Article contents
Rethinking non-recognition: The EU’s Investment Agreement with Taiwan under the One-China Policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2020
Abstract
This article re-examines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations.
By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analysed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.
Keywords
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Footnotes
Associate Professor of Law and Lee Kong Chian Fellow, Singapore Management University School of Law. Ph.D. in political science, Free University of Brussels-VUB; J.D., LL.M., University of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank Professors Bruno Coppiers, Clara Portela, Vjosa Musliu, Florian Trauner, François Finck, Stefaan Smis, Julien Chaisse, and Benjamin Hartman for their insight and comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also acknowledge the valuable assistance of Sicong Chen, Catherine Chang, Javier Han, Joshua Ng, Claudia Tan, and Gladys Yeo. All errors are my own.
References
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2 Ibid.
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38 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), Arts. 1 and 3.
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43 Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), Art. X.
44 J. Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (2012), 13–15; Frowein, supra note 30.
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47 S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (1998), 31; Talmon, supra note 37, at 147.
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49 European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Taiwan and the European Union Hold 2nd Human Rights Consultations’, 14 May 2019, available at eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/62602/taiwan-and-european-union-hold-2nd-human-rights-consultations_en.
50 S. Fischer, The EU’s Non-recognition and Engagement Policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, EU Institute for Security Studies Seminar Reports (2010), 1–3; T. de Waal, Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe’s De Facto States and Breakaway Territories (2018), 15.
51 P. Semneby, Statement by the EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby, OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEL/126/11 (2011), at 5.
52 B. Coppieters, ‘‘‘Statehood”, “De Facto Authorities” and “Occupation”: Contested Concepts and the EU’s Engagement in its European Neighbourhood’, (2018) 17(4) Ethnopolitics 343, at 348. Although commentators have used the Non-recognition and Engagement Policy to refer to the EU’s approach to all unrecognized entities, the policy is arguably different from the ‘engagement without recognition’.
53 Lindemann, supra note 41, at 490; Newman and Visoka, supra note 45, at 773.
54 The five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. The nine EU states that recognize Palestine include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden. J. Solana, ‘The EU must Recognize the Palestinian, Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union’, AALEP, 15 May 2018, available at www.aalep.eu/eu-must-recognize-palestinian-state; V. Xhambazi, ‘A Blueprint Solution for Kosovo: What is at Stake?’, New Eastern Europe, 28 January 2019, available at neweasterneurope.eu/2019/01/28/a-blueprint-solution-for-kosovo-what-is-at-stake%EF%BB%BF/.
55 EU-Kosovo Stabilization and Association Agreement (2015), Arts. 1 and 8.
56 Ibid., Art. 10.
57 EU-Palestine Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation on Trade and Cooperation (1997), Titles I and II.
58 European Commission, ‘The Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Cumulation and the PEM Convention’, available at ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/rules-origin/general-aspects-preferential-origin/arrangements-list/paneuromediterranean-cumulation-pem-convention_en.
59 S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice’, (1993) 63(1) British Year Book of International Law 231, at 256.
60 Crawford, supra note 33, at 149.
61 House of Commons Library, UK Relations with Taiwan, CDP 2017-0190 (2017), 13.
62 王萬里 [W. Wang], 歐盟台灣中國三邊關係剖析 [EU-Taiwan China: An Analysis of the Trilateral Relations] (2008), 193–5.
63 Mengin, supra note 11, at 139; J. Cabestan, ‘The Taiwan Issue in China-Europe Relations: An Irritant More than Leverage’, in D. Shambaugh et al. (eds.), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects (2008), 84, at 85.
64 Mengin, supra note 11, at 139; Cabestan, ibid., at 85.
65 Ibid.
66 J. Cabestan, France’s Taiwan’s Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy (2001), 10; S. Hu, ‘Structural Constraints on the EU’s Role in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations’, (2011) 10(1) European Journal of East Asian Studies 37, at 43.
67 Mengin, supra note 14, at 32–3; C. Tubilewicz, ‘Europe in Taiwan’s Post-Cold War Foreign Relations’, (2007) 18(2) Diplomacy and Statecraft 415, at 434.
68 Mengin, supra note 11, at 151; Cabestan, supra note 63, at 94.
69 P. Lim and S. Winkler, ‘The European Union’s Relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)’, in J. Damn and P. Lim (eds.), European Perspectives on Taiwan (2012), 170, at 172–5.
