1. European Treaty Series, no. 106: Tractatenblad 1980 nr. 129. Tractatenblad 1981 nr. 74 and 234.

2. Chart of signatures and ratifications, Transfront 1989 (2), CAHCT (89) 6 and LR-R-CT (91)9. See for a description of some general aspects of local transfrontier cooperation: V. Freiherr von Malchus, La Coopération des Régions Frontalières en Europe, Doc. CE, As/Coll Front (1972); J. Witmer, Grenznachbarliche Zusammenarbeit, Schweizer Studien zum Intemationalen Recht, Band 19 (1979); Transatlantic Colloquy on Cross-Border Relations: European and North American Perspectives, S. Ercmann (ed.), Schweizer Studien zum Intemationalen Recht, Band 49 (1987); U. Beyerlin, Rechtsprobleme der Lokalen Grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit (1988).

3. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities, General Remarks 8 (1980).As to the (legal) character of the EOC, see U. Beyerlin, Grenzüberschreitende Unterstaatliche Zusammenarbeit: Zum Entwurf eines Europäischen Rahmenübereinkommens über die Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit Zwischen Gebietskörperschaften, 40 ZaöRV 573–595 (1980); E. Decaux, La Convention-cadre Europiéenne sur la Coopération Transfrontalière des Collectivés Locales, RGDIP 580–620 (1984); B. Schlögel, Grenzüberschreitende Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit, Vorausselzungen und Rechtsgrundlagen sowie Beispiele in der Abwasserbeseitigung, Energie-und Wasserversorgung und im Nahverkehr 27–68 (1982).

4. In principle, frontiers are not legal barriers to the conclusion of transfrontier agreements of a private law character between decentralised public authorities. In my view private law transfrontier agreements must be assumed possible unless explicitly prohibited by national law. In principle they can be concluded on the same basis as those between authorities within one state.

5. The amendment of the Constitution of Austria in 1988 enabling the Länder to conclude international agreements could be seen as an implementation of the EOC. See R. Rack, österreichs Länder und das Völkerrecht, 1 Archiv des Völkerrechts 31–44 (1989).

6. In force since April 1, 1991, Tractatenblad 1991 nr. 45. For a discussion of this Convention, see R. Seerden, Samenhang over de Grenzen heen: Grensoverschrijdende Samenwerking IWettelijke Regelingen in het Bijzonder de Gemeentelijke Bevoegdheden, 8 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 498–508 (1989). A treaty on this matter has recently been concluded (May 23, 1991, not yet in force) between the governments of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany and the Länder Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia, Tractatenblad 1991 nr. 102. See also infra sub 5.

7. At its meeting of June 8–10, 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee for Transfrontier Cooperation (CAHCT) of the Council of Europe adopted a questionnaire for submission to member states on the implementation of the EOC. At its meeting of May 17–18, 1989 the Committee agreed that a number of additional questions would be put to the delegations. In December 1989 the present author completed a study based on the replies of the member states: R. Seerden, Study on the Implementation of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities, CAHCT (89) 7 rev./Add. I, II. The study clearly shows that the EOC has hardly been implemented in the states in which it is in force. In the light of the findings of this study an additional protocol to the EOC has been drafted by the Select Committee of Experts on Transfrontier Cooperation in October 1991 (LR-R-CT (91)9). The aim of this protocol is to recognize and guarantee the right of local authorities to transfrontier cooperation and especially the recognition by the states of the legal validity of acts accomplished by (public) transfrontier cooperation bodies.

8. Some authors reject the (overall) applicability of public international law in this respect. See, e.g., P-M. Dupuy, La Coopération Régionale Transfrontalière et le Droit International, AFDI844–852 (1977); R. Lafore, V’Action À étranger des Collectivitées Territoriales, 3 Revue de Droit Public 798–811 (1988). Other authors seem to accept (in some way or other) the applicability of public international law. See, e.g., E.W. Vierdag, De Praktijk van de Zogenoemde ‘Internationale Administratieve Akkoorden’, in Recht en Praktijk in het Verdragenrecht, 99 Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht 36–73 (1989); H. Blix, Treaty Making Power 17–25 (1960); E. Zoller, La Conclusion et la Mise en Oeuvre des Traités dans les états Fédérées et Unitaires, 2 RIDC 737–750 (1990).

