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Lois Mémorielles in Post-Genocide Societies: The Rwandan Law on Genocide Ideology under International Human Rights Law Scrutiny

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2014

PIETRO SULLO
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Abstract

This article discusses the Rwandan Law 18/2008 on genocide ideology in the light of international human rights standards. In order to put the genocide ideology law into context, it sketches a brief overview of the post-genocide scenario. Because of the influence that provisions restricting freedom of expression aimed at fighting negationism might exert on testimonies during genocide trials, it pays particular attention to the transitional justice strategies adopted in Rwanda. Finally, it assesses the law on the genocide ideology against the background provided by the measures implemented in some European countries to deal with the phenomenon of negationism.

Keywords

Europefreedom of speechgenocidehuman rightsRwanda
Type
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 419 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2014 

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References

1 See Cajani, L., ‘Diritto Penale e Libertà dello Storico’ and P. Sullo, ‘Cosa Resta di Auschwitz? Il Genocidio Ruandese e il Superamento del Passato attraverso il Diritto’ in Resta, G. and Zeno-Zencovich, V. (eds.), Riparare, Risarcire, Ricordare. Un Dialogo tra Storici e Giuristi (2012)Google Scholar.

2 See Huttenbach, H., ‘From the Editor: Towards a Conceptual Definition of Genocide’, (2002) 4 (2)Journal of Genocide Research 167CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See Cajani, supra note 1, at 371–3.

4 Ibid., at 382.

5 Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are the main ethnic groups in Rwanda, amounting respectively to 84 per cent, 15 per cent and 1 per cent of the population.

6 On the Rwandan genocide, see A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999); Stover, E. and Weinstein, H. M. (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (2005)Google Scholar; M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2002); G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide (1997); P. Sullo, ‘Genocide and Transitional Justice: Gacaca Courts and the Search for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ (PhD thesis, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, 2009).

7 See on this point Melvern, L., ‘The Past is the Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide’ in Clark, P. and Kaufman, Z. D. (eds.), After Genocide. Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (2008)Google Scholar, at 21–31.

8 See Des Forges, supra note 6, at 71.

9 See Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze v. The Prosecutor (Case ICTR-99-52T), Judgment of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda, 3 December 2003; Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze v. The Prosecutor (Case ICTR-99-52-A), Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 28 November 2007. On the Media Case, see also Della Morte, G., ‘De-Mediatising the Media Case: Elements of a Critical Approach’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1019CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See, on this point, Organization of African Unity, Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP), Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (2000), 12:

In short, it is clear that Rwandans have, in some way, regarded themselves as members of either one or the other ethnic group for well over a century now, and when we take into account the massive trauma of the past decade, it seems inconceivable to us that any future lasting peace for this country is possible if it fails to take that reality squarely into account.

On the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi identity, see Waldorf, L., ‘Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice’ (2006) 79 Temple Law Review 1, at 26Google Scholar:

In Rwanda, the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi are complicated, socially constructed ethnic identities: both groups speak the same language, share the same culture, practice the same religion, live together, and often intermarry. Contrary to stereotype, many Hutu and Tutsi cannot be distinguished by physical appearance, which is why the Belgian colonial government, post-independence Hutu regimes, and génocidaires relied so heavily on identity cards. In pre-colonial times, Hutu and Tutsi were somewhat fluid identities based largely on socio-political status and economic activity. The German and Belgian colonialists, however, treated Hutu and Tutsi as fixed, racial identities and viewed the Tutsi as racially superior “Hamites” who supposedly came from Ethiopia. The post-colonial Hutu regimes further instrumentalized ethnic identities.

11 See P. C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts. Between Retribution and Reparation (2011); P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda. Justice without Lawyers (2010); Sullo, P., ‘Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda: Between Traditional Justice and Rule of Law’, in Brems, E.et al. (eds.), Transitional Justice and Rule of Law: Institutional Design and the Changing Normative Structure of Post-Authoritarian Societies (forthcoming, 2014)Google Scholar.

12 The idea to set up gacaca courts, tasking them with the charge of dealing with genocide legacy dates back to 1995 and was discussed within an international forum in Kigali. It was definitively adopted within the Urugwiro meetings at the presidential seat between 1998 and 1999.

