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State Co-operation and International Criminal Court Bargaining Influence in the Arrest and the Surrender of Suspects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

STEVEN D. ROPER  and
LILIAN A. BARRIA
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Abstract

While much has been written about the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), less attention has been focused on the enforcement capability of the Court. As demonstrated by the history of the ad hoc international tribunals, one of the most pressing problems for international criminal courts is the arrest and the surrender of suspects, which often requires substantial bargaining between the court and the state in which the suspect resides. We develop a classification of the issues which have the greatest impact on the bargaining influence of the ICC to secure the arrest of indictees, and apply this classification scheme to a study of the four ongoing situations at the ICC in order to explore the bargaining environment in which the ICC operates. While many of the cases have features which should assist the ICC in bargaining with the state, the situation in Sudan represents the greatest challenge for the Court.

Keywords

arrestbargaining influenceInternational Criminal Courtstate co-operationsurrender
Type
HAGUE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: International Criminal Court
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 457 - 476
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2008

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