70 See H. Kapur, China and the European Economic Community: The New Connection (1986), 37 (citing Soames’ statement).
71 See Lim and Winkler, supra note 69, at 175 (referring to the 1975 record of meeting between Soames and Chiao).
72 Mengin, supra note 11, at 140; Lim and Winkler, ibid., at 177.
73 Wang, supra note 62, at 38–50.
74 Y. Lan, ‘The European Parliament and the China-Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach’, (2004) 9(1) European Foreign Affairs Review 115, at 117–131; B. Lang, Taiwanese Lobbying in European Union: ‘Workable Diplomacy’ and its Limitations, EU Diplomacy Papers 08/2015 (2015), at 14–16.
75 P. L. Hsieh, ‘Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization’, (2005) 39(6) Journal of World Trade 1195, at 1196–200.
76 Tang, supra note 4, at 316.
77 Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium, ‘Introduction’, 8 July 2017, available at www.roc-taiwan.org/be_en/post/13.html.
78 EETO in Taiwan, supra note 4.
79 H. Su, ‘The EU’s Taiwan Policy in a New Context’, (2010) 46(1) Issues & Studies 1, at 6.
80 EETO, supra note 1, at 68; Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium: Missions and Countries, 29 July 2019, available at www.roc-taiwan.org/be/post/19.html (in Chinese).
81 For example, the diplomatic status of Taiwan’s missions in Greece, Poland and Spain, see 國史館 [Academia Historia], 中華民國史外交志 (初稿) [Diplomatic History of the Republic of China] (2002), 822; International Law Association, Washington Conference: Recognition/Non-recognition in International Law (2014), at 10–11.
82 EETO in Taiwan, supra note 4; Tang, supra note 4, at 316.
83 Details on entities sui generis, see Crawford, supra note 33, at 124–5.
84 For example, J. Nasr and M. Martin, ‘Merkel Says Germany to Stick to “One China” Policy’, Reuters, 12 December 2016, available at www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-china-germany-idINKBN1411GM; House of Commons Library, supra note 61, at 13.
85 ‘Taïwan – Élections Présidentielle et Législatives [Taiwan – Presidential and Legislative Elections]’, France Diplomatie, 16 January 2016, available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/asie-oceanie/evenements/article/taiwan-elections-presidentielle-et-legislatives-16-01-16.
86 For example, Arrangement between the Justice Authorities of Taiwan and the Authorities of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (2016), Arts. 1, 2, 6, and 14.
87 N. Connor, ‘British Airways Comes Under Attack in China for Listing China and Hong Kong as Countries’, Telegraph, 14 March 2018, available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/14/british-airways-comes-attack-china-listing-taiwan-hong-kong/.
88 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Taiwan: China: Written question – HL9452’, 19 July 2018, available at www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2018-07-11/HL9452/.
89 M. Kajinek, ‘Prague Proposes to Amend Partnership Agreement with Beijing; Rejects “One China” Policy’, Epoch Times, 17 January 2019, available at www.theepochtimes.com/prague-proposes-to-amend-partnership-agreement-with-beijing-rejects-one-china-policy_2769963.html.
90 R. Panizza, The Treaty of Lisbon: Fact Sheets on the European Union (2019), 1.
91 For details see W. Shan and S. Zhang, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way Toward a Common Investment Policy’, (2011) 21(4) European Journal of International Law 1049, at 1058–61; J. Chaisse, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment – How will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime?’, (2012) 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 51, at 57–9.
92 Treaty on European Union (2007), Art. 24(1).
93 Ibid., Arts. 24(2), 24(3).
94 Council of the European Union, The European Union: Facts and Figures (2017), at 5.
95 Ibid., at 6.
96 J. Li et al., ‘China-EU Political Relations’, in Hong Zhou (ed.), China-EU Relations: Reassessing the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2017), 35, at 47–8; European Council and Council of the European Union, ‘The Council of the European Union’, available at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/.
97 European Council and Council of the European Union, ibid.
98 Panizza, supra note 90, at 3.
99 Lan, supra note 74, at 122–6; Lang, supra note 74, at 13.
100 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication From the Commission to the Council: Towards a New Asia Strategy’, COM(94) 314 (1994), footnote 1, at 3.
101 Ibid.
102 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission: Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’, COM(2001) 469 (2001), at 5.