9. Transfrontier agreements between decentralised (local) authorities -in French ‘controls transfrontaliers’/ ‘accords infra-étatiques’ -are, in this article, unless otherwise stated, referred to as ‘transfrontier agreements’. They concern agreements (of a public law character) between the organs of decentralised state authorities such as municipalities, provinces, regions and also component parts of federal states, such as the Swiss cantons, the German Länder, etc. (in the frontier areas) of neighbouring states.

10. P. Reuter, Introduction au Droit des Traités, 36 (1985).

11. ‘Administrative agreements’/‘agreements in simplified form’: J. Basdevant, La Conclusion et la Redaction des Traités et des Instruments DiplomatiquesAutres que les Traités, 1926 Receuil des Cours 601 - 641; Ch. Rousseau, Principes Généraux du Droit International Public 306 (1944); Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties 20–21 (1960); H. Blix, supra note 8, at 17–25; Ch. Rousseau, Droit International Public, Tome I, Introduction et Sources 70–73 (1971); L. Wildhaber, Treaty-making Power and Constitution, An International and Comparative Study 106–146 (1971); L. Wildhaber, Executive Agreements, 7 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 81–86 (1984). ‘Accords infra-étatiques’: G. Burdeau, Les Accords Conclus Entre Autorités Administratives ou Organismes Publicde Pays Différents, in Mélanges Offerts À Paul Reuter, ‘Le Droit International: Unité et Diversité’ 103–126 (1981); Y. Lejeune, Le Statut International des Collectivités Federées (À la Lumière de l’Expérience Suisse)44(1984). ‘Contrats transfromaliers’: J-M. Woehrling, Problemes Juridiques de la Coopération Transfrontaliere au Niveau Local ou Regional, OECD, ENV/TFP/1977, at 10.

12. L. Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 141. Ch. Rousseau, supra note 11, at 73, also mentions in this respect the absence of constitutional provisions for treaty-making power to distinguish ‘les accords en forme simplifiée’ from treaties. See also H. Blix, supra note 8, at 17: “the circumstance that so many modem treaties become binding merely by being signed by persons not mentioned in the constitution accordingly may seem puzzling, and has caused doctrinal debate”.

13. See also J. Basdevant, supra note 11, at 624, who regards those agreements as instruments, “dont le caractére diplomatique s’atténue parce qu’ils ne sont plus élaborés par ceux dont la mission normale est de représenter l’Etat au dehors. Ce sont des instruments élaboris et signés par des fonctionnaires techniques. Pour l’éboration d’un tel accord la négotiation va etre confiée À des agents techniques qui fixeront les termes de l’accord, et dresseront et signeront l’instrument. Ce procédé devient de plus en plus fréquent”.

14. E. W. Vierdag, supra note 8, at 42. Vierdag's report is written in Dutch. It is hoped that passages rendered into English in this article reflect Vierdag's original text. See also C.J. NoË, in Verslag van de Algemene Ledenvergadering, 100 Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Imernationaal Recht 11 (1990). NoË, in response to Vierdag, defines international administrative agreements as “international arrangements that ministers, state institutions, departments wish to conclude with foreign ‘counterparts’”.

15. E. W. Vierdag, supra note 8, at 42. Because of this reference to local transfrontier cooperation Vierdag's examination of and findings on this phenomenon form a principal focus of this article.

16. In the author's opinion the difference between the two is not relevant here.

17. See also L. Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 141.

18. So in this respect no attention will be given to national law aspects of that distinction. See, e.g., L. Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 146 and 183.

19. Art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates ‘the sources of international law’. If international administrative agreements are binding under international law, they must fall within one of the four sources mentioned in Art. 38(1). Although in this respect the sources of international treaties and custom overlap, it is logical that administrative agreements will be recognized as a category of international treaties.

