеха. Однако, эффективные институциональные конфигурации, как правило, сочетают в себе высококачественные регулирующие институты, эффективные системы развития навыков и социальную культуру, в значительной степени не подверженную коррупции, поэтому между эффективными конфигурациями есть некоторая общность. Напротив, неэффективные институциональные конфигурации обычно бывают относительно слабыми в одном или нескольких из этих трех важнейших факторов. Важно отметить, что мы обнаруживаем некоторые новые закономерности на основании самых последних данных, а именно потенциально новые формы капитализма, которые связаны со справедливым созданием богатства. Кроме того, мы делаем вывод о том, что эффективные институты кредитного рынка более важны, а институты коллективных переговоров менее важны, чем предполагалось в первоначальном исследовании. Мы обсуждаем значение данной работы для сравнительной литературы по капитализму, руководящих кругов и будущего капитализма в глобальной экономике.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Este estudio de replicación fue invitado por el Editor en Jefe del Management and Organizational Review, Arie Y. Lewin. El estudio original por Judge, Fainshmidt, y Brown (2014) abarcó la crisis financiera global (2005-2010), y por ende, este periodo de tiempo anómalo puede no haber sido representativos de la mayoría de las economías, o de la economía global en general. En este estudio de replicación refinamos y extendemos a Judge et al. (2014) que exploró la pregunta provocativa: cuál forma de capitalismo funciona mejor en términos de “creación de riqueza equitativa. Similar al estudio inicial, encontramos que hay múltiples caminos para el éxito macro-económico. Sin embargo, las configuraciones institucionales efectivas tienden a combinar instituciones regulatorias de alta calidad, sistemas efectivos de desarrollo de habilidades, y culturas sociales que en gran medida no se ven afectadas por la corrupción, por lo que hay algo en común entre las configuraciones efectivas. En contraste, las configuraciones institucionales inefectivas tienden a ser relativamente débiles en uno o varios de estos tres conjuntos críticos de instituciones. Lo que es más importante, encontramos algunos patrones novedosos que emergen de los datos más recientes incluyendo las nuevas formas de capitalismo asociadas con la creación equitativa de la riqueza. Además, encontramos que las instituciones efectivas del mercado crediticio son más importantes, y las instituciones de negociación colectiva son menos importantes que el estudio original sugería. Discutimos las implicaciones para la literatura del capitalismo comparativo, los encargados de formular políticas y el futuro del capitalismo en la economía global.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

accepted by Editor-in-Chief Arie Y. Lewin

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