1 See Letter Dated 13 March 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2007/144 (2007), Ann.

2 See N. Cook, Côte d'Ivoire's Post-Election Crisis, CRS Report for Congress, 15 March 2011, at 49–63.

3 UN Doc. S/RES/1765 (2007), para. 1.

4 See, in detail, Cook, supra note 2, at 58–9; Human Rights Council (HRC), ‘Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Côte d'Ivoire’, UN Doc. A/HRC/16/79 (2011), paras. 3–9.

5 La Commission électorale indépendante, Second tour de l'élection du président de la Republique de Côte d'Ivoire, Scrutin du 28 novembre 2010, Resultats provisoires par centre de coordination, 2 décembre 2010, available at www.ceici.org/elections/docs/EPR2010_2T_RESULTATS_VALEURS_02122010.pdf.

6 Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire (La Constitution du 23 juillet 2000), Art. 94.

7 Le Conseil constitutionnel, Portant proclamation des résultats définitifs de l'élection présidentielle du 28 novembre 2010, Decision No. CI-2010-Ep-34/03-12/CC/SG (3 décembre 2010).

8 Y. J. Choi, SRSG, UNOCI, ‘Statement on the Certification of the Result of the Second Round of the Presidential Election Held on 28 November 2010’, 3 December 2010, paras. 12, 14, First Statement, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml.

9 T. Cocks and L. Coulibaly, ‘Ivory Coast's Gbagbo Sworn in Despite Poll Row’, Reuters, 4 December 2010.

10 Cook, supra note 2, at 3; HRC, supra note 4, at 6–7; J. James, ‘Ivory Coast Crisis as Presidential Rivals Both Sworn In’, BBC News, 4 December 2010.

11 In media analysis, the two governments have been distinguished in similar terms. Among many examples are ‘the government of the self-proclaimed President Laurent Gbagbo’; see CNN Wire Staff, ‘Ouattara Supporter Killed in Abidjan’, CNN News, 4 January 2011; ‘Alassane Ouattara, the Internationally Recognized President-Elect’; see Unnamed, ‘U.N.: Gbagbo Blocking Mass-graves Probe’, UPI, 2 January 2011.

12 The Constitutional Council ratified Ouattara as president, reversing its earlier decision, adding that ‘all decisions contrary to this one are null and void’, and invited him to take an oath in front of an official audience. A. Aboa and T. Cocks, ‘Ivory Coast Top Court Declares Ouattara President’, Reuters, 5 May 2011.

13 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, ECW/CEG/ABJ/EXT/FR./Rev.2, 7 December 2010, paras. 7, 9.

14 AU, Communiqué of the 252nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLII), 9 December 2010, para. 4.

15 See ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, ECW/CEG/ABJ/EXT/FR./Rev.0, 24 December 2010, para. 7; AU, Communiqué of the 259th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/AHG/COMM(CCLIX), 28 January 2011, para. 2.

16 See Press Release, UNSC, UN Doc. SC/10102 (7 December 2010); UN SCOR, 65th yr, 6437th mtg, UN Doc. S/PV.6437 (2010).

17 Press Release, UNSC, UN Doc. SC/10105 (8 December 2010). Also, careful consideration was apparent in subsequent resolutions in this regard, e.g., UN Doc. S/RES/1962 (2010), para. 1.

18 F. Yang, ‘UN Security Council Recognizes Ouattara as Winner of Côte d'Ivoire Presidential Runoff’, Xinhua, 9 December 2010; UN Official Media, ‘Ouattara Backed by Security Council as President of Côte d'Ivoire’, UN Radio, 9 December 2010.

19 See HRC, Res. S-14/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-14/1 (2011). However, in a later resolution, the Human Rights Council wrote a relatively explicit phrase that they welcome the recognition made by the regional organization. ‘Alassane Ouattara as President of Côte d'Ivoire’, HRC, Res. 16/25, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/25 (2011), para. 2.

20 E.g., Unnamed, ‘UN Urges Recognition of Ouattara as Ivory Coast Leader’, BBC News, 20 December 2010.

21 ‘Report of the Credentials Committee’, UN Doc. A/65/583/Rev.1 (2010), para. 7. As the November report had not yet been taken up by the plenary of the Assembly, the Committee was able to simply revise the previous report, UN Doc. A/65/PV.73 (2010), at 1.

