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Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control? Tensions in the International System for the Control of Drugs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2016

NEIL BOISTER
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Abstract

This article examines the tensions within the international drug control system which are putting the until now consensual position in regard to the prohibition on drugs supply and use for anything other than medical and scientific use – the Vienna Consensus – under strain. The article examines a number of areas where policy stress is leading to controversy about potential violation of international drug control treaty obligations by states parties. Drawing a comparison with earlier periods of stress when drug control fell under the League of Nations, it suggests that what appears to be occurring is a shift in the Vienna consensus, and that the drug conventions are sufficiently flexible to permit resulting shifts in practice, although reform would be preferable.

Keywords

international drug control systemdrug control reformdrug conventionscannabis marketsdrugs and human rights
Type
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 389 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2016 

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References

1 See S.K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control (1981), at 227.

2 Rule 57 of the Rules of Functional ECOSOC Commissions, which includes the CND, requires the Commission to vote when a member requests, and adoption without a vote where no such request is made. The usual practice is not to ask for a vote in the practice in the CND except in regard to the scheduling of drugs. The Rules are available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CHR/RoP.pdf

3 May, H.L., ‘Narcotic Drug Control: Development of Action and the Establishment of Supervision under the United Nations’ (1948) 441 International Conciliation 303Google Scholar, at 305.

4 See generally, W.O. Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo American Search for Order in Asia 1912-1954 (1991); J.M. Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945 (1997); W.B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History (2000).

5 Pennsylvania State University, Special Collections, Historical Collections and Labor Archive, Harry Anslinger Papers, Box 4, File 2, Notes for the Opium Question, under title ‘International’, at 2.

6 The Lake Success Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at the Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925, 19 February 1925, and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, signed at Lake Success, New York, 11 December 1946, 12 UNTS 179. In force upon signature for each party in accordance with the provisions of the drug control treaties. See Chatterjee, supra note 1, at 326.

7 New York, 30 March 1961, 520 UNTS 151; in force 13 December 1964.

8 Geneva, 25 March 1972, 976 UNTS 3; in force 8 August 1975.

9 Vienna, 21 February 1971, 1019 UNTS 175; in force 16 August 1976.

10 See D. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured (2012), 136 et seq.

11 Vienna, 20 December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95; in force 11 November 1990.

12 A term used by Harry Anslinger when he convinced the British and Dutch to give up their opium monopolies in 1943 – Pennsylvania State University, Special Collections, Historical Collections and Labor Archive, Harry Anslinger Papers, Box 5, File 9, Scrapbook.

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17 Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force 27 January 1980.

18 Preambular para. 8 and Art. 4(c), 1961 Convention; preambular para. 5 and Art. 5(2), 1972 Convention.

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21 Preambular para. 8.

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32 Organic Law 1/1992 of 21 February 1992.

33 Presidential Decree 309 of 9 October 1990.

34 Law 30 of 2000. Possession of drugs for personal consumption, in amounts higher than the ones needed for ten daily doses, remained a criminal offence.

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38 Decree of 20 August 2009, amending art 478 of the General Health Act.

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44 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 16; D. Bewley-Taylor and M. Jelsma, The UN Drug control Conventions: The Limits of Latitude, TNI/IDPC Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, no.18, March 2012, 9.

45 Art. 36(1)(b) of the 1961 Convention, Art. 22(1)(b) of the 1971 Convention and Art. 3(4)(d) of the 1988 Convention.

46 UN Doc. A/Res/S20/4, 10 June 1998.

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52 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004, supra note 37, 77, para. 510.

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55 2008 BCSC 661.

56 2010 BCCA 15.

57 2011 SCC 44.

58 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2011 (New York: UN, 2012), 239, para. 289.

59 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2014, supra note 49, 54, para. 362.

60 Barrett and Nowak, supra note 22, 451–4; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 10–14.

61 Barrett and Nowak, supra note 22, at 449.

62 See, e.g., operative para. 2 of GA resolution 69/201 of 18 December 2014.

63 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc A/65/255, 6 August 2010, 8.