103 Ibid., at 23.
104 China’s EU Policy Paper, 13 October 2003, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ceupp_665916/t27708.shtml.
105 Ibid.
106 Council of the European Union, 2771st Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations, 16291/06 (Presse 353) (2006), at 8.
107 Lim and Winkler, supra note 69, at 184–5; Council of the European Union, Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (2007), at 8.
108 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, 11492/12 (2012), at 17.
109 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a New EU Strategy on China, JOIN(2016) 30, at 5; Council of the European Union, EU Strategy on China – Council Conclusions (18 July 2016), 11252/16, at 3.
110 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Decision of the Taiwanese Leader Regarding the NUC, 66885/1/06 REV 1 (Presse 63) (2006), at 1; Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Cross-Strait Relations, 7328/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 65) (2008), at 1.
111 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Decision of the Taiwanese Leader Regarding the NUC, supra note 110, at 1; Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Cross-Strait Relations, 9954/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 145) (2008), at 1; Speech on Behalf of the High Representative and Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the Latest Developments in the Cross-strait Relations between Mainland China and Taiwan [Mogherini’s Speech], 30 January 2019.
112 Statement by High Representative and Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the Elections in Taiwan, 16 June 2016; Somaliland Election: Statement by International Partners, 21 November 2017.
113 See generally, European Parliament Resolution on Taiwan, B5-0347, 0356, 0372 and 0388/2000 (2000); K. Göncz et al., Question for Written Answer to the Commission, Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of China, Taiwan E-001267-13, OJ C 361 E, European Parliament, 6 February 2013; Lan, supra note 74, at 123–8.
114 劉文彬 [W. Liu], 歐洲議會與中華民國立法院及中共全國人民代表大會關係之比較研究 [‘A Comparative Study between the Relations of the European Parliament with the Legislature and the National People’s Assembly (1975–2000)’], (2005) 34台灣師大歷史學報 [Bulletin of Historical Research, NationalTaiwan Normal University] 137, at 167; M. Yu and W. Yen, ‘European Parliament Taiwan Friendship Group visits Taiwan’, Focus Taiwan, 17 February 2019, available at focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201902170014.aspx.
115 Liu, ibid., at 167; Tubilewicz, supra note 67, at 428.
116 Lang, supra note 74, at 14.
117 Liu, supra note 114, at 169–72.
118 章孝嚴在歐洲議會演說 [Chang Hsiao-yen Spoke at the European Parliament], CTS, 22 May 1997, available at news.cts.com.tw/cts/general/199705/199705220003790.html; Wang, supra note 62, at 58.
119 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 王金平院長率團訪問歐洲議會 [President Wang Jin-pyng Led the Delegation to Visit the European Parliament], 3 July 2002, available at www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=FAEEE2F9798A98FD&sms=6DC19D8F09484C89&s=ABA2441A081F7DB79; 張福昌 [F. Chang], 台歐關係的基石:「歐洲議會友台小組」的建構與功能 [‘The Cornerstone of Relations between Taiwan and the EU – Constructions and Functions of the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group’], (2009) 27(4) 東吳政治學報 [Soochow Journal of Political Science] 55, at 62.
120 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Development of the External Service, COM(2001) 381 (2001), at 9–10; European Commission Establishes European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan, IP/03/347 (2003), at 1.
121 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union Concerning the Adoption of the ‘Anti-Secession Law’ by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 7297/05 REV2 (Presse 62) (2005), at 1; European Parliament Resolution on Taiwan, P6_TA(2006)0228 (2006); Council of the European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Occasion of the Participation of Taiwan as an Observer in the 62nd Session of the World Health Assembly, 9486/09 (Presse 123) (2009), at 1; Lim and Winkler, supra note 69, at 183.
122 Europe-Asia Partnerships: European Parliament Resolution on the Commission Communication on Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (COM(2001)469 – C5-0255/2002 – 2002/2120(COS)), P5_TA(2002)0428 (2002).
123 Ibid.
124 Parliamentary Questions: Answer Given by Mr De Gucht on Behalf of the Commission, E-001267/2013, OJ C 361 E, 11/12/2013.