22 UN Doc. A/RES/65/237 (2010).

23 Press Release, UNGA, UN Doc. GA/11043 (23 December 2010); see Cook, supra note 2, footnote 38.

24 Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Doc. SG/SM/13331, AFR/2086, GA/11044 (28 December 2010).

25 E.g., Angola and Lebanon; N. Colombant, ‘Despite Growing Pressure, Ivory Coast Incumbent Gbagbo Still Has Outside Allies’, VOA News, 27 December 2010.

26 CNN Wire Staff, ‘Britain, Canada Reject Gbagbo's Authority on Envoys’, CNN News, 6 January 2011. In response, Gbagbo's government also announced that they would cut diplomatic ties with countries that recognized ambassadors named by Ouattara; X. Tong, ‘Gbagbo's Government Revokes Accreditation of British and Canadian Ambassadors’, Xinhua, 7 January 2011.

27 L. Thomas, ‘France Says EU Recognizes Only Ouattara's Ambassadors’, Reuters, 29 December 2010.

28 Council of the European Union, Press Release, 3065th Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs, 5888/1/11 REV 1 (en) (31 January 2011), Council's Conclusions on Côte d'Ivoire, at 13–14, para. 1.

29 ECOWAS, ‘Resolution A/RES.1/03/11 of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS on the Situation in Côte d'Ivoire’, A/RES. 1/03/11 (24 March 2011); Transmitted to the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2011/182 (2011), Ann.

30 E.g., Gbagbo's request to ban flights of UN and French military aircraft after Ouattara had departed to attend the meeting of the AU was rejected as ‘illegitimate’; Unnamed, ‘Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo Bans UN and French Flight’, BBC News, 10 March 2010; see also Cook, supra note 2, at 8.

31 On the factual analysis of the patterns of political violence against civilians, see Straus, S., ‘“It's Sheer Horror Here”: Patterns of Violence during the First Four Months of Côte d'Ivoire's Post-Electoral Crisis’, (2011) 110 African Affairs 481CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 481–9.

32 A. Quinn, ‘Ivory Coast President Offered Exile in Africa: US’, Reuters, 17 December 2011. Meanwhile, they also warned that there would be no alternative option but to take coercive measures if Gbagbo failed to heed this last demand; ECOWAS, supra note 15, para. 10.

33 AU, Communiqué of the 259th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, SC/AHG/COMM(CCLIX) (28 January 2011), para. 5.

34 Ibid., para. 6. AU, ‘The High Level Panel for the Resolution of the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire Concludes Its First Visit to Abidjan’, 22 February 2011, Press Release.

35 AU, Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (CCLXV), 10 March 2011, paras. 8–9.

36 E.g., Amnesty International (AI), ‘Tens of Thousands at Risk in Côte d'Ivoire as Fighting Intensifies’ Côte d'Ivoire Mission Report’, AFR 31/001/2011 (22 February 2011), 1 March 2011; Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Côte d'Ivoire: Leaders Should Prevent Abuses by Their Forces’, 24 February 2011; ‘Côte d'Ivoire: Crimes against Humanity by Gbagbo Forces’, 15 March 2011.

37 See HRC, supra note 19; HRC, 16/25, UN Doc. A/HRC/REX/16/25 (2011).

38 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, ECW/HSG/ABJ/39 (23–24 March 2011), para. 25; ECOWAS, supra note 29.

39 UN Doc. S/RES/1975 (2011).

40 Ibid., para. 6.

41 Council Decision (EU), 2010/656/CFSP (30 October 2010), OJ L 285/28.

42 Council Decision (EU), 2011/221/CFSP (6 April 2011), OJ L 93/20–24; Council Regulation (EU), No. 330/2011 (6 April 2011), OJ L/93/10–15.

43 On 27 March 2011, Force Nouvelle, a rebel force that had controlled the northern region since 2002, was officially recognized as the national military named FRCI; see Unnamed, ‘Ivory Coast's Ouattara Says Rebels Are Legitimate Army’, Reuters, 18 March 2011.

44 HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Côte d'Ivoire, UN Doc. A/HCR/17/49 (2011), para. 6.

45 Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Doc. SG/SM/13494, AFR/2157 (4 April 2011).

46 Since a significant number of soldiers who fought for Gbagbo had melted into the population, the report noted the militias and mercenaries were finally dislodged on 4 May; HRC, supra note 44, para. 7.

