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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2019
We study the implications of patents in an overlapping generations model with horizontal innovation of differentiated physical capital. We show that within this demographic structure of finitely lived agents, weakening patent protection generates two contradicting effects on innovation and growth. Weakening patent protection lowers the (average) price of patented machines, thereby increasing machine utilization, output, aggregate saving, and investment. However, a higher demand for machines shifts investment away from the R&D activity aimed at inventing new machine varieties toward the formation of physical capital. The growth-maximizing level of patent protection is incomplete. Shortening patent length is more effective than loosening patent breadth in spurring growth, due to an additional positive effect on growth, that is decreasing investment in old patents. Welfare can be improved by weakening patent protection beyond the growth-maximizing level.
This work integrates, corrects, and extends the analyses presented by Diwakar and Sorek in earlier working papers titled “Finite Lifetimes, Patents’ Length and Breadth, and Growth” and “Dynamics of Human Capital Accumulation, IPR Policy, and Growth” (circulated as Auburn University Department of Economics Working Papers: AU-WP #2016-11 and #2016-7, respectively). We are grateful to a referee of this Journal for various helpful comment and suggestions. We have also benefitted from comments by seminar participant at Auburn University, the 2016 and 2017 Southern Economic Association conferences in Washington DC and Tampa FL, and the 2017 North American Econometric Society Summer Meeting in St. Louis MO