125 Parliamentary Questions: Answer Given by Mr De Gucht on Behalf of the Commission, E-005503/13, OJ C 40 E, 11/2/2014.
126 Lim and Winkler, supra note 69, at 178.
127 Hsieh, supra note 75, at 1197–8.
128 Lim and Winkler, supra note 69, at 178; C. Wu, ‘Toward an EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Treaty’, in J. Chaisse (ed.), China-European Union Investment Relationships – Towards a New Leadership in Global Investment Governance? (2018), 206, at 209.
129 R. Ash, ‘Economic Relations Between Taiwan and Europe’, (2002) 169 China Quarterly 154, at 164; C. M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship (1999), 165.
130 ‘Taiwan-EU Economic Consultation Meeting Wraps up in Brussels’, Taiwan Today, 10 December 2018, available at taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=146809; M. Okano-Heijmans et al., ‘Cross-Strait Relations and Trade Diplomacy on East Asia: Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic Cooperation’, (2015) Clingendael Report, at 21, 60.
131 F. Laursen, ‘The Politics and Economics of EU-China/Taiwan Relations: A European Perspective’, (2006) Dalhousie EUCE Occasional Paper No. 1, at 7.
132 Okano-Heijmans et al., supra note 130, at 60; Laursen, ibid., at 7.
133 Wang, supra note 62, at 57.
134 World Trade Organization, Parties, Observers and Accessions, available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm.
135 See S. Winkler, ‘A Question of Sovereignty? EU Policies Towards Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations’, (2013) 11(1) Asia Europe Journal 1, at 7 (citing GPA/M/17 (2002)).
136 Ibid., at 8; Modalities of Accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement, GPA/87 (2006), at 1.
137 European Commission, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), 14 July 2017, available at ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/.
138 Panel Report European Communities and its Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, 21 September 2010, WT/DS377/R.
139 T. Lin, ‘Systemic Reflection on the EC-IT Product Case: Establishing an “Understanding” on Maintaining the Product Coverage of the Current Information Technology Agreement in the Face of Technological Change’, (2011) 45(2) Journal of World Trade 401, at 403–14; H. Liu and S. Peng, ‘Managing Trade Conflicts in the ICT Industry: A Case Study of EU-Greater China Area’, (2016) 19(3) Journal of International Economic Law 629, at 641–3.
140 For example, China – Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS509; European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS516.
141 EU-Taiwan Trade Relations: European Parliament Resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan Trade Relations
(2013/2675(RSP)), P7_TA(2013)0412, paras. 2–4.
142 Parliamentary Questions, Answer Given by Mr De Gucht on Behalf of the Commission, E-012889/2013, OJ C 228, 17/07/2014.
143 European Commission, supra note 7, at 31.
144 European Commission, South Korea, 7 May 2019, available at ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/; European Commission, EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, 1 February 2019, available at ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/.
145 European Commission, Negotiations and Agreement, 25 July 2019, available at ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_being-negotiated.
146 Ibid.
147 European Commission, supra note 7, at 31.
148 Ibid., at 36.
149 Remarks by Spokesperson of the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the EU on European Commission’s intention to explore launching negotiations on investment with Taiwan, 16 October 2015, available at www.chinamission.be/eng/fyrjh/t1306697.htm.
150 China’s Policy Paper on the European Union, xinhuanet, 18 December 2018, available at www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/18/c_137681829.htm. China indicated the same position against ‘official’ EU-Taiwan agreements in the 2014 policy paper on the EU.
151 European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2016 on a New Forward-looking and Innovative Future Strategy for Trade and Investment, P8_TA(2016)0299, para. 48.
152 European Parliament Resolution of 30 May 2018 on the Annual Report on the Implementation of the Common Commercial Policy, P8_TA(2018)0230, para. 13.
153 European Parliament Resolution of 12 September 2018 on the State of EU-China Relations, P8_TA(2018)0343, para. 47.
154 See answer given by Malmström on behalf of the European Commission, E-005498/2018, 16 January 2019 (‘To date, the Working Group has met several times, most recently in May 2018, and [t]hese meetings allow to better understand each other’s investment policies and to prepare the technical ground for possible future negotiations.’).
155 Ibid.
156 The investment working group was established in 2017 and held five meetings, including two via video calls, by September 2019. M. Banks, ‘Group of MEPs Throw Weight Behind EU-Taiwan Trade Agreement’, Parliament Magazine, 25 February 2019, available at www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/group-meps-throw-weight-behind-eu-taiwan-trade-agreement; interview with a Taiwanese diplomat in Brussels, 3 September 2019.