47 See Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Côte d'Ivoire, 6 April 2005, para. 9.

48 Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire, Arts. 35, 37, 38.

49 UN Doc. S/RES/1765 (2007), para. 6. Regarding the five criteria for certification standards, see Security Council, The Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2008/250 (2008), para. 32.

50 ‘Panel in Côte d'Ivoire Accepts UN Election Certification Standards’, UN News Center, 26 March 2008.

51 For comprehensive historical analysis, see Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994). For analysis on types of technical assistance, see S. Darnolf, ‘International Election Support: Helping or Hindering Democratic Elections?’, IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference, 16–19 February 2011, São Paulo, Brazil, at 6.

52 International election monitoring for the 1990 election in Nicaragua was referred to as the first case of a United Nations-supervised election within an independent member state; see Franck, T., ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, (1992) 86 AJIL 46CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 71–2; see also D. Stoelting, ‘The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations’, (1991–92) 28 Stanford JIL 372, at 377–9.

53 ONUVEH has been referred to as ‘the first instance in which the UN, acting at the request of a national government, intervened in the electoral process solely to validate the legitimacy of outcome’, Franck, supra note 52, at 72–3; Stoelting, supra note 52, at 380–3.

54 See UNOCI, ‘The Certification of Election in Côte d'Ivoire’, available at www.onuci.org/pdf/faqcertificationen.pdf.

55 UN Charter, Art. 2(7).

56 See Stoelting, supra note 52, at 372–5.

57 Cook, supra note 2, at 2.

58 Pretoria Agreement, supra note 47, para. 10.

59 Y. J. Choi, ‘Statement of the Certification of the Final Result of the First Round of the Presidential Election Held on 31 October 2010’, SRSG, UNOCI, 12 November 2010, paras. 16–18, available at www.onuci.org/IMG/pdf/doc3.pdf.

60 Two statements have been issued. For the first, see supra note 8. The second statement included a more detailed explanation of the methods for certification; see Y. J. Choi, ‘Statement on the Second Round of the Presidential Election Held on 28 November 2010’, SRSG, UNOCI, 8 December 2010, paras. 10–13, available at www.onuci.org/pdf/declarationyjchoieng.pdf, Second Statement.

61 Bassett, T. J., ‘Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d'Ivoire's 2010 Presidential Elections’, (2011) 440 African Affairs 469CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 470 – for critical analysis of the Constitutional Council's decision, see 477–9.

62 See Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire, Arts. 88, 98.

63 Cook, supra note 2, at 6; see Television Ivoirienne, ‘Government Communiqué on the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire’, via BBC Monitoring Africa, 18 December 2010; T. Cocks, ‘Gbagbo Ally Accuses West of Wooing Ivorian Military’, Reuters, 12 December 2010.

64 UNOCI, supra note 54.

65 As framed in international law, judgments of domestic juridical organs are to be treated as fact and do not per se constitute legal effect; see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2008), 38–40.

66 See SRSG, supra note 60.

67 J. d'Aspremont, ‘Duality of Governments in Côte d'Ivoire’, EJIL Analysis, 4 January 2011.

68 Banegas, R., ‘Post-Election Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire: The GBONHI War’, (2011) 440 African Affairs 457CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 461. The Golf Hotel, in Ouattara's presence, was officially referred to as ‘the headquarters of the legitimate Government of President Ouattara’; see Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Doc. SG/SM/13503, AFR/2160 (11 April 2011).

69 S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law (1998), 115; S. Magiera, ‘Governments’, in EPIL (online version).

70 See Mclean, J., ‘Government to State: Globalization, Regulation, and Governments as Legal Persons’, (2003) 10 Ind. JGLS 173Google Scholar.

71 Talmon, supra note 69, at 105.

72 Talmon, S., ‘Who Is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law’, in Brownlie, I. et al. (eds.), The Reality of International Law (1999), 499Google Scholar, at 500.

73 Ibid., at 536; d'Aspremont, J., ‘Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy’, (2006) 38 JYUJILP 877Google Scholar, at 878–9.

74 H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), 157.

75 The recognition of a government provides an opinion on the subjective legal status of that government; see Talmon, supra note 69, at 29–30. Regarding the legal relations derived from the recognition of government in exile, see 115–268; see also M. N. Shaw, International Law (2008), 453–5.