20. For the treaty-making power in this respect, see the Arts. 7 and 8 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Local authorities are not mentioned there. See also U. Beyerlin, supra note 2, at 198: “Eine stillschweigende verfassungsrechtliche Kompetenz lokaler Aufgabentrager zur grenznachbarlichen Zusamnienarbeil lässt sich unter Umstdäden durch die Auslegung einer oder mehrerer geschriebener Verfassungsnornienunterber¨cksichtigung ihrer systematischen Stellung unddes Gesamtzusammenhangs, in den sie eingebettet sind, gewinnen”.

21. McNair, supra note 11, at 60.

22. G. Burdeau, supra note 8, at 110 and 113. See also U. Beyerlin, Dezentrale Grenzüberschreitende Zusamnienarbeil als Transnational Rechtsphänomen, 3 Archiv des Völkerrechts 297 (1989). He states: “Rechtlich bemerkenswert erscheint, dass die lokalen grenznachbarlichen Vereinbarungen öffentlichrechtlichen Typs imdeutsch-schweizerischen Raum allesamt nichtauf der Basis eines hierzu ermächtigenden Völkerrechtsverages zwischen den betreffenden Nachbarstaaten zustande gekommen sind”.

23. Ch. Rousseau, supra note 11, at 73. See also infra note 30 and accompanying text. Rudolf holds a more restrictive view. He argues that transfrontier cooperation established by organs not authorised by the constitution is, in general, of a legally non-binding character and has no relevance in international law: W. Rudolf, Bundesstaat und Völkerrecht, 1 Archiv des Völkerrechts 17 (1989).

24. See, e.g., G. Burdeau, supra note 11, at 117. McNair also makes a distinction between agreements concluded on a governmental level and those concluded on a local level. With regard to the first category he states: “It is believed that it is true of an organ or agency of the central Government to say that its agreements bind the State”. He adds the following: “but the precise relation of certain departments to the central Government varies greatly in different States, and every case requires separate consideration upon its facts”; see McNair, supra note 11, at 21.

25. McNair, supra note 11, at 20.

26. See, e.g., W.K. Geek, Die Völkerrechtlichen Wirkungen Verfassungswidriger Verträge 76 (1961): “Verwendet man den Begriff der Ermächtigung in dem hier gebrauchten Sinne -ausdrücklich und stillschweigend, generell und speciell- und bejaht man ausserdem die Möglickeit, dass sich in einerAnzahl von Staaten ein Satz des Verfassungsgewohnheitsrechtes über die originäre Vertragsschlusskompetenz von Ministern herausgebildet hat, so erscheint es durchaus möglich, dass alle Vertragserklärungen von Ministern aufirgendeine Weise verfassungsrechtlich legitimiert sind. Es wäre allerdings auch denkbar, dass sich ein Satz des Völkergewohnheitsrechtes herausgebildet hat, der die Befugnis zur Aufgabe von Vertragserklärungen bestimmten oder alien Ministern unmittelbar und unabhängig von den Vorliegen einer verfassungsrechtlich einwandfreien Kompetenzzuweisung billigt”.

27. The Eastern Greenland Case, 1933 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser. A/B, No. 53). See also BVerfG 22.3.1983 (2BvR 475/78) BVerfGE63, 343, in Deutsche Rechtsprechung in volkerrechtlichen Fragen (1981–1985) (Fomes iuris gentium: Ser. A: Sect.2; T.9), at 27: “Das Völkerrecht schützt insoweitauch weder einen guten glauben an die Vertretungsmacht untergeordneter Behörden. noch kennt es eine Verimming zugunsten ihrer Vertretungsmacht”.

28. This can also be seen in relation to Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See, e.g., L. Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 85.

29. G. Burdeau, supra note 11, at 1 IS.

30. Id. 115. See also Y. Lejeune, supra note 11, at 412, who states: “des types vane's de liaisons de droit public avec des personnes public étrangeres attesient de l’outonomie croissame que les cantons, comme toutes les collectiviés infra-étatiques, se sont reconnue dans les matiéres externes qui constituent le prolongement de lews competences internes” [Emphasis added, RS]. Though it mainly concerns the Swiss practice, this is in my view also applicable to other states. When speaking of ‘le prolongement’ one can think of various legal powers. For instance in the Netherlands several environmental law provisions exist in which decentralised authorities have the obligation/power, when acting on that field, to take into account transfrontier aspects. One can also mention here that compulsory internal cooperation between neighbouring authorities (for instance in the Dutch Town and Country Planning Act) could be extended to external cooperation with neighbouring authorities across the border. This ‘prolongement’ could also follow from more general principles like autonomy. In that respect the European Charter of Local Self-Govemment, European Treaty Series, No. 122, is important. Summarizing the foregoing: There exists a kind of ‘implied powers’ for local authorities to act internationally.

