1. Dec. 1,1965: speech British representative Lord Caradon, U.N. GAOR (1386 plen. mtg.).

2. See Klein, R.S. and Faudiol, G.Trouble in paradise: managing an emergency in the Dutch Caribbean (Washington DCGeorgetown University, 1985).Google Scholar

3. It is generally held that after the entering into force of the 1954 Kingdom Charter and, especially, the adoption of U.N.G.A. Res. 945 (X) in 1955 the territory is not ‘non-selfgoverning’ anymore under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, and can therefore be considered decolonized. However, as will be argued later, this does not imply that Dutch duties have ceased. See extensively on this and other questions discussed here related to the Antillean right to self-determination and corresponding Dutch duties; Tillema, A.J.P. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, a study in self-determination (to be published in Oct. 1989 on the Antilles).Google Scholar

4. See Krimpen, C. vanHetAntillen dillema, herwaardering van het dekolonisatieproces,7/8 Socialisme en Democratic (July Aug., 1987).Google Scholar

5. See van Helsdingen, W.H.Het Statuui voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 194 (Staatsdrukkerij Den Haag,1957).Google Scholar

6. See Kuiper, PJ.Kapteyn, P.J.G.A colonial power as champion of self-determination: Netherlands' practice in the periods 1945–1975,3 International Law in the Netherlands 177 (1980). As it would be later in Article 43 of the Charter of the U.N..Google Scholar

7. See van Helsdingen, W.H.supra note 5, at 143,222.Google Scholar

8. To facilitate a possible secession of Surinam at a later date, for in 1954 Surinam felt no desire to become independent.

9. The Netherlands had ceased submitting reports to the Secretary-General in pursuance of Article 73 (e) of the Charter for it considered that after the entering into force of the Constitutional Interim Rules the territories could no longer be considered non-self-goveming in the sense of that article, as reponsible government had been introduced. See Reports of the Ministery of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (MvBZ).no. 41.

10. Own translation. As to point 2), the three options were already discussed in the U.N. when preparing G.A.Res.742 and were indeed inserted in this resolution, which was adopted in November 1953. See also note 74.

11. See van Helsdingen, W.H.supra note 5, at 206: “Ik meen dat deze conceptie ons Koninkrijk nog voor lange tijd, misschien voor immer, bijeen zal kunnen houden”. Therefore, conclusions like “the Charter was considered a step towards the full independence of the two territories in the West”, are, seen in the light of the traveau préparatoires of the Kingdom Charter, unjustified. SeeGoogle ScholarHflfte, R.Oostindie, G. Decolonization upside down: the case of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, (to be published in: Paul Sutton ed., Europe and the Caribbean, London Macmillan 1989).Google Scholar

12. See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 41, at 68. The statement was clearly intended to silence those states in the General Assembly that considered that the only legitimate outcome of the process of self-determination was the emergence as an independent state. This possibility, then, was not outruled for the future. Although the statement was in general terms, it clearly referred to the case of Surinam, as the wording reads “(…) therefore (…) not too difficult” - which was the compromise reached with Surinam - while this kind of wording would not have been used if one also wanted to refer to any Dutch desire for a change.

13. See van Helsdingen, W.H.supra note 5, at 625–626.Google Scholar

14. The General Assembly of the U.N. only reluctantly accepted the decolonization by adoption of Res. 945 (X) in 1955. There were especially doubts as to the achieved measure of self-government.

15. Cited in: Verton, P.Aruba en de dekolonisalie van de Nederlandse Antillen, Dec. 1978 Internationale Spectator. Earlier that year, general strikes in Surinam led to the downfall of the Pengel-Cabinet and both the political stability and internal order were threatened. However, this had not yet proved to be a situation in which, according to the Charter, Dutch intervention might have been necessary.Google Scholar

16. See Höfte and Oostindie, supra note 11, at 2,7.

17. It was even stated by two Dutch parliamentarians that independence, if needed, would eventually be forced upon the territories. If necessary, the date of independence would be sent to the Antilles by mail. See Plataforma 4/3, Sep. 1987 G.A.M., Wehry Nederland en het Caraibische Bekken, De Nederlandse Antillen, Aruba en buitenlands beleid 152, (uitgave Clingendael, 1989).Google Scholar