76 Lauterpacht, supra note 74, at 141; H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2003), 197–8. In the early 1950s, disputes arose regarding the criteria adopted in the representation question; see Jhabvala, F., ‘The Credentials Approach to Representation Questions in the U.N. General Assembly’, (1977) 7 Cal. W. ILR 615Google Scholar, at 632.

77 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), 43.

78 Murphy, S. D., ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments’, in Fox, G. H. and Roth, B. R. (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (2000), 125Google Scholar.

79 It has been remarked that state practices regarding recognition of governments dominated by the application of de facto or effective-control tests is ‘the logical default position in an international system of sovereign states’; B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999), 136.

80 See L. T. Galloway, Recognizing Foreign Governments: The Practice of the United States (1978), 128, especially the Appendix for governments’ criteria for the recognition of other governments.

81 Ibid., at 137–8.

82 Murphy, supra note 78, at 139.

83 E.g., in the case of Congo, the Credential Committee conducted a thorough interpretation of the constitutional law of the Congo; Ciobanu, D., ‘Credentials and Representations of Member States at the United Nations’, (1976) 25 ICLQ 351CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 371.

84 d'Aspremont, supra note 73, at 905–7.

85 On government in exile having lost its effectiveness in the territory of the state and its representation, see Talmon, supra note 69, at 173–84; Roth, B. R., ‘Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine’, (2010) 11 Melb. JIL 392Google Scholar, at 415–39. For the Credential Committee's practices of accreditation resorting to the criterion of constitutionality, see d'Aspremont, supra note 73, at 905.

86 For China, see, e.g., Liang, Y.-L., ‘Notes on the Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations’, (1951) 45 AJIL 690Google Scholar; for Cambodia, see, e.g., Ratliff, S., ‘UN Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia and a New Accreditation Proposal for the Twenty-First Century’, (1999) 87 California Law Review 1207CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Murphy, supra note 78, at 143–51.

87 UN Doc. A/RES/396(V) (1950), para. 1.

88 See, e.g., Fox, G. H., ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’, (1992) 17 Yale JIL 539Google Scholar, at 596–606; Griffin, M., ‘Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy through Its Accreditation Process, and Should It?’, (1999–2000) 32 JYUJILP 725Google Scholar; d'Aspremont, supra note 67.

89 See Talmon, supra note 69, at 115.

90 See sub-subsection 2.2.1, supra.

91 d'Aspremont, supra note 67.

92 See Scope of ‘Credentials’ in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, UN Doc. A/8160 (1970).

93 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 76, at 197.

94 See UN Doc. A/RES/396(V) (1950).

95 See ‘Memorandum on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations, Transmitted to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General (UN Doc. S/1466 (1950))’, (1950) 4:2 IO 356, at 356–60.

96 See, e.g., Warbrick, C., ‘The New British Policy on Recognition of Governments’, (1981) 30 ICLQ 568CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Talmon, S., ‘Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice’, (1992) 63 BYIL 231Google Scholar. The UK also announced that they regard Ouattara as ‘legitimate president of Côte d'Ivoire’. Cf. recent case of Libya; see S. Talmon, ‘The Difference between Rhetoric and Reality: Why an Illegitimate Regime May Still be a Government in the Eyes of International Law’, EJIL Analysis, 3 March 2011; D. Akande, ‘Which Entity Is the Government of Libya and Why Does It Matter?’, EJIL Analysis, 16 June 2011.

97 See supra note 24.

98 Roth, supra note 85.

99 See Lauterpacht, supra note 74, at 143.

100 Financial restrictions and economic embargos against the regime resulted in weakening his rule internally; see Banegas, supra note 68, at 463.

101 On 14 December 2010, Ouattara sent a letter as the newly elected president of Côte d'Ivoire confirming the ICC's jurisdiction in Côte d'Ivoire, based on a declaration submitted in 2003, NR 0039-PR-du 14/12/2010.

102 See d'Aspremont, supra note 73, at 877–918. Prof. d'Aspremont makes a distinction between ‘legitimacy of origin’ and ‘legitimacy of exercise’, and asserts that election provides the one but not the other.

103 d'Aspremont, supra note 67.

