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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2025
This study examines how the managerial interpretation of incentive arrangement affects corporate engagement in social areas, as reflected in corporate social performance, from two interrelated perspectives: the political influence view and the normative agency view. Building the theoretical framework on state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives' dual-career tracks perspective, we contend that economic factors (performance decline and relative pay gap) and political factors (socialist imprints and political career horizon) could divergently reshape the interpretation of incentive arrangement on corporate social performance. Using ‘Pay Ceiling Order’ as a quasi-natural experiment context, a secondary analysis, and a controlled experiment reveal that compensation restriction on top executives causes a decrease in corporate social performance. This relationship is weakened when there are stronger socialist imprints inherited by a focal firm and when the executives have a longer political prospect. In contrast, the relationship is strengthened when firms face severe performance declines and when the executives' compensation is relatively lower than peers. The findings show that compensation is an indispensable incentive joining with political and economic factors, enabling SOEs to engage in social areas. We discuss the implications of understanding top executive incentives with incentive arrangements and how the government purpose influences top executive responses to compensation incentive in ways that matter for long-term social value.
本研究从两个相互关联的视角:政治影响观和规范代理观,考察了管理层对激励方案解释如何影响企业在社会领域的参与,以及这种参与如何反映在企业社会绩效上。基于国有企业(SOE)高管的双重职业轨迹视角构建理论框架,我们认为经济因素(绩效下降和薪酬差距)和政治因素(社会主义印记和政治职业视野)可能会不同地重塑激励方案对企业社会绩效的解释。利用“限薪令”作为准自然实验和对照实验揭示了对高层管理人员的薪酬限制会导致企业社会绩效的下降。当焦点公司继承了更强烈的社会主义印记,且高管拥有更长的政治前景时,这种关系会减弱。相反,当公司面临严重的绩效下降,且高管的薪酬相对于同行较低时,这种关系会加强。研究结果表明,促使国有企业能够参与社会领域,薪酬是与政治和经济因素结合的不可或缺的激励因素。我们讨论高层管理人员激励与激励安排的启示,以及政府目标如何影响高层管理人员对薪酬激励的反应,这些反应对长期社会贡献至关重要。