18. See Kapteyn, PJ.G. De Nederlandse Antillen en de uiloefening van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht, vol. 45 no. 6 Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie voor Wetenschappen, (afd. Letterkunde) 179 (1982).Google Scholar

19. See Höfte and Ostindie, supra note 11, at 3.

20. See van Helsdingen, W.H.supra note 11, at 59.Google Scholar

21. See Wehry, supra note 17, at 144–145.Google Scholar

22. Between 1948 and 1954 both Curaao and Aruba had possessed eight seats in parliament; afterwards Curaao got twelve and Aruba only eight, giving Curaao an automatic majority, very much against Aruban wishes.

23. See Kapteyn, P.J.G.supra note 18, at 184.Google Scholar

24. However, it should be noted that the Netherlands Antilles never outright rejected the Aruban quest for a status aparte; for instance, after a summit of the islands in August 1974, it was confirmed by the representattives of all the islands that Aruba had the right to self-determination, and in 1975 the Antillean parliament reaffirmed this. See Wehry, supra note 17, at 153.Google Scholar

25. I.e., the rule that decolonization has to take place within the traditional colonial boundaries, leaving room for only one people in each colonial unit. However, in the U.N. practice this principle had not been applied that strict in case of the splitting up of (island) colonies materialized before the territory would gain its new status. See also Kapteyn, P.J.G.supra note 18, at 171.Google Scholar

26. Cf. Verton in many articles throughout the years, and Benlhem, G. van van den Bergh eLal., Aruba en de onafhankelijkheid. Institute of Social Studies (1978).Google Scholar

27. This was also stressed in Dutch parliament by an Aruban opposition party in 1985, See Henriquez, 5 June 1985, Behandeling Rijkswet 452, Kamerstukken II 1984/85, 18826 (R1275) Hand. II 1984/85 at 5471.

28. Also called the Committee Biesheuvel, consisting of representatives of the Netherlands, the Antilles and Aruba.

29. Independence is only one of the options open to the people under G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV). Others are association or integration with an independent state and even much broader “any other political status freely determined by the people”. This new fourth option was not yet mentioned in G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), and stressed that it is the freely expressed will of the people that is decisive, and that any restriction in this respect would be out of place.

30. See Hand, . II 1978/1979 at 156–158, cited in:Google ScholarKuyper, P.J.Kapteyn, P.J.G.supra note 6, at 209.Google Scholar

31. See Stenografisch Verslag Conferentie van De Nederlandse Antillen, De eilanden van de Nederlandse Antillen en Nederland, at 159.

32. Issues that should come up in this transition period included inter alia, according to the Netherlands, a restructuring of the constitutional framework (that is: decentralization) and the building up of an economic viability. See Verslag, supra note 31, at 23.

33. See Verslag, supra note 31, at 160.

34. See Verslag, supra note 31, at 23. According to the Minister many questions whould then come up, such as (1) whether the choice was made in a truely democratic way; (2) whether the support for such a choice would be broad and varied enough among the different peoples, the peoples of the Antilles as well as that of the Netherlands; (3) whether one could expect serious international repercussions.

35. See the 1982-Report of the Commission, p. 77–78.

36. In the words of Croes himself, See Discussion in Dutch parliament, supra note 27, at 5339.

37. See Croes; Verslag, supra note 31, at 89: “In het verlengde van de uitoefening van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht en de keuze voor onafhankelijkheid moet er toch een andere uitweg zijn?”

38. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27, at no. 6 and Wehry, supra note 17, at 160.

39. Wijziging van het Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, houdende losmaking van Aruba uit het Staatsverband der Nederlandse Antillen, 18826 (R1275), Staatsblad 1985, at 452.

40. See Kamerstukken n 1984/85, supra note 27, at no. 13, 14 and at 5341,5461.

41. Id..

42. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27,at 54–62.