104 J. Wouters et al., ‘Democracy and International Law’, Working Paper No 5 (June 2004), LIRGIAD, at 7–17.

105 Fox, supra note 88, at 603–4.

106 Ibid., at 588–607; see also Griffin, supra note 88, at 726.

107 Griffin, supra note 88, at 725.

108 Prof. Franck maintains ‘democracy as the key factor for determining the legitimacy of State in the international system’ based on ‘the existence of emerging normative expectations in the international system that states will be organized as democratic governments’. Although his essay was carefully tagged, ‘the radical vision, while not yet fully word made law’, he maintains his conviction that such value ‘is rapidly becoming, in our time, a normative rule of the international system’; Franck, supra note 52, at 46 (emphasis added).

109 Ibid.

110 Marks, S., ‘The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic Governance”’, (1997) 91 ASIL Proc. 372Google Scholar, at 372. Prof. Marks also sharply spoke on this, saying ‘for democracy appeared to mean everything, and therefore nothing’; see also S. Marks, ‘International Law, Democracy and the End of History’, in Fox and Roth, supra note 78, at 532.

111 See also Wippman, D., ‘Defending Democracy through Foreign Intervention’, (1997) 19 Houston JIL 659Google Scholar, at 663.

112 Even earlier than Franck, regarding the assertion that a government should be in accordance with democratic principles to be lawful (E. Lauterpacht, The Times, 23 December 1989), harsh criticism was also made describing this trend in the literature as ‘a new form of threat to international public order’ and that such an ‘adoption of a standard of democratic government would lead to endless intervention in the affairs of States’; I. Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998), 59–61.

113 Noting the illiberal democracies, see d'Aspremont, supra note 73; see also d'Aspremont, J. and Brabandere, E. D., ‘The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise’, (2011) 34 Fordham ILJ 190Google Scholar.

114 Murphy, supra note 78, at 139; Talmon, supra note 69, at 22–3.

115 Except in the cases of South Africa and Hungary, where the credential issue was dealt with without there being competing authorities.

116 UN Doc. S/RES/1962 (2010); UN Doc. S/RES/1967 (2011); UN Doc. S/RES/1968 (2011).

117 See Murphy, S. D., ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy and the Concept of Collective Security after the Cold War’, (1994) 32 CJTL 201Google Scholar, at 203.

118 See supra notes 36 and 37. Meanwhile, the response was regarded as ‘a watershed in the emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect’ because the responsibility to protect framework facilitated the Security Council's decision to respond in a timely and decisive manner.

119 See Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Doc. SG/SM/13548 (6 May 2011).

120 S. Bureau, ‘The Situation in Ivory Coast: Intervention to Protect or Regime Change Operation?’, International Law Notepad, 11 April 2011, available at http://internationallawnotepad.wordpress.com/2011/04/11/situation-ivory-coast-intervention-regime-change/#more-518.

121 Press Release, supra note 45.

122 SC Res. 1975, supra note 39, paras. 1, 3.

123 Henderson, C., ‘International Measures for the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire’, (2011) 60 ICLQ 767CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 772–3.

124 UN Doc. S/RES/940 (1994), para. 4.

125 UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997), para. 1.

126 W. M. Reisman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracy’, (1994–95) 18 Fordham ILJ 794, at 795.

127 See, e.g., Slaughter, A.-M., ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, (1995) 6 EJIL 503CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and also see critics, Alvarez, J. E., ‘Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory’, (2001) 12 EJIL 183CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

128 Bureau, supra note 120.

129 The UNOCI was established by SC Res. 1528 (UN Doc. S/RES/1528 (2004)) under the request made by then-president of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Gbagbo; see also UNSC, UN Doc. S/2003/99 (2003); UN Doc. S/RES/1464 (2003).

130 The three basic principles are: (i) consent of the parties, (ii) impartiality, and (iii) the non-use of force except in self-defence. UN-DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008), 31–5. Although there have been fluctuations and challenges, these principles have remained as ‘the bedrock principles of peacekeeping’; see ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)’, UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809 (2000), para. 48; see also Tsagourias, N., ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’, (2006) 11 JCSL 465Google Scholar, at 465–6. Regarding the principle of non-use of force, a series of attacks against the peacekeepers was reported, thus providing grounds for them to claim their action to be self-defence; see Press Release, supra note 68.

131 The representative for Brazil also stressed that the UNOCI should remain impartial so as not to become part of the conflict; see Press Release, UNSC, UN Doc. SC/10215 (30 March 2011).

