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The Lack of Uniformity in the Terminology of the International Law of Remedies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 July 2009
Abstract
The terminology regarding remedies in the field of international responsibility is far from uniform, either in literature, as well as in case law, diplomatic practice etc.. This state of affairs is bound to have its impact on the codification of state responsibility by the International Law Commission. Was this ‘terminology-problem’ tackled by the International Law Commission and its Special Rapporteurs?
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References
1. Christine Gray has produced the article Is there an International Law of Remedies?, 56 B.Y.B.I.L. (1985), and the book Judicial Remedies in International Law (1987), in which she concludes that the position of remedies in international law is far from clear.
2. Aréchaga, J. de, International Responsibility, in M. Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law 564 (1968); see also I. Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations. State Responsibility (Part 1) 199 (1983).Google Scholar
3. Graefrath, R., Responsibility and Damages Caused 185 RCADI73 (1984).Google Scholar
4. Riedel, E., Damages, in R. Bemhaidt (ed.), 10 EPIL 68 (1987).Google Scholar
5. Id..
6. B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 34; see also Tanzi, A., Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful Act?, in M. Spinedi, B. Simma (eds.), 1–33 UN Codification on State Responsibility (1987); see also Art 3 Part 1 Ago-draft, which does not indicate damage as a constituent element of an internationally wrongful act, because it does not view damage as an element distinct from the breach of an international obligation [emphasis added, SH]; see also I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 199: “‘injury’ is a breach of a legal duty”.Google Scholar
7. Wolfrum, R., Reparationfor Internationally Wrongful Acts, in R. Berhardt (ed.), 10 EPIL 352–353 (1987).Google Scholar
8. (Spain v. United Kingdom) 1923 2 U.N.R.I.A.A., 641.
9. B. Bollecker-Stem, Le Préjudice dans La Théorie de La Responsabilité Internationale 10 (1973).
10. In Sohn & Baxter (eds.), 55 AJIL 580 (1961).
11. Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Sen A, No. 17, 29).
12. Id., at 47.
13. Supra note 2, at 565.
14. Supra note 3, at 46.
15. 1949 I.C.J. Rep., 184.
16. B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals 233 (1953).
17. H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pads, II, 17, xxii, as cited by the German-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission in the Lusitania Cases, see B. Cheng, supra note 16, at 234, n.3 (1953).
18. I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 199; B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 69.
19. I. Brownlie, id..
20. B. Bollecker-Stem, supra note 9, at 15; see also J. de Aréchaga, supra note 2, at 571, stating that this concept is incompatible with the basic idea underlying the duty of reparation.
21. Supra note 3, at 69.
22. E. Riedel, Satisfaction, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 10 EPIL 383 (1987); R. Wolfrum, supra note 7, at 353; C. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law 41 (1987).
23. (United States v. Iran) 19801.C.J. Rep. 3, Para. 90 and Para. 95, Subpara. 5 respectively.
24. In particular Subparas. I to 4.
25. Gray, C., Is there an International Law of Remedies?, 56 B. Y.B.I.L. 37 (1985); B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 46.Google Scholar
26. Thomsen, S.D., Restitution, in R. Bemhardt (ed.), 10 EPIL 375–376 (1987).Google Scholar
27. Id., at 376.
28. Tenékidés, Professor, Responsabilité Internationale, in 2 Encyclopédie Juridique Dalloz (1969)Google Scholar, 790, as cited by I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 218; C. Gray, supra note 22, at 12; H. Stoll, Consequences of Liability, in XI IECompL, (Torts) (1983), S. 9.
29. B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 77; J. de Aréchaga, supra note 2, at 565.
30. In English municipal law the expression ‘restitution in integrum’ is used to indicate the measure of damages to which the victim is entitled. Restitution in kind is largely unknown to the common law which adheres to the rule of Roman law omnis condemnatio estpecuniaria and calls it restitutio in integrum, which it is not. It was in this sense employed by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Private law Sources and Analogies 147 (1929): Mann, F.A., The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National Law, 48 B.Y.B.I.L., 2–3 (1976–1977).Google Scholar
31. H. Stoll, supra note 28, S. 9.
32. C. Gray, supra note 22, at 13; Personnaz, J., La Réparation du Préjudice en Droit International Public 74 (1938); Garcia Amador, II Y.B.I.L.C. 17 (1961).Google Scholar
33. (Italy v. Venezuela) 1930 2 U.N.R.I.A.A., 977, at 1002.
