1 The Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercado Comúm del Sur in Spanish, Mercado Comun do Sul in Portuguese) was created by the Treaty of Asunción signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay on 26 March 1991 (hereafter, ‘MERCOSUR’).

2 See Vervaele, J. A., ‘Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America’, (2005) 54 ICLQ 387CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 At the beginning, MERCOSUR fulfilled member states’ expectations about the establishment of a customs union. However, the establishment of a common market (the final aim of MERCOSUR) was delayed on several occasions, due to economic reasons and, in part, to the lack of commitment on the part of member states.

4 The Additional Protocol regarding institutional arrangements of MERCOSUR (Ouro Preto Protocol) was signed on 17 December 1994. The text of the Protocol is available in (1995) 34 ILM 1244. The Ouro Preto Protocol entered into force on 15 December 1995 (hereafter, ‘OPP’).

5 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 23/00 – Relanzamiento del MERCOSUR – Incorporación de la normativa MERCOSUR al ordenamiento jurídico de los estados partes, available at www.mercosur.int/msweb/Normas/normas_web/Decisiones/ES/Dec_023_000_Relanzamiento_Incorp-Normativa_Acta%201_00.PDF.

6 Venezuela asked to become a full member state in 2006. However, its membership is still pending because the Paraguayan Congress has not yet ratified the accession framework agreement.

7 According to the accession framework agreement, Venezuela must gradually incorporate the norms already adopted within MERCOSUR, in the process of acquiring a ‘full’ membership.

8 During the period 1999–2005, there were ten ad hoc tribunals constituted under the Brasilia Protocol. The Permanent Review Tribunal was established in 2004.

9 By MERCOSUR law, the author intends the legal system originating from the Treaty of Asunción, including primary and secondary law.

10 For a detailed analysis of this question, see Giupponi, M. B. Olmos, ‘Sources of Law in MERCOSUR’, in Filho, M. Toscano Franca, Lixinski, L., and Giupponi, M. B. Olmos (eds.), The Law of MERCOSUR (2010), 57Google Scholar; see also the analysis of L. Olavo Baptista, ‘MERCOSUR, Its Institutions and Juridical Structure’ (1998), available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/south/mstit2_e.pdf; see also G. Gari, ‘The MERCOSUR Legal System’, in The Liberalisation of Trade in Services in MERCOSUR (2009), 43.

11 According to the definition provided by M. Benzig, under international law, ‘a source of law must by definition be one that produces binding abstract and general rules’: M. Benzing, ‘International Organizations or Institutions: Secondary Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009), available at www.mpepil.com.

12 Namely the Treaty of Asunción and the various protocols adopted under its framework.

13 These are formally international treaties that must be ratified by member states to enter into force.

14 MERCOSUR primary law covers an array of issues such as commerce, culture, and education. Frequently, these treaties are called ‘protocols’.

15 The Brasilia Protocol was replaced by the OP and is available at www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSR/brasilia/pbrasilia_e.asp.

16 The OP is available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/7/13152.pdf.

17 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 23/05. Protocolo Constitutivo del Parlamento del Mercosur. The Protocol is available in Spanish at www.parlamentodelmercosur.org.

18 See, e.g., Protocol on Human Rights (2005