157 See P. Kerneis et al., Taiwan and European Union Trade and Economic Relations – the Case for a Deep and Comprehensive Bilateral Investment Agreement’ European Services Forum and Bureau of Foreign Trade (2016), footnote 63, at 44 (citing Malmström’s statement, www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20151015-0900-COMMITTEE-INTA).
158 EETO, supra note 1, at 11.
159 European Commission, supra note 7, at 31; Wu, supra note 128, at 222–3.
160 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Minutes of Meeting, C/M/259, 27 October 1992, 3–4; S. Winkler, ‘Can Trade Make a Sovereign? Taiwan-China-EU Relations in the WTO’, (2008) Asia Europe Journal 467, at 475–6.
161 Hsieh, supra note 75, at 1202–3.
162 EETO, supra note 1, at 11.
163 European Commission: Directorate General for Trade, Client and Supplier Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade (value %) (2018, excluding intra-EU trade), at 1.
164 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, COM(1998) 181, at 1–3; Commission of the European Communities, Commission Paper for Transmission to the Council and the European Parliament, A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations, COM(2003) 533, at 3–5; C. Xin, ‘China-EU Economic and Trade Relations’, in Hong Zhou (ed.) China-EU Relations: Reassessing the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2017), 69, at 70–2.
165 I. Ewert, ‘The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges’, (2016) Egmont Institute Security Policy Brief, No. 68, at 2–3; European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, JOIN(2019) 5, at 6.
166 European Commission, ibid., at 6.
167 European Commission, supra note 109, at 6; China’s Policy Paper on the European Union, supra note 150.
168 European Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2016 on China’s Market Economy Status (2016/2667(RSP)), P8_TA(2016)0223.
169 M. Johnson, ‘Why Would Italy Endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’, Financial Times, 21 March 2019, available at www.ft.com/content/f0af46b0-4b2d-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d; Country Profiles, BELT and ROAD, available at beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/country-profiles.
170 L. Poggetti, ‘One China – One Europe? German Foreign Minister’s Remarks Irk Beijing’, The Diplomat, 9 September 2017, available at thediplomat.com/2017/09/one-china-one-europe-german-foreign-ministers-remarks-irk-beijing/.
171 Ibid.
172 European Commission, supra note 165, at 1–2.
173 J. Hoslag, ‘The Exclusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership’, (2011) 49(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 293, at 308–9; R. Maher, ‘Europe’s Response to China’s Rise: Competing Strategic Visions’, (2017) 15 Asia Europe Journal 133, at 142–3.
174 Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session by Ursula von der Leyen, Candidate for President of the European Commission, 16 July 2019, at 4, available at ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/opening-statement-plenary-session_en_fr_de.pdf.
175 D. DeAeth, ‘President Tsai Promotes EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement’, Taiwan News, 9 August 2018, available at www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3502922; ‘President Tsai Meets Belgian Senate President and Mrs. Brotchi’, Office of the President ROC (Taiwan), 6 May 2019, available at english.president.gov.tw/News/5733.
176 Mogherini’s Speech, supra note 111.
177 Ibid.
178 Banks, supra note 156.
179 EIAS Report, Taiwan’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) into the European Union: Quantitative Research (2018), at 11–12; EETO, supra note 1, at 23-5.
180 EIAS Report, ibid., at 11.
181 EETO, supra note 1, at 5.
182 EIAS Report, Taiwan’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) into the European Union: Qualitative Research (2018), at 10.
183 Banks, supra note 156.
184 S. Jacobsen, ‘Offshore Wind Power Firms See Taiwan as a Battleground to Expand in Asia’, Reuters, 30 April 2018, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-windpower/offshore-wind-power-firms-see-taiwan-as-a-battleground-to-expand-in-asia-idUSKBN1I11IV.
185 Ibid.; E. White and L. Hook, ‘Taiwan Offshore Wind Saga Rattles Global Investors’, Financial Times, 11 February 2019, available at www.ft.com/content/eb64a90a-260e-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf.
186 FTAs/Economic Cooperation Agreements, available at investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/showBusinessPagechtG_Agreement04?lang=cht&search=G_Agreement04&menuNum=92 (in Chinese); List of Countries that Have Signed Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Investments or Free Trade Agreements with Taiwan, available at investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/showBusinessPagechtG_Agreement01?lang=cht&search=G_Agreement01&menuNum=92; H. Ciurtin, ‘A New Era in Cross-Strait Relations? A Post-sovereign Enquiry in Taiwan’s Investment Treaty System’, in J. Chaisse (ed.) China’s International Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Law and Policy (2019), 290, at 298–9.