31. Apart from national law provisions also cooperation obligations exist in international and supranational law. In treaties there are obligations for (state-)authorities to cooperate. See, e.g., in the field of country planning: The Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Concerning the Establishment of the Benelux Economic Union, Tractatenblad 1958 nr. 18; The Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Town and Country Planning, Tractatenblad 1976 nr. 75. Also very important in this respect are transfrontier cooperation obligations based on European law. See, e.g., in the field of the environment: The Council Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, Dir. No. 85/337/EEC, O.J. 1985, L 175/40.

32. E. Zoller, supra note 8, at 741–743.

33. See,e.g., Fauchille,Traité de Droit International Public, Tome ler, Troisèeme Partie 296 (1921): “Aufond les éléments essentiels des traités internationaux sont comme pour les contracts entre particuliers: un consentement réciproque réguliérement exprimé, la capacité des contractants, un objet licite et possible an point de vue international”. See also H.H.M. Sondaal, De Nederlandse Verdragspraktijk 22–27 (1986).

34. J.C.E. van den Brandhof, Administratieve Overeenkomsten in net Internationaal Publiekrecht, 40 Nederlands Juristenblad 1281 (1986). NoË's view is, that if the parties intend to create binding force administrative agreements are (must be) treaties and, if not, statements of intention of policy; C.J. NoË, supra note 14, at 14.

35. This is not really explained by Vierdag, supra note 8, at 48: “It seems likely to me that administrative agreements are binding at least as they contain obligatory formulations”.

36. E. W. Vierdag, supra note 8, at 57. But see Rudolfs opinion, supra note 23.

37. E.W. Vierdag, supra note 8, at 57–58.

38. It should be noted that many writers regard the explicit constitutional powers of the component states of certain federal states to conclude treaties in principle as treaty-making capacity. See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, II Y.I.L.C. 1953, 138 ff; H. Mosler, Die Auswärtige Gewalt im Verfassungssystem der Bundesrepubli’k Deutschland, in Völkerrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen, Festschrift Carl Bilfinger 261 (1954); R. Bernhardt, Der Abschluss Völkerrechtlicher Verträge im Bundesstaat 18(1957); L. Wildhaber supra note 12, at 263. See also McNair, supra note 21.

39. According to Y. Lejeune, supra note 11, at 253: “les rapports des Etats fédrées avec l’étranger sont en principe gouvernées par le droit international public. Les relations placies ou situées ≪≪À bas niveau≫≫ [low level relations] échappent toutefois au droit des gens pour étre soumises À un ou plusieurs droits internes; quant aux rapports extra-juridiques, ils échappent À tout droit”.

40. Y. Lejeune, supra note 11, at 44.

41. E. W. Vierdag, supra note 8, at 50–52. See also H. Blix, supra note 11, at 20. But see note 48.

42. “Ces règies [des règies d’imputation des accords internationaux] établies doivent ici Être combinées avec l’unité juridique de l’Etat pour conduire À assimiler en général les accords conclus entre ministres, mÊme non expressément habililés, À des verilables traités internationaiix”, G. Burdeau, supra note 11, at 117.

43. See. e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 435, 446 (1990).

44. See also C.J. NoË, supra note 14, at 11 and 12, who states: “if the ‘competent authorities’ (a collective term for ministers, state institutions etc.) have the intention to create an international arrangement that must be international legally binding for the States, then the conclusion of a treaty is necessary. That treaty can directly be concluded between states or governments. It is however possible that the ‘competent authorities’ through delegation have the power to conclude these treaties or that the government delegates the power for this on an ad hoc basis. On delegation in this respect see also H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, at 885 (1952).