43. In reply it was pointed out that these were no real alternatives at the time in the light of the Dutch policy and they had therefore, as being not realistic, not been included in the referendum. Croes and Van der Kuyp, Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27, at 5471–5493.

44. See Verslag, supra note 31, at 47.

45. Id..

46. Conclusion no. 9 of the Conference in its wording had already referred to measures regarding the Antilles “as long as they are still within the Kingdom”.

47. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27, at no. 11, p. 3.

48. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27, at 5409–5414,5480–5481.

49. They were present to be correct, as representatives of the Antilles. No representatives of the four smaller islands Seem to have been present.

50. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27 at 5423.

51. See, Nota 4 December 1986, Contactplan 1987, at 100.

52. See Handelsblad, N.R.C. Feb. 2 and 16,1985.Google Scholar

53. See Nota 4 December 1986, supra note 51, at 81.

54. See W. de Kwaadsteniet, NAA., onafhankelijkheid, gemenebest sui generis, address held at 6 April 1988, Willemstad, Curasao; Contactplan 1987, at 81 and Contactplan 1988, at 83.

55. Id..

56. See Wehry, supra note 17, at 164.Google Scholar

57. The Dutch reluctance to grant St. Martin independence prompted Wathey to state that he would involve the U.N. if the Netherlands would not be more forthcoming on the issue of independence. See N.R.C.-Handelsblad, Feb. 21,1989.

58. See N.R.C.-Handelsblad, Feb. 24,1989.

59. The Committee was set up in 1961 under G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI) to supervise the implementation of G.A. Res. 1514 (XV); The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) and two years later equipped with the functions of the former Committee of information on Non-Self- Governing Territories.

60. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SC.22/SR. 119 (1973), at 4.

61. Prime Minister Liberia-Peters of the Antilles has announced in June 1989 that next November an official referendum will be held in which the people of the Antilles will be able to make its desires clear as to the constitutional development of the Antilles, including the possibility of independence. See N.R.C.-Handelsblad,June26,1989.

62. See Koot, W. De Antillen en Aruba op weg naar 1996, Internationale Spectator, Feb. 1989 and Koot, W.Marcha, and Tempel, W. Welke staatkundige structuur wordt gewenst door de bevolking van de Nederlandse Antillen? (Universiteit van de Nederlandse Antillen 1988).Google Scholar

63. See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 73 at 44, 126.

64. The Netherlands actually participated in the work of the Special Committee of Six that did the preparatory work for G.A. Res. 1541, formulating these three options.

65. See Kuyper, PJ. and Kapteyn, P.J.G.supra note 6, at 216.Google Scholar

66. Statement by Lichtveld, See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 77 at 343.

67. Statement by Quarles van Ufford, See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 83 at 343.

68. Statement Piket, See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 100 at 492.

69. Very much related to this, one can possibly also argue that pursuant to the doctrine created by the Eastern Greenland (1933) and Nuclear Test cases (1974) before the World Court, statements like these are to some extent binding on the Netherlands as a matter of international law.

70. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/2 at 11 (1960).

71. That other possibilities than independence were contemplated (independence was not even included in the wording of Art. 73), and that there was even some kind of confidence on the side of the colonial powers that most territories would want to remain with their mother countries, is very well evidenced by the statement of the Netherlands: “(…) the realization of selfgovernment needs no trusteeship, no commissions and no time-tables as long as the intentions of the both parties remain unsullied by greed, or bad faith or tiranny. It may take the form of a continued equal partnership within one commonwealth or that of an independent nation. That is for the inhabitants of the territory to decide. But it will come as inevitably as noon follows the dawn”. Van Mook (May 11,1945), See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 23 at 192.

72. Loudin in Commission II (June 20,1945), See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 23 at 195.

73. See U.N. Doc. A/4526 at 4–5 (1960).

74. This resolution contained in its Annex a list of factors that had to be taken into account when deciding whether a territory was or was not a territory whose people had not yet attained a full measure of self-government.

75. supra note 29.

76. See Antonio Cassese, The Self-determination of Peoples, in Louis Henkin (ed.), The International bill of rights, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 93(1983).

