We present a set of research and briefly describe the individual contributions to the Macroeconomic Dynamics special issue on inequality, public insurance, and monetary policy.

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.

We extend the dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model in Bond et al. [Economic Theory (48, 171–204, 2011)] and show that if the labor-intensive good is inferior, then there may exist multiple steady states in autarky and poverty traps can arise. Poverty traps for the world economy, in the form of Pareto-dominated steady states, are also shown to exist. We show that the opening of trade can have the effect of pulling the initially poorer country out of a poverty trap, with both countries having steady state capital stocks exceeding the autarky level. However, trade can also pull an initially richer country into a poverty trap. These possibilities are a sharp contrast with dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin models with normality in consumption, where the country with the larger (smaller) capital stock than the other will reach a steady state where the level of welfare is higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state.

This paper aims to investigate impacts of public provision of universal health insurance (UHI) in an environment with household heterogeneity and financial market incompleteness. Various UHI polices with both distortionary and nondistortionary financing methods are compared to address the trade-off between risk reduction and tax distortion, as well as the corresponding welfare implications. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with endogenous insurance choice and labor supply decisions to perform quantitative analysis. The results suggest that the UHI expenditure coverage rate is too high in most OECD countries when the distortion effect is considered. We find a clear crowding-out effect on asset holdings. Implications for private health insurance (PHI) purchases when UHI is introduced depend on the pricing and the design of coverage. We find that the rich are sensitive to the price of PHI, and would prefer a supplemental plan when UHI is introduced.

Although several targeted welfare programs across the world have made owner-occupied housing exempt from the means test, relatively little is known about the impact of such exemption on portfolio choice and consumption. We study the Australian age pension scheme and argue that current uncapped exemption may lead to distortionary incentives for high levels of housing wealth to be sheltered from the means test. We set up a life-cycle model with explicit housing choice and borrowing constraints to match some key features of the Australian economy. We find that abolishing the exemption of owner-occupied housing in the assets test increases aggregate output, capital accumulation, and welfare, but decreases housing investment and homeownership. However, removing such distortions does not necessarily imply that all households would be better off. Lowering taxes to maintain fiscal balance would result in wealthy households experiencing a large welfare loss, whereas the majority of the population would benefit.

To what extent did deviations from the Taylor rule between 2002 and 2006 help to promote price stability and maximum sustainable employment? To address that question, I estimate a New Keynesian model with unemployment and perform a counterfactual experiment where monetary policy strictly follows a Taylor rule over the period 2002:Q1–2006:Q4. I find that such a policy would have generated a sizeable increase in unemployment and resulted in an undesirably low rate of inflation. Around mid-2004, when the counterfactual deviates the most from the actual series, the model indicates that the probability of an unemployment rate greater than 8% would have been as high as 80%, whereas the probability of an inflation rate above 1% would have been close to zero.

In this paper we study optimal policies in an environment where search frictions both in labor and goods markets give rise to unemployment and fiat money, as in Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (American Economic Review, 2011). The underlying frictions that give rise to endogenous unemployment and fiat money also result in inefficient outcomes. Here we show that efficiency can be restored whenever lump sum monetary transfers are possible and a decentralized production subsidy financed by money printing and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax exist. This is the case even when the Hosios and Friedman rules do not hold.

One questionable aspect of price posting with directed search is the strong commitment by sellers to commit to the advertised terms of trade. In this paper I explore the welfare implications of assuming that sellers cannot commit and vary the quality of their output ex post according to realized demand. I show that such lack of commitment translates into lower participation by buyers, lower average quality, and a consumption-equivalent loss of 0.3% of annual GDP.