45. S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986 at 87 (1989). See also Harvard Research in International Law on Treaties, Supplement to 29 AJIL 693 (1935): “The law governing validity, binding force, interpretation, application and termination of treaties between states cannot be the municipal law of any of them; it is well settled by the doctrine, practice and jurisprudence that this is international law”.

46. The Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser. A, No. 20).

47. Mann, F.A., The Law Governing State Contracts, in Studies in International Law 180 (1973). With regard to the submission of treaties to municipal law Mann speaks of the ‘commercialisation’ of treaties. He states that this phenomenon has been less fully documented and consequently has received little academic attention in comparison to contracts between states and private persons governed by public international law (at 241–242).Google Scholar

48. See also P-M. Dupuy, supra note 8, at 849.

49. For this reason Beyerlin denies the applicability of public international law to them. U. Beyerlin, supra note 7, at 378 and supra note 22, at 320.

50. G. Burdeau, supra note 11, at 115. For some illustrations, in the field of technical cooperation between the Netherlands and some developing countries, of administrative agreements (‘arrangements’) being (the implementation of) treaties, see Tractatenblad 1991 Nrs. 21, 22, 23, and 24.

51. E.W. Vierdag, in Verslag van de Algemene Ledenvergadering, supra note 14, at 45.

52. S. Godard, Contribution À l’Etude des Aspects Juridiques de la Coopération Transfrontaliére Appliquée À la Protection de l’Environnement, le Cas des Régions Frontalières Franco-espagnols 399 (1987). See also E. Decaux, supra note 3, at 596–597.

53. Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 14. See also Y. Lejeune, supra note 11, at 78, who states: “Certes, il n’est pas douteux que les auteurs de la Convention-cadre européenne n’ont pas entendu conférer un caractère international aux relations transfrontalières mais an contraire les soumettre aux règies étabiles par le(s) droit(s) interne(s)”. See also H.H.M. Sondaal, supra note 33, at 20.

54. At the ratification of the EOC Italy and France stated “that its application shall be subject to the conclusion of inter-state agreements”, Reservations and declarations, Transfront (89) 6, CAHCT (89) 11. It seems to be for this reason that in French practice transfrontier agreements, if based on an inter-state agreement, can be regarded as treaties, see E. Zoller. supra note 8, at 738. For further elaboration on the Benelux-Agreement, see infra sub 5.

55. The national public law character of transfrontier agreements is also illustrated by Jans, in reaction to Vierdag's report. He states that ‘transfrontier’ powers are mostly based in (non-constitutional) legislation, such as planning and environmental law. In some provisions local authorities are explicitly empowered to harmonise acts with authorities across the border. J.H. Jans, in Verslag van de Algemene Ledenvergadering, supra note 14, at 35. See also supra note 30.

56. Lissitzyn points out that administrative agreements between non-sovereign entities in general are legally binding, but that many of them are of a private law nature and therefore contracts governed by internal law; O. Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities Other than Independant States in the Law of Treaties, 125 RCADI 83 (1968). See also L. Di Marzo, Component Units of Federal States and International Agreements 153 (1980).

57. See, e.g., McNair, supra note 11, at 20. On the issue of the legal character of administrative agreements in the state practice of the United Kingdom he points out: “As regards interdepartmental agreements (i.e. agreements concluded directly between the Governments Departments of different states) these agreements are, generally speaking, agreements which concern matters of private law rather than matters of an international legal character” [emphasis added, RS]. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.

58. P-M. Dupuy, supra note 8, at 852, regards transfrontier agreements concluded between local authorities in principle as public law agreements. These (however) he brings under international private law.

59. See supra note 1.

60. See the Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 10–11: “Neighbourhood relations include those situated on a territorial strip extending to a distance from the national frontier which each Contracting Party may determine freely in a declaration at the time of signature or ratification […] the term ‘neighbourhood’ in international law implies a certain proximity, which should make it possible, even in cases where no territorial strip has been designated, to rule out unjustified requests from municipalities or regions not having any ‘neighbourhood’ problems to settle with municipalities or regions on the other side of the frontier”. E.g. Italy, supra note 54, fixed a 25 km-zone.

61. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 14: “The reference to these models in the Convention does not give them treaty force but merely implies an undertaking by States to pay them all due attention”. Especially France was in favour of this, see B. Schlögel, supra note 3, at 47 and E. Decaux, supra note 3, at 559.

62. See supra note 54.

63. Private law cooperation in the author's view, see supra note 4, is possible without the basis of the EOC. One can think of the conclusion of contracts (like the setting up of bodies) dealing with the management of transfrontier nature parks or mutual purification plants. For some examples see Transfront/Office (83) 5, 8 and 13.

64. For other documents than the Annex of the EOC holding model agreements, see e.g., CAHCT (89) 18, addenda I and II concerning ‘Preparation of model agreements on transfrontier nature parks’ and ‘Preparation of model agreements on interregional economic cooperation and spatial planning’.

65. In the explanatory report on the approbation of the EOC by the Dutch Parliament this is also stated, Toelichtende Nota bij de goedkeuring van de Europese kaderovereenkomst inzake grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen territoriale gemeenschappen of autoriteiten, Tweede Kamer, 1981, 16995, nr. 1, at 3. For further elaboration on these models, see E. Decaux, supra note 3, at 597–615 and B. Schlogel, supra note 3, at 57–67.

66. The fact that the EOC deals with private law cooperation (and even factual cooperation) may, in the author's view, well illustrate this. The reservations made at the ratification of the EOC by some states, see supra note 54, illustrate also that an overall (especially public law) decentralised transfrontier cooperation is handled with caution. For example: The Federal Republic of Germany excluded the Länder from the scope of the EOC. See also infra sub 5.2 and 5.3.

67. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Opinion no. 96 (1979) on the draft European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial. Communities or Authorities. Assembly Debate on October 11, 1979 (19th Sitting). Text adopted by the Assembly on October 11, 1979 (19th Sitting).

68. E. Decaux, supra note 3, at 594–595.

69. U. Beyerlin, supra note 3, at 590. In the explanatory report on the approbation of the Benelux-Agreement by the Dutch Parliament it is explicitly stated that the EOC concerns a declaration of intent to make transfrontier cooperation possible, Toelichtende Nota bij de Benelux-Overeenkomst inzake grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen samenwerkingsverbanden of autoriteiten, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1986–1987, 19986, nr. 1, at 1.

70. Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 10.

71. Id., at 11.

72. See also supra note 30 and 55. Other indications, which will not be further explained here, for assuming a legal character to the EOC can be found in: a. the fact that in principle no additional inter-state treaties are necessary and most states did not make provisions for the conclusion of additional inter-state treaties (see supra note 54). b. the fact that local authorities can be excluded from its scope. What is the purpose of this if no rights or obligations can be derived from the EOC? (see supra note 66). c. the fact that “the Convention's entry into force does not per se have the effect of invalidating cooperation agreements already concluded between Contracting Parties”. [Emphasis added, RS] (Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 14). d. the fact that it lasted about 15 years to establish the EOC. Such a period is too long for a declaration of intent!

73. The relation between the twelve articles of the EOC and the Annex to the EOC is considered unusual. See, e.g., Zehetner, F., Das Europäische Rahmenübereinkommen über die Grenzüberschreitende Zusanmenarbeil Zwischen Gebietskörperschaften, 7 Umwelt und Planungsrecht 211 (1983): “Es besteht einerseils aus einer 12 Artikel umfassenden Konvention, dem eigentlichen völkerrechtlichen Vertrag, und anderseits aus einer relativ umfangreichenden Anlage, der -und darin liegt das Ungewöhnliche- kein Vertragskarakter zukommt und die, obwohl ‘Anlage’, nicht Bestandteil des übereinkommens ist.”; See also E. Decaux, supra note 4, at 592–593, who states that in public international law a treaty and annex in principle have the same legal status.Google Scholar

74. See, e.g., F. Zehetner, supra note 73, at 214: “Der bedeutsame Fortsschritt liegt darin, dass die Vertragsstaten die Phase blosser Duldung überwunden haben und sich zur Förderung der grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit der Gebietskörperschaften verpflichtet haben”.