132 Bureau, supra note 120.

133 See Oussoufou Bamba's statement after the adoption of the resolution; Press Release, UNSC, UN Doc. SC/10215 (30 March 2011).

134 See HRW, ‘Côte d'Ivoire: Ouattara Forces Kill, Rape Civilians during Offensive’, News, 9 April 2011.

135 See media reports, S. Kouassi et al., ‘Laurent Gbagbo's Forces Fired on by UN Attack Helicopters’, Guardian UK, 4 April 2011; A. Laing, ‘Ivory Coast: French Helicopters Launch Rockets at Gbagbo's Palace’, The Telegraph, 8 April 2011; Unnamed, ‘Ivory Coast: New Air Strikes near Gbagbo Residence’, BBC News, 10 April 2011.

136 S. Gutterman, ‘Russia Criticises UN Force Role in Ivory Coast’, Reuters, 14 April 2011; see also Cook, supra note 2, at 2.

137 See Brahimi Report, supra note 130, at 9, para. 50.

138 See Bureau, supra note 120.

139 See Tsagourias, supra note 130, at 465.

140 Invitation provided by a government with effective control, even experiencing temporary loss of control, has been regarded as legitimate grounds for intervention. On this issue, see D. Wippman, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation’, in Fox and Roth, supra note 78, at 293–327.

141 E.g., Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989); see S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (2001), 102–6. States doubted ‘the propriety of any attempt by foreign states to influence domestic political process’; Scheffer, D. J., ‘Use of Force after the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order’, in Henkin, L. et al. (eds.), Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force (1991), 123Google Scholar.

142 Consent of the legitimate government was regarded as the decisive factor for intervention. See, regarding Haiti, Chesterman, supra note 141, at 155; regarding Sierra Leone, see Nowrot, K. and Schbacker, E. W., ‘The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone’, (1998) 14 AUILR 321Google Scholar, at 386.

143 UN Doc. S/RES/940 (1994); see Leininger, J., ‘Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping: Conflict Resolution through State-Building and Democracy Promotion in Haiti’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 10 (2006), 495–9Google Scholar.

144 UN Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997). Decision (Final Communiqué) made by ECOWAS annexed in the letter (dated 8 September 1997) from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1997/695 (8 September 1997), Annexes I and II.

145 Reisman, supra note 126, at 796; the other comment on the case of Haiti, ‘a high-water mark of council activisms in the 1990s’, T. G. Weiss, Military–Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect (2005), 198; see also Roth, supra note 79, at 383–7; O'Connell, M. E., ‘Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy’, (1998) 36 CJTL 473Google Scholar, at 487–8.

146 Roth, supra note 79, at 406–8.

147 Chesterman, supra note 141, at 159–60.

148 Wippman, supra note 140, at 293–327; Levitt, J. I., ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa’, (2006) 24 Wisc. ILJ 785Google Scholar, at 789.

149 The Nicaragua judgment is pertinent here: ‘The Court . . . finds that no such general right of intervention, in support of an opposition within another State, exists in contemporary international law’; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits and Judgment, [1986] ICJ Rep. 109, para. 209.

150 See, generally, Beigbeder, supra note 51, at 119–47.

151 Stoelting, supra note 52, at 372; see, e.g., G. H. Fox, ‘Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting’, (2000–01) 19 Wisc. ILJ 295; Reisman, W. M., ‘International Election Observation’, (1992) 4 Pace Yearbook of International Law 1Google Scholar.

152 See, e.g., T. M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement’, in Fox and Roth, supra note 78, at 25–47.

153 Wouters et al., supra note 104, at 17–22; Wheatley, S., ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’, (2002) 5 ICLQ 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 234–5.

154 ECOWAS, Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, A/SP1/12/01 (December 2001, entered into force 2005), Art. 45(1); AU, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 30 January 2007, Art. 25.

155 Although it would still be difficult to identify a general obligation to introduce democratic government in international law, Prof. Wheatley noted that there is ‘a progressive and irreversible movement to a world community of democratic states’; Wheatley, supra note 153, at 233–4.

156 See B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (1996). Regarding the notion of democratic peace, see, e.g., M. W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (1997); J. L. Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (1995).

157 See Levitt, supra note 148.

158 Marks, S., ‘What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?’, (2011) 22 EJIL 507CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 515.