64 1961 Commentary, supra note 26, 449–50.

65 Concluding Observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/CO/84/THA, 8 July 2005, para. 14, and Report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, UN Doc A/50/40, 3 October 1995, para. 449.

66 Constitutional Review, Nos. 2, 3/PUU-V/2007; ILDC 1041 (ID 2007), 23 October 2007.

67 UN Doc. A/HRC/4/20, para. 53.

68 Ibid., para. 3.24.

69 Through Art. 3(5). See, R. Lines, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: What do the international drug control treaties say about ‘most serious crimes’, University of Essex Human Rights Centre Blogs, 29 May 2015, blogs.essex.ac.uk/hrc/2015/05/29/the-death-penalty-for-drug-offences-what-do-the-international-drug-control-treaties-say-about-most-serious-crimes/.

70 In April 2015 Australia withdrew its Ambassador because of the execution of two of its nationals for drug trafficking by Indonesia – Bridie Jabour and Calla Wahlquist, ‘Indonesia executions', The Guardian online, http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/apr/29/execution-bali-nine-pair-six-others-indonesia-angry-reaction-live

71 UNODC, Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: A Human Rights Perspective, Note by the Executive Director, UN Doc. E/CN.7/2010/CRP.6*–E/CN.15/2010/CRP.1, 3 March 2010, paras. 25 and 26.

72 L. Naidoo, President of the INCB, in INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2014, iii.

73 UNCCPCJ, Vienna, 21 May 2015 (authors notes).

74 Barrett and Nowak, supra note 22, at 496.

75 OAC, Minutes of the Seventeenth Session: Held at Geneva from October 30th to November 9th, 1933, C.661.M.316.1933.XI (Geneva December 1933), 14.

76 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, supra note 14, at 78.

77 Pfeiffer, S., ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Drug Control Regime: The Case of Traditional Coca Leaf Chewing’, (2013) 5 Göttingen Journal of International Law 287Google Scholar, 297–8.

78 Ibid., 295 et seq.

79 Law 1008 of 19 July 1988 considered coca leaf production and chewing legal; only extraction and supply of cocaine was classed as illegal.

80 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001, supra note 36, at 57, para. 368.

81 Art. 30(II)(2).

82 Art. 384.

83 Letter Dated 12 March 2009 From the President of Bolivia Addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc E/2009/78 enclosure, 15 May 2009, 4.

84 See Pfeiffer, supra note 77, 301–2.

85 Proposal of Amendments by the Plurinational State of Bolivia to Art. 49, paras. 1(c) and 2(e): United States of America, UN Doc E/2011/47, 19 January 2011, 3.

86 In terms of Art. 46. See Pfeiffer, supra note 77, 304. This tactical change was foreshadowed by Helfer's work on treaty exit and reservations – see, Helfer, L.R., ‘Exiting treaties’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 579–1648Google Scholar and ‘Not fully committed? Reservations, risk and treaty design’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of International Law 367–82.

87 UNSG Depository Notification, UN Doc C.N.94.2013.Treaties-VI.18, 10 January 2012.

88 D. Bewley-Taylor, T. Blickman and M. Jelsma, The Rise and Decline of cannabis Prohibition: The History of Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System and Options for Reform, (2014), 62, citing Helfer, L.R., ‘Not fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of International Law 367Google Scholar, at 379.

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92 UNSG Depository Notification, UN Doc C.N.88.2013.TREATIES-VI.18, 15 January 2013.

93 UNSG Depository Notification, UN Doc C.N.732.2012.TREATIES-VI.18, 21 December 2012.

94 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2011, supra note 58, at 37, para. 279.

95 Pfeiffer, supra note 77, at 311, 318.

96 Pfeiffer, supra note 77, at 310 citing the 1961 Commentary, supra note 26, at 110, para. 9.

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102 See, e.g., Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2013, (New York: UN, 2014), 8, para. 54.