75. In the Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 13, it is stated that states “may conclude inter-State agreements as they deem necessary for the conclusion of agreements or arrangements between territorial communities or authorities in order to stipulate more precisely the framework, forms and limits within which they would like territorial communities to act” [emphasis added, RS].

76. See supra note 6. The Benelux-Agreement is written in Dutch and French. I hope that passages rendered into English in this article reflect the original text as accurately as possible.

77. See supra note 2. The Benelux-Agreement resembles model (1.4. and) 1.5. of the Annex to the EOC. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

78. Gemeenschappelijke Memorie van Toelichling bij de Benelux-Overeenkomst op hel gebied van de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen lerriloriale samemverkingsverbanden of autoiileiten, Benelux. 132e aanv. Basisteksten 1987–3. at 11.

79. For Belgium the Regions (‘Gawesten/Gemeenschappen’) are excluded. For the rest all the decentralised authorities fall within the scope of the Benelux-Agreement. It does not necessarily concern transfrontier cooperation in frontier regions, Gemeenschappelijke Memorie van Toelichting, supra note 78, at 12.

80. At least the Belgium ‘provincies’, ‘polders’ and ‘waterringen’ and the Dutch ‘openbare lichamen in het kader van de Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen’ do not have the power to cooperate autonomously with other authorities within the national context.

81. It is not examined here but this could also be the case in the national law of Luxembourg.

82. Gemeenschappelijke Memorie van Toelichting, supra note 78, at 13.

83. The common organs consistingof other authorities than municipalities have similar powers (Art. 43 Wgr concerning the provinces and Art. 50b Wgr concerning district water boards).

84. Memorie van Toelichting, Gedr. St., Senaat, 1988–1989, 651/1, at 4.

85. In the author's view these administrative agreements must not be mixed up with those mentioned supra sub 2.

86. Gemeenschappelijke Memorie van Toelichting, supra note 78, at 13.

87. Advies van de Raad van State, supra note 84, at 15.

88. Memorie van Toelichting, supra note 83, at 4.

89. See supra note 6. The Agreement, which is not yet in force, is written in Dutch and German. I hope that passages rendered into English in this article reflect the original text as accurately as possible.

90. The Agreement resembles model (1.4 and) 1.5. of the Annex to the EOC. See also supra note 64 and accompanying text.

91. The Läinder are excluded. For the rest the most important decentralised authorities (not all) fall within the scope of the Agreement. It concerns the Dutch municipalities and provinces (and in principle cooperation bodies between them) and the German municipalities (and in principle cooperation bodies between them).

92. On the basis of Art. 3( 1) of the Benelux-Agreement these powers exist.

93. It is strange that a similar provision is lacking for the public body. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.

94. In the author's view it is not impossible that out of these (public law) agreements (indirectly) rights and obligations for third parties can follow.

95. See also Art. 2(3) of the Benelux-Agreement, supra note 82 and accompanying text, with regard to the ‘formal’ powers to cooperate (in those fields where the authorities have substantive competences). No Annex to the Agreement is provided in which the several legal acts of national law are mentioned. It will be analogous to the Benelux-Agreement concerning those legal acts that are applicable to internal cooperation. The Protocol to the Agreement states that the contracting parties (on ministerial level) shall consult each other in cases where one of them finds this necessary with respect to the interpretation of the Agreement.

96. See also supra sub 5.2.1.

97. See for the same possibility: Art. 3(3) of the Benelux-Agreement.

98. In my opinion responsibility of a private law character towards third parties can also follow from Art. 7(4) of the Agreement (dealing with the common organ).

99. G. Burdeau, supra note 11, at 114 states: “il serait certainement présomptueux de prétendre présenter de faÇon sysématique le régime juridique des accords entre organismes publics de pays différents. Trop d’incertitudes règnent en effet sur le véritable nature de ces accords, qui ne pourra Être determinée qu’au Caspar cas, el généralement après un examen critique des éléments de lew contenu”.

100. Y. Lejeune, supra note 11, at 44.