187 P. L. Hsieh, ‘The Quest for Recognition: Taiwan’s Military and Trade Agreements with Singapore under the One-China policy’, (2019) 19 International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 89, at 106–7.
188 Y. Bernal, ‘Taiwan: FTA with Panama Still in Place Despite Diplomatic Rupture’, Panama Today, 10 May 2018, available at www.panamatoday.com/panama/taiwan-fta-panama-still-place-despite-diplomatic-rupture-6813; N. Renteria, ‘El Salvador Top Court Suspends Scrapping of Taiwan Trade Accord’, Reuters, 14 March 2019, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvador-taiwan/el-salvador-top-court-suspends-scrapping-of-taiwan-trade-accord-idUSKCN1QU340.
189 List of Countries that Have Signed Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Investments or Free Trade Agreements with Taiwan, supra note 186.
190 Taiwan concluded five investment agreements with German authorities. List of ROC Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements, supra note 5.
191 Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion of Bilateral Investment and Cooperation in Training Programs between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Spain and the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Taipei (2010), Art. 2.
192 S. Tiezzi, ‘Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy” Scores Win in the Philippines’, The Diplomat, 9 December 2017, available at thediplomat.com/2017/12/taiwans-new-southbound-policy-scores-win-in-the-philippines/; ‘Taiwan and India Have Signed Two Bilateral Agreements on December 18, 2018 to Further Boost Trade and Investment between the Two Countries’, 18 December 2018, available at www.roc-taiwan.org/inmaa_en/post/5095.html; ‘Taiwan and Vietnam to Sign New Bilateral Investment Deal: Report’, Taiwan News, 18 December 2019, available at www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3839797.
193 Crawford, supra note 34, at 61.
194 Confidentiality Agreement between the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration of Ministry of Health and Welfare and the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines and Healthcare of the Council of Europe (2014).
195 Administrative Arrangement between the Taipei Representative Office in the European Union and Belgium and the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs of the European Commission on Cluster Cooperation (2018).
196 For bilateral and international investment dispute settlement mechanisms involving Asian countries see generally W. Zhu, ‘Some Considerations on the Civil, Commercial and Investment Settlement Claims between China and the Other Belt and Road Countries’, in J. Chaisse and J. Górski (eds.), The Belt and Road Initiative: Law, Economics, and Politics (2018), 607; G. Matteucci, ‘International Commercial Mediation, and Opportunity for the OBOR’, ibid., at 621; M. Dimsey, ‘Central Asian Investment Arbitration and OBOR – Learning from the Current Investment Regime’, ibid., at 709.
197 Fraser, supra note 22, at 101; Wolf, supra note 9, at 106–7; Lindemann, supra note 8, at 210.
198 Member states of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), see icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx. Note that although Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations, it is a party to the Convention.
199 European Commission, Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and Beyond – The Path for Reform, Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration towards an Investment Court (2015); A. Reinisch, ‘The EU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: WTO Litigators Going “Investor-State Arbitration” and Back to a Permanent “Investment Court”’, in M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Year Book of International Economic Law (2017), at 261.
200 See generally Opinion 2/15 of the Court (2017), available at curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190727&doclang=EN; Reinisch, supra note 199, at 251–2; D. Kleimann and G. Kübek, ‘The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment Agreements in the EU: The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15’, (2018) 45(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 13, at 38–42.
201 Bilateral Investment Agreement between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India and the India Taipei Association in Taipei (2018), Art. 28.
202 C. Lo, ‘Surveit v. Taiwan, A Claim Too Ambitious? An Assessment of Taiwan’s First Investment Treaty Case and Its Implications’, (2019) 12(1) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 73, at 75–9.
203 Surfeit Harvest Investment Holding Pte Ltd v. Republic of China (Taiwan), PCA, available at www.italaw.com/cases/5929.
204 ICSID Convention (1965), Art. 54(1).
205 EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (2018), Art. 3.22(2); EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (2019), Art. 3.57(2).
206 European Chamber of Commerce, 2018 Position Papers: Clearing the Hurdles to Economic Progress (2018), at 16–44.
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