We provide an overview to the special issue entitled New Tools for Global Analysis of Economic Dynamics by detailing the main aim of each contribution being part of it.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of demographic change on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, financed with a defined contribution scheme. In particular, we examine the relationship between retirement, fertility, and pensions in a three-period overlapping generations model. We focus on both the case of mandatory retirement and the case where the retirement age is freely chosen. In the case of mandatory retirement, increasing longevity has an unambiguously negative impact on fertility and pension payouts and a positive effect on the level of physical capital in the steady state. On the other hand, when agents choose the time of retirement, an increase in life expectancy positively affects physical capital only when the tax rate is sufficiently low and can have a positive impact on pension benefits, because agents may find it optimal to retire later and to decrease fertility less. Finally, the effects of the social security tax on capital per worker are negative with mandatory retirement; however, they could be positive in the optimal retirement case.

We develop an overlapping generations model to study how the interplay between social and human capital affects fertility. In a framework where families face a trade-off between the quantity and quality of children, we incorporate the assumption that social capital plays a key role in the accumulation of human capital. We show how the erosion of social capital can trigger a chain of reactions leading households to base their childbearing decisions on quantity, instead of quality, resulting in higher fertility.

We analyze the effects of children’s health on human capital accumulation and on long-run economic growth. For this purpose, we design an R&D-based growth model in which the stock of human capital of the next generation is determined by parental education and health investments. We show that (i) there is a complementarity between education and health: if parents want to have better educated children, they also raise health investments and vice versa; (ii) parental health investments exert an unambiguously positive effect on long-run economic growth, (iii) faster population growth reduces long-run economic growth. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence for modern economies in the twentieth century.

This paper deals with the optimal management of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We specifically focus on a contrasting tax evasion-based strategy for controlling the debt-to-GDP ratio. Two devices can be employed by the policymaker: by the one side, the tax rate is to be applied to the tax payers; by the other side, the monitoring activity is to be performed in order to detect the evaded taxes. To pursue our scopes, a stochastic control problem is developed and solved. Some numerical experiments validate the theoretical proposal and lead to an intuitive discussion of the obtained findings.

This paper shows that global indeterminacy may characterize the three-dimensional vector field implied by the Lucas [(1988) Journal of Monetary Economics 22, 3–42] endogenous growth model. To achieve this result, we demonstrate the emergence of a family of homoclinic orbits connecting the steady state to itself in backward and forward time, when the stable and unstable manifolds are locally governed by real eigenvalues. In this situation, we prove that if the saddle quantity is negative, and other genericity conditions are fulfilled, a stable limit cycle bifurcates from the homoclinic orbit. Orbits originating in a tubular neighborhood of the homoclinic orbit are then bound to converge to this limit cycle, creating the conditions for the onset of global indeterminacy. Some economic intuitions related to this phenomenon are finally explored.

In this paper, the location patterns of Multinational Enterprises are modeled by an evolutionary two-country model in which producing in a developed economy offers strong cost-reducing externalities of within-country spillovers and opting for a developing economy entails cheap labor but also extra operational costs due to the undersupply of public goods. The offshoring process, that is, manufacturing activity outsourced in the developing economy, increases the bargaining power of its workers and, with it, its labor cost. The investigation underlines that an increasing labor-productivity remuneration in the developing economy may spark a reshoring process that depends on the agglomeration and endowment drivers characterizing an industry. The reshoring process can be narrowed by a flexible labor remuneration scheme, with wages indexed to the domestic concentration of manufacturing activity. The presence of sub-optimal location patterns points out the existence of a trade-off between stability and efficiency, which underlines that policy measures designed to make a country a more efficient location are neither sufficient nor necessary for preventing offshoring or ensuring reshoring.

Many studies have stressed that human activities may cause the extinction of single species. Anthropogenic activities, however, may affect not only the number of individuals of single species, but also their behavior. To investigate this issue, we propose a growth model in which agents may care not only for the species’ survival but also for the typicality of their behavior. We assume that the environmental defensive expenditures can protect the species avoiding their extinction, but can induce the species to modify their behavior. Results emerging from the model suggest that if the social planner cares for typicality of species behavior, then an infinite growth process may no longer be optimal. Numerical simulations, moreover, show the possible existence of a trade-off between number and behavior of the species, leading the system to a high number of species’ members that behave in an atypical way or to few members behaving very typically.

The aim of this research is to build on a theory for explaining economic development in a (neoclassical) growth model with endogenous fertility. The economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of rational and identical individuals and identical competitive firms producing with a constant-returns-to-scale technology and no externalities. From a theoretical perspective, the distinguishing feature of this work is that endogenous fertility per se explains the existence of low- and high-development regimes. It provides different reasons (history driven or expectations driven) why some countries enter development trajectories with high GDP and low fertility and others experience underperformances with low GDP and high fertility. The model is also capable to reproduce fertility fluctuations and explain the baby busts and baby booms observed in the last century in some developed countries.

We study a model in which parents care about the economic and social status of their offspring. The chances of an individual achieving social status depends on innate traits, that is, IQ, ability, social and cultural environment, and other price-insensitive endowments, passed on by their parents, on human capital investments and on chance events. Parents can, through human capital investments, increase the offspring’s probability of climbing the social ladder, although they cannot borrow against the children’s perspective earning. Consequently, income and trait heterogeneity are the determinants of unequal opportunities and of intergenerational mobility.

We investigate the sectoral and the distributional effects of a food subsidy program, where food consumption in the economy is subsidized by taxing the manufacturing good producers. In a two-agent model comprising of farmer and industrialist households, agents consume food to accumulate health. Simulations indicate that while the subsidy program increases food output and agents’ health both in the short run and the long run, manufacturing output and aggregate real GDP appear to fall in the short run and increase only in the long run. The program does not make both agents better off and exhibits social welfare gains for a limited range of subsidies.

We examine the impact of balanced-budget labor income taxes on the existence of expectation-driven business cycles in a two-sector version of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (SGU) [(1997) Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000] model with constant government expenditures and counter-cyclical taxes. Our results show that the destabilizing impact of labor income taxes strongly depends on the capital intensity difference across sectors. Local indeterminacy is indeed more likely when the consumption good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate decreases, and less likely when the investment good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate increases. The implication of this result can be quantitatively significant. Indeed, when compared to SGU, local indeterminacy can be either completely ruled out for all OECD countries when the investment good is sufficiently capital intensive or drastically improved, delivering indeterminacy for a larger set of OECD countries, if the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive. Focusing however on recent estimates of the sectoral capital shares corresponding to the empirically plausible case of a capital intensive consumption good, we find that there is a significant increase of the range of economically relevant labor tax rates (from a minimum tax rate of 30% to 24.7% for which local indeterminacy arises with respect to the aggregate formulation of SGU.