103 Through application of Law 19.172 of 2013.

104 Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma, supra note 87, at 59.

105 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Noy v. State 83 P.3d 538, 544–5 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). See Brandeis, J., ‘The Continuing Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans still have a Constitutional Right to Possess Marijuana in their Homes’ (2012) 29 Alaska Law Review 175Google Scholar.

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107 Title 21 USC, Chapter 13. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) the US Supreme Court upheld the authority of US Federal officials to enforce Federal law that conflicts with state law. On the policy change see Mikos, R.A., ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New Approach to Medical Marijuana’, (2011) 22 Stanford Law and Policy Review 633Google Scholar.

108 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010, (New York: UN, 2011), 63, para. 395.

109 Ibid., 63, para. 394.

110 Amendment A-64 of 2011, enacted as art. 18 section 16 of the Constitution of Colorado.

111 Initiative I-502 (2012).

112 Memorandum for all United States Attorneys. From James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General. Subject: Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement. August 29, 2013, available on the US Department of Justice Website at www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.

113 Ibid., 1–2.

114 Ibid., 2.

115 Ibid., 3.

116 Ibid., 4.

117 See W. Bennet and J. Walsh, Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties, Brookings, Washington Office for Latin America, October 2014, at 7.

118 Ibid., at 8.

119 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 18 U.S.C. § 3607. See Bennet and Walsh, supra note 117, 2 et seq. citing James Cole, Assistant Attorney General, Response to Questions for the Record, Conflicts Between State and Federal Marijuana Laws, Hearing Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 4 (18 June 2014).

120 An argument put to the INCB in 2013 by William Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, see Bennet and Walsh, supra note 117, at 8.

121 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2013, supra note 102, at 49, para. 375 and 96, para. 713.

122 Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma, supra note 87, at 54. The Federal Government cannot command the States to change their laws – New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 114, 162 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997), but can pre-empt these laws under Art. VI of the Constitution.

123 A. McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 79, fn. 1.

124 Harvard Research - Research in the International Law of Treaties, Supplement to 29 American Journal of International Law, October 1935, Art. 23; LaGrand (Germany v. United States) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, para. 111.

125 While there is no specific reference in Art. 27 to the possibility that a treaty may expressly justify reference to internal laws as a reason for not meeting an obligation, Art. 23(a) of the Harvard Draft did admit of this possibility and there is nothing in Art. 27 to prevent it. See O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (2012), 462.

126 1961 Commentary, supra note 26, at 440.

127 Signed at Geneva on 26 June 1936, 198 LNTS 300; in force 26 October 1939.

128 1961 Commentary, supra note 26, at 449, fn. 9. It was copied from Art. 17 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and Protocol, 20 April 1929, 1931 LNTS 45; 112 LNTS 371.

129 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).

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131 Cole Memorandum, supra note 112, at 4.

132 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Official Records, Volume II (New York, 1964) UN Doc. E/CONF.34/24/Add.1; UN Publication Sales No. 63.XI.4., p. 233.

133 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2011, supra note 58, 38, para. 281.

134 See 1961 Records vol. 2, supra note 132, at 243, where the Legal Advisor notes that the ‘organ supervising the execution of the Convention would be entitled to inquire what provisions of their constitution or domestic law prevented them from complying.’

135 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, in force 29 September 2003. The US ratified the Convention on 3 November 2005.

136 Bennet and Walsh, supra note 117, 8, citing remarks made by William Brownfield, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at a Debate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 2014.

137 ‘Presidential Determination—Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2015’, 15 September 2014, cited in Bennet and Wells, supra note 117, at 10.

138 See Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma, supra note 87, 32–41.

139 Presidential Determination no. 2014-15 of September 15, 2014, ‘Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2015,’ 79 Fed. Reg. 56625 (22 September 2014), at 55626.

140 See Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma, supra note 87, at 66.

141 See, e.g., Bennet and Walsh, supra note 117, at 3.