13 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, The Chilling Effect of Rwanda's Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism’ (2010), note 70 at 43:

Prosecutions by the Rwandan government for RPA abuses in 1994 which took place in the years immediately following the genocide were labelled “crimes of revenge” or “human rights violations”, not war crimes or crimes against humanity. Approximately 32 soldiers, mainly of low rank, accused of killing or violating the rights of civilians in 1994 were prosecuted, of whom 14 were tried, convicted and received custodial sentences.

See also Amnesty International, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April – August 1994 (AFR 47/16/94) 19 October 1994, and Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality (2008) 90, 103–9.

14 See Waldorf, supra note 10, at 1.

15 Women won 45 out of the 80 available seats in Rwanda's 2008 parliamentary election.

16 Art. 54 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda states:

Political organizations are prohibited from basing themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination. Political organizations must constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda and gender equality and complementarity, whether in the recruitment of members, putting in place organs of leadership and in their operations and activities.

17 See Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda.

18 Report of the UN Secretary-General, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, (2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616, para 8. Transitional justice

comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.

19 On this point, see A. Lollini, Costituzionalismo e Giustizia di Transizione, Il Ruolo Costituente della Commissione Sudafricana Verità e Riconciliazione (2005).

20 This paragraph is based on the work of L. Pech, The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe: Towards a (Qualified) EU-wide Criminal Prohibition (2009), available at <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org> (last visited 25 September 2012), and of G. Resta and V. Zeno-Zencovich (eds.), Riparare, Risarcire, Ricordare. Un dialogo tra storici e giuristi (2012).

21 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia (2001), at 269.

22 See Cajani, supra note 1, at 373–91, and Pech, supra note 20, at 3.

23 See Pech, supra note 20, at 6:

The report (of the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights) refers to Finland, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Greece, Malta, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom as examples of countries where “revisionist ideologies” could be punished under general criminal provisions dealing with the maintenance of public peace or those dealing with statements and behaviours motivated by racist intent. For instance, in the United Kingdom, denying the Holocaust, while not an offence under British law, might nonetheless be prosecuted if – and only if – it is done in a manner that also constitutes incitement to racial hatred as defined under British law, while in the Netherlands, the Supreme Court has authorized the sanction of Holocaust denial when it amounts to insult or defamation of Jews.

24 Ibid., at 7.

25 Ibid., at 9.

26 See on this point Art. 20(4) of the German Grundgesetz: ‘Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deutschen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist’. (‘All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available’.).

27 See, on this point, BVerfGE 5, 85.

28 German Criminal Code, s.130:

Whoever, in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace: 1. incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 2. assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming segments of the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years.

29 German Criminal Code, s.185: ‘Insult shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine and, if the insult is committed by means of violence, with imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine’.

30 German Criminal Code, s.186:

Whoever asserts or disseminates a fact in relation to another, which is capable of maligning him or disparaging him in the public opinion, shall, if this fact is not demonstrably true, be punished with imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine and, if the act was committed publicly or through the dissemination of writings (section 11 subsection (3)), with imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine.

31 German Criminal Code, s.189: ‘Whoever disparages the memory of a deceased person shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine’

32 See Pech, supra note 20, at 10–11:

One can, however, easily deduce from the case law that German courts operate on the presumption that any utterance denying or downplaying Nazi crimes invariably poses, in itself, a threat to public peace. In dramatic contrast with the American standard of “clear and present danger”, the mere existence of a potential and abstract threat is sufficient. As for the position adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court on the question of whether the criminalization of Holocaust denial is compatible with freedom of expression, one may also describe it as quite “absolutist”.

33 Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198, at 208.

34 See Pech, supra note 20, at 15.

35 See Act No. 2001-70 of 29 January 2001.

36 See Act No. 2001-434 of 21 May 2001.

37 See Act No. 72-546, 1 July 1972.

38 Law 90-615, 13 July 1990.

39 According to Art. 6 of its Charter, the International Military Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes against peace (aggression), crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

40 See Pech, supra note 20, at 17. The doctrine concerning the First Amendment to the US Constitution distinguishes between content-based and content-neutral limitations upon the freedom of speech.