34. J. de Aréchaga, supra note 2, at 566; M.B. Alvarez de Eulate, La “Restitutio in Intergrum” en la Práctica y en la Jurisprudencia Internacionales, 29–32 Temis: Revista de Ciencia y Técnica JurÍdica (1971–72), at 31, as cited by I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 220.
35. 53 ILR 1973, at 297, Para. 85.
36. F.A. Mann, supra note 30, at 13; see also C. Gray, supra note 22, at 12–17.
37. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 210.
38. S.D. Thomsen, supra note 26, at 376.
39. (Cambodia v. Thailand) 19621.C J. Rep. 6, at 36–37. An arbitral award in which material restitution was ordered is one of the Cases concerning the rights of Britains in Spanish Morocco, (Spain v. United Kingdom) 1923 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 615, at 722.
40. E. Riedel, supra note 4, at 69.
41. B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 20; similarly I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 199 “[…] loss, damnum, whether this is a financial quantification of physical injury or damage, or of other consequences of a breach or injury”; Wolf, J., Gibt es im Völkerrecht einen einheitlichen Schadensbegriff?, 49/3 ZA6RV 415 (1989); C. Gray, supra note 22, at 19–28.Google Scholar
42. 7 U.N.R.I.A.A., 1923, 32 at 35.
43. Id., at 40.
44. C. Gray, supra note 22, at 41. According to Zemanek, “[w]ith the exception of cases of diplomatic protection, international law does not provide for the material compensation of immaterial damage”: Responsibility of States: General Principles, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 10 EPIL 369 (1987).
45. B. Graefrath, supra note 3, at 69.
46. I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 208; see also H. Stoll, supra note 28, S. 8; C. Gray, supra note 22, at 42.
47. I. Brownlie, id., at 208.
48. Notably B. Bollecker-Stern, supra note 9, particularly 185–223.
49. Id., at 191–194; G. Salvioli, La Responsabilité des Elats et La Fixation des Dommages et IntérÊts par Les Tribunaux Internationaux, 28 RCADI251 (1929) says that the two conditions mostly go together, see also B. Cheng, supra note 16, at 241–253: causality is presumed whenever the author of the unlawful act could have foreseen the damage that his act would cause, or whenever the normal and natural course of events would indicate that the injury is a logical consequence of the act
50. (United Kingdom v. Albania) 19491.C.J. Rep. (Assessment of Compensation), 244 at 249–50: for both the damage to the two British warships and for the damage arising out of the death and injuries of personnel of the armed forces compensation was awarded.
51. (Canada v. United States) 1935 3 U.N.R.I.A.A., 1609: “[the United States] ought formally to acknowledge its illegality, and to apologize [satisfaction…] and further, that as a material amend in respect of the wrong the United States should pay the sum of $25,000 [compensation]”; E. Riedel, Damages, supra note 4, at 69, but see Brownlie, who states that the $25,000 award was not an instance of compensation, supra note 2, at 208. Curiously enough, Riedel writes in another article (supra note 22, at 383) that the tribunal in this case rejected claims for damages.
52. H. Stoll, supra note 28, s.10.
53. Id..
54. E.g. A. Tanzi, supra note 6, at 9: “[F]orms of reparation for [injuries of a non-material character] fall within the sphere of satisfaction”; E. Riedel, supra note 22, at 383; see also K. Strupp, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht. Das völkerrechtliche Delikt 213 (1920): “[r]echtlich als Genugtuung aufzufassen, begegnen tins [Schadenersatzansprüchen für immaterielle Schaden] […], wo Staaten sich in ihrer Ehre verletztfühlen, während sie in der Regeldort erhoben werden, wo immaterielle Güter der Staatsangehörigen völkerrechtswidrig betroffen sind”.
55. Supra note 3, at 86.
56. Supra note 50, at 36.
57. (France v. Italy) 1913 11 U.N.R.I.A.A., at 460, respectively at 475.
58. This view was again confirmed in the Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France) 19741.C.J. Rep. 253, Para. 18: “[t]he declaration, if obtained, would characterize those tests as a violation of Australia's rights under international law […]. Such a declaration is a form of * satisfaction’ which the Applicant might have legitimately demanded when it presented its final submissions in the present proceedings, independently of any claim to compensation”.
