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DEBT STABILIZATION IN THE PRESENCE OF ENDOGENOUS RISK PREMIA: A DYNAMIC GAME APPROACH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2018

Tzanis Anevlavis ,
George Papavassilopoulos ,
Jacob Engwerda  and
Bas van Aarle
Tzanis Anevlavis
Affiliation:
National Technical University of Athens
George Papavassilopoulos
Affiliation:
National Technical University of Athens
Jacob Engwerda*
Affiliation:
Tilburg University
Bas van Aarle
Affiliation:
Leuven Centre for Irish Studies
*
Address correspondence to: Jacob Engwerda, Department of Econometrics and O.R., Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the possibility that financial markets require risk premia on holding sovereign debt of countries that appear vulnerable from a fiscal sustainability perspective. Both the level of debt as well as the rate of change of debt are assumed to impact on the risk premium. We analyze the impact of such an endogenous risk premium in a simple debt game between a monetary and a fiscal player, as introduced by [Tabellini (1986) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 10, 427–442]. The risk premium term adds a nonlinearity to the linear model in case risk premia are absent. We analyze outcomes in case of noncooperative open-loop Nash strategies and in case of cooperative strategies and consider the workings of the risk premium as a market-based disciplining device (in case of high debt) and adjustment rewarding device (in case of a declining debt trajectory).

Keywords

Debt StabilizationDifferential GamesNonlinear Dynamical SystemsRisk PremiumEconomic Dynamics
Type
Articles
Information
Macroeconomic Dynamics , Volume 23 , Issue 7 , October 2019 , pp. 2616 - 2648
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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Footnotes

We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Guido Tabellini and seminar participants of the 17th ISDG conference for useful comments on a first version of the paper.

References

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