77. Art. 1 reads: “1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. (…) 3. The states Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”.

78. Speekenbrink in Committee III, 14 October 1975, See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 116 at 514 and, the second part, Van Boven in Committee III on 11 October 1976, SeeMvBZ, supra note 9, no. 117 at 447–448.

79. This also becomes clear from the attitude of the socialist states within the Special Committee that did the preparatory work on the Declaration on Principles (Res. 2625). The proposal of these states on the issue provided that: “1. All peoples, large and small, have equal rights, the inalienable right to self-determination and complete freedom (…) 2. Consequently (a) Each people has the right to determine freely their political status, including the right to establish an independent national State (…).” That the proposal reads “including” and not something like “that is”, implicitly confirms that also in the view of these states other options were legitimate. Proposal of 1969, submitted by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/L.74, in: A/7619, op.cit. at 53.

80. See statement of the Chairman quoted earlier.

81. See also for this statement the introduction. U.N. GAOR (1386 plen. mtg.) at 4–5 (Dec. 1, 1965). Similar policies were pursued by the administering powers Austrialia, New Zealand and the USA. See extensively the study mentioned in note 3.

82. That these rights of the people are not exhausted once a territory is decolonized will be further explained in the closing remarks.

83. We are referring here to treaty-law (Art. 73 of the Charter of the U.N. and Art. 1 of the Human Right Covenants), as well as to customary international law - as evidenced by state practice and U.N. practice (especially G.A. resolutions and the work of the committee of Twenty-Four) - , and, obviously, to the inter-relation between these two.

84. The story was mentioned by Van der Jagt in the First Chamber in the 1985-Antilles debate, Hand. I 1984/85 at 1314.

85. Paragraph 3 of this resolution states that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence”. While in 1960 the paragraph was inserted as an argument against an unwilling mother country, now, the Minister argued, it was a valid argument against the Aruban reluctance. See Kamerstukken II 1984/85, supra note 27, no. 11 at 3 and Hand. I 1984/85, supra note 84, at 1295, 1320.

86. See the report of the “Koninkrijks Werkgroep” mentioned earlier.

87. Cf. Aurelia Cristescu in the report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The right to self-determination, historical and current developments on the basis of the United Nations instruments, U.N. New York at 24 (1981).

88. Furthermore, the Netherlands, has not confined itself to this argument: it has re-affirmed the right of the islands of the Antilles to self-determination and has made clear that it understands this right as it has been elaborated upon in the context of the U.N. and the 1966 Human Rights Covenants. Therefore, de iure all the options, modalities, rights and duties as they exist in the strict colonial context, apply. It is also a little bit strange to hear the Dutch government stress time and time again that the 1954 Kingdom Charter has always been considered as an intermediate phase on the Antillean path to independence. This is not true, as noted earlier.

89. See Verslag, supra note 34.

90. Vraagpuntennotitie over de Gemenebest relatie, doc. 20200 T.K., See in Wehry, supra note 17, at 174–175.

91. See MvBZ, supra note 9, no. 41 at 63,95.

92. Some authors have in this respect pointed at the geographical presence of Venezuela to especially Curacao and “a strong feeling amongst Venezuelans that these islands are indeed part of their country's territory, having once been wrested away by the Dutch”. See Verton, Nos Future, wegen naar een toekomst van de Nederlandse Antillen 201 (1986) and also Hoetink, Volkenrechtelijke aspecten van Antilliaanse onafhankelijkheid (H. Meijers ed. 1980).

93. Interesting in this respect is that, once outgoing, Minister of Antillean Affairs De Koning stated in May 1989 that he did not intend to hurry Antillean independence. He observed that the Antilles were now not even prepared to think about independence. Apparently, all of the sudden it was fell that such a reluctance had to be taken into account. Nevertheless, De Koning insisted on Aruban independence in 1996. See N.R.C. Handelsblad, June 26,1989.

94. See note 61.

95. That once made the former Antillean Prime Minister Evertsz stats that: “six minus one, would not be five but zero!”.