59. I. Brownlie, supra note 2, at 209.
60. C. Gray, supra note 22, at 41.
61. Bissonnette, P.A., La Satisfaction comme mode de réparation en droit international, Part II Chs. 1 and 2 (1952).Google Scholar
62. K. Strupp, supra note 54, at 216.
63. Supra note 2, at 572.
64. Special Rapporteur GarcÍa Amador understood this kind of State responsibility as a civil law-like responsibility (the idea of reparation proper), which he intended to supplement by criminal responsibility (the idea of punishment): II Y.B.I.L.C. 182–183 (1956).
65. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 & Add. 1 (Responsibility of the State for injuries caused in its territory to the person or property of aliens - reparation of the injury), II Y.B.I.L.C. 7 (1961).
66. Initiated through U.N. G.A. Resolution 1505(XV), with Judge Ago as Special Rapporteur. The ILC created a sub-committee on State Responsibility on May 7, 1962. Ago prepared a programme of work: II Y.B.I.L.C. 227–228 (1963).
67. See II (2) Y.B.I.L.C. 75 (1978).
68. Explanation by Ago in II Y.B.I.L.C. 179 (1970) and II Y.B.I.L.C. 169 (1973).
69. The general structure of the draft has been described at length in the Commission's report of its twentyseventh session, II Y.B.I.L.C. 55–59 (1975).
70. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330 (Preliminary Report) II (2) Y.B.I.L.C., 107–129 (1980); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/344 (Second Report) II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 79–101 (1981); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/354 & Add.1–2 (Third Report) II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 22–50 (1982); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 & Add. 1, Com 1 (Fourth Report) 11(1) Y.B.I.L.C. 3–24 (1983); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380 & Corr.l (Fifth Report) II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 1–4 (1984); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/389 (Sixth Report) II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 3–20 (1985); U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/397 & Add. 1 (Seventh Report) II (1) 1 ff. (1986).
71. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330, II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 112, Para. 29 (1980).
72. Id., at 113, Paras. 30 and 31.
73. I Y.B.I.L.C. 206–207 (1981).
74. II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. at 89, Para. 85 (1981).
75. Draft Article 6 proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his Fifth Report (1984), II (1) Y.B.I.L.C. 3–4 (1984): a. The injured State may require the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act to: (1) discontinue the act, to release and return the persons and objects held through such act; and (2) apply such remedies as are provided for in its internal law; and (3) subject to Article 7, re-establish the situation as it existed before the act; and (4) provide appropriate guarantees against repetition of the act 2. To the extent that it is materially impossible to act in conformity with Paragraph l(c), the injured state may request the state which has committed the internationally wrongful act to pay to it a sum of money corresponding to the value which a re-establishment of the situation as it existed before the breach, would bear.
76. E.g. Ushakov, who believes that the Special Rapporteur construes the concept of restitutio in integrum in an indefensible general sense, valid for all forms of state responsibility. In his opinion, this measure is only possible in the area of material responsibility and, more particularly, in the case of damage to property or things: I Y.B.I.L.C. 209 (1981).
77. Vallat, I Y.B.I.L.C. 87 (1980).
78. I Y.B.I.L.C.209 (1981).
79. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-First Session, in United Nations (ed.), General Assembly, Official Records: Forty-Fourth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/44/10) at 190 (1989).
80. Preliminary Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/416 & Corr. 1 and 2, Para. 4 (1988).
81. Id., Para. 21.
82. II(1) Y.B.I.L.C. 101(1981).
83. Supra note 80, Paras. 22 and 31.
84. Id., Paras. 39 and 40.
85. Id., Paras. 48 and 49.
86. Id., Para. 52.
87. Id., Para. 82.
88. Second Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/425 & Corr. 1.
89. Id., Para. 20.
90. Id., Para. 24; cf. the criticisms of some Commission-members on Riphagen’ Articles 6 and 7.
91. Report of the International Law Commission, in United Nations (ed.), General Assembly Official Records: Forty-Fifth Session Supplement No. 10 (A/45/10) at 192 (1990).
92. Supra note 88, Para. 52 and 53.
93. Id., Para. 13.
94. Id., Para. 13–15.
95. Id., Para. 135.
96. Supra note 91, at 217.
97. Id.: it was generally agreed in the ILC-discussions that these are a form of satisfaction.
98. Supra note 91, Para. 138.
99. Ibid., Para. 145.
100. The text can be found in: supra note 80, at 33–34, and supra note 88 at 24–25.
101. Supra note 79, at 205, and supra note 91, at 194.
102. Supra note 91, at 195 and 218.
103. See supra note 79, at 209 and 215, and supra note 91, at 192.
104. Supra note 91, at 185.
105. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 & Add.l (1990).
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