41 M. Rebérioux, ‘Contre la Loi Gayssot’, in Le Monde, 21 May 1996. On opposition against the Loi Gayssot, see also Vidal-Naquet, P., ‘Qui sont les Assassins de la Mémoire?’, in Vidal-Naquet, P. (ed.), Assassins de la Mémoire. ‘Un Eichmann de Papier’ et autres Essais sur le Révisionnisme édition revue et augmentée, postface de G. Sapiro (2005),Google Scholar 206.

42 See Pech, supra note 20, at 18–19.

43 Art. 10 of the ECHR affirms that:

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

44 The legal reasoning justifying the Loi Gayssot is challenged by some scholars. See for instance Pech, supra note 20, at 19–21:

To put it differently, the Holocaust, being an incomparable event from so many points of view, it may at least be reasonably argued that a legal regime d’exception is justified even though this regime cannot be easily reconciled with what it is normally constitutionally permissible. Rather than the harm suffered by descendants of Nazis crimes’ victims, which may be relatively diffuse and indirect when Holocaust deniers do not specifically target them, or the potential dangers mentioned by public authorities, it is the quasi-unanimous public abhorrence for these horrendous crimes that fundamentally explains legislative action and why any attempt to deny or downplay the Nazi crimes continues to be viewed as morally intolerable. This also appears to explain why most recent legislative initiatives, aimed at punishing the denial of “other” genocides, have been met with fierce resistance.

45 See Art. 3 of LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés (Act No. 2005-158, France, February 2005).

46 See Cajani, supra note 1, at 393.

47 Assembly, Constitution of 4 October 1958, Twelfth Legislature, Proposed Law concerning Recognition of the Vendée Genocide of 1793–94 (No. 387, registered at the Presidency of the National Assembly on 21 February 2007).

48 See BOE - Law 52/2007 of 26 December, which recognizes and extends rights to, and establishes measures for, those who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and dictatorship.

49 See Organic Law 10/1995 of 23 November, of the Penal Code.

50 See Art. 20(1) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978:

The following rights are recognized and protected: 1) the right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction. 2) the right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation. 3) the right to academic freedom. 4) the right to freely communicate or receive truthful information by any means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to the clause of conscience and professional secrecy in the exercise of these freedoms.

51 See Pech, supra note 20, at 23.

52 See Tribunal Constitucional de España, STC 235/2007:

By historical reasons, our constitutional ordering lies on the widest guarantee of fundamental rights, which may no be limited on the grounds that they are used to further unconstitutional goals. As it is known, in our system – not so in other systems of our legal environment –, there is no room for a model of “militant democracy”, that is to say, a model in which not only respect but loyal adherence to law and, above all, to the Constitution is ordered . . .. This notion, doubtlessly, comes into sight with remarkable intensity in the constitutional regulation of free thought, free participation in public affairs, free expression and free information . . ., because it entails the urgent need of setting clear boundaries between behaviors that do not merit protection and the very dissemination of ideas and ideologies.

53 See the Act of 18 December 1998 concerning the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, Art. 55.

54 See Law of 25 October 2000 amending Act No. 140/1961 Coll., Criminal Code, as amended.

55 See Law amending and supplementing Art. 95 of the Criminal Code, inserting Art. 170(2) in and supplementing Annex to the Code. Official Gazette. 2010, Nos. 75–3792.

56 See Cajani, supra, note 1, at 377–8.

57 See case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom (Application No. 5493/72) 7 December 1976, Series A No. 24, para. 49.

58 See Pech, supra, note 20, at 35–6.

59 Ibid., at 27.

60 Art. 17 of the ECHR states:

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.

61 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, Official Journal of the European Union, L 328/55 (6 December 2008).

62 See Cajani, supra note 1 at 386–7.

63 See Art. 1(c) and (d).

64 See Pech, supra note 20 at 44–5:

These provisions have raised a certain number of concerns. Firstly, the notions of “public condoning”, “denial” and of “gross trivialization” are not defined. The last one, in particular, is especially vague. French courts, for instance, decided to liberally interpret the Gayssot Act to punish the gross minimizing of Nazi crimes but formally required the demonstration that those engaged in such conduct acted in bad faith. No such requirement is explicitly mentioned in the EU FD. Secondly, the EU FD is both more open-ended and broader than the 2003 Council of Europe's Additional Protocol on cybercrime. Indeed, Article 1(1)(c) of the EU FD remains silent as to whom can establish the factual existence of a genocide contrary to what Article 6 of the Additional Protocol does. In addition, there is no temporal limitation so it cannot be entirely excluded that countries may decide to describe as genocides historical events, such as the Armenian genocide, which took place before the concept of genocide was formalized. The EU FD might also be interpreted as obliging countries, where the legislator has “merely” recognized the existence of a particular genocide, to logically introduce criminal provisions in order to punish the act of publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing this genocide.

65 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), at 139–45.

66 See Cajani, supra note 1, at 408.

67 Ibid., at 405–10.

68 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 13, at 11.

69 Waldorf, L., Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers, 11 (1)Journal of Genocide Research 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 102.

70 Ibid.

71 See Art. 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003:

Freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the State. Freedom of speech and freedom of information shall not prejudice public order and good morals, the right of every citizen to honour, good reputation and the privacy of personal and family life. It is also guaranteed so long as it does not prejudice the protection of the youth and minors. The conditions for exercising such freedoms are determined by law. There is hereby established an independent institution known as the “High Council of the Press”. The law shall determine its functions, organization and operation.

72 See Waldorf, supra note 69, at 108. The Commission held that ‘government must prosecute and take measures against persons who continue to stir up . . . the ideology of MDR PARMEHUTU which is based on discrimination and division, particularly those leaders of MDR who head these actions’. See also Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 13, at 11.

73 HRW has reported that ‘when asked to define “divisionism”, not one judge interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers was able to do so, despite each having adjudicated and convicted defendants on divisionism charges’. See on this point Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality. Progress in Judicial Reforms in Rwanda (2008), at 34.

74 ASF, La Pratique Judiciaire du Contentieux de l’Idéologie du Génocide et Infractions Connexes: Limites et Défis d’Application 2007–2010 (2011).

75 Ibid., at 79 and 83.

76 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Justice, 9th and 10th periodic report of the Republic of Rwanda under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, July 2005–July 2009 (July 2009), at 22.

77 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Ninety-Fifth Session CCPR/C/RWA/CO/3 (New York, 31 March 2009).

78 ASF, supra note 74, at 51.

79 Ibid., at 78. My translation: ‘These words demonstrate that the accused does not attach any importance to the genocide of the Tutsi committed in Rwanda in 1994; the only genocide committed in Rwanda was against the Tutsi, no genocide was committed against the Hutu or the Twa. The accused has downplayed the genocide against the Tutsi affirming that other genocides had been committed.’

80 Law No. 18/2008 of 23/07/2008 Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology.

81 See Waldorf, supra note 69, at 109.

82 Republic of Rwanda, Joint Government Assessment, Draft Final, (23 July 2008), at 73, 79.

83 Art. 19 of ICCPR states that:

1)Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2)Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3)The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a)For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b)For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

84 See Art. 19, Comment on the Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology of Rwanda, (September 2009), at 9.

85 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 on Article 19 of the ICCPR, 12 September 2011, para 2.

86 Ibid., at para 4.

87 Ibid., at para 6.

88 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 11 on Article 20 of the ICCPR, 29 July 1983, para 2.

89 General Comment No. 34, 12 September 2011, para 50.

90 Ibid., at para 51.

91 See Art. 19, supra note 84, at 11:

Article 7 provides that any association, political organisation or non-profit making organisation convicted of the ideology of genocide shall be punished through its dissolution or a fine of 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 Rwandan francs (approximately €6,145 to €12,290) without prejudice to individual liability of any participant in the commission of the crime. Many such associations and organisations, including non-governmental organisations in Rwanda, would be bankrupted if they were levied such a fine for overstepping the low threshold for “genocide ideology”.

92 See Art. 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, which entered into force 2 September 1990, and entered into force in Rwanda on 23 February 1991.

93 See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules), A/RES/40/33, 29 November 1985.

94 See P. Sullo, ‘When Hurbinek Survives. Transitional Justice and Children's Rights: Lessons Learnt from Rwanda’, in I. Derluyn et al. (eds.), Remember: Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconciliation of War-Affected Children (2012), at 127–51.

95 Art. 19, supra note 84, at 12.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 For Rwandan government statistics on genocide ideology in 2009 on file with Amnesty International, see Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, supra note 13, at 19:

When Amnesty International requested statistics which disaggregate convictions, acquittals and sentences for “genocide ideology” or “divisionism” and which demonstrate which courts these cases had been tried in, the National Public Prosecution Authority said they did not hold such records . . . Of 749 cases of “genocide revisionism and other related crimes” which were brought before Rwandan courts in 2009, 260 resulted in acquittals. It is not clear, however, from the statistics what constitutes a crime related to “genocide revisionism” and how many of these were prosecuted under the 2008 law on “genocide ideology”.

99 Art. 19, supra note 84, at 4.

100 See National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Manuel pour les Camps de Solidarité et autres Formations, (October 2006), at 81, 83, 154, and 162. See also T. Davis, Rwanda: Ingando Camps a ‘Government tool for social engineering’, NGO News Africa, available at <http://ngonewsafrica.org/archives/9805> (last accessed on 5 April 2013).

101 See Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality, Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda (2008), at 36.

102 Ibid., at 38.

103 National Assembly, Rapport d’Analyse sur le Problème d’Idéologie du Genocide Evoquée au sein des établissements Scolaires, December 2007.

104 Report of the ad hoc Parliamentary Commission created on 20 January 2004 by the Parliament, the Chamber, in charge of examining the killings perpetrated in the province of Gikongoro, the genocidal ideology and those who propagate it throughout Rwanda, Rwandan Senate, Republic of Rwanda, Genocide Ideology and Strategies for its Eradication (2006), at 161.

105 National Assembly, 2007 Rapport d’Analyse, supra note 103, at 40.

106 See, on this point, Court of Higher Instance, Huye, No. RP 0015/07/TGI/HYE RPGR 40832/S2/06/MR/KJ, Prosecutor v. Célestin Sindikubwabo, 24 April 2007.

107 Amnesty International, supra, note 14, at 21–2.

108 See Waldorf, supra note 64, at 112.

109 ICTR, Kanyarukiga Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 bis, para. 26, 30 October 2008.

110 See Vincent Brown aka Vincent Bajinja (et al.) v. Government of Rwanda and the Secretary of State for Home Department [2009] EWHC 770, 8 April 2009, para. 62.

111 Organic Law modifying and complementing the Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 concerning the transfer of cases to the Republic of Rwanda from The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Other States, Official Gazette, 26 May 2009, Art. 2 – Guarantee of rights of an accused person.

112 See G. Della Morte, ‘Contro il Reato di Negazionismo. O, Almeno, Contro Questo Reato’, Huffington Post, available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.it/gabriele-della-morte/contro-il-reato-di-negazi_b_2092908.html?utm_hp_ref=italy> (last accessed on 12 November 2012).

113 Ibid.

114 G. Santayana, Life of Reason (1905), at 284.

115 Todorov, T., ‘Memory as Remedy for Evil’, (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 447CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 448.

116 See Waldorf, supra note 69, at 104:

Since 2008, however, the government has reemphasized ethnicity in describing the 1994 genocide. A constitutional amendment added new ethnicized language to that portion of the preamble that stresses reconciliation: “Emphasizing the necessity to strengthen and promote national unity and reconciliation which were seriously shaken by the 1994 Tutsi genocide and its consequences” (original emphasis). References to the genocide throughout the 2003 Constitution were modified in a similar fashion.

117 See ‘Rwanda: Government Seeks to Amend Genocide Ideology Law’ (2012), available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201211030056.html> (last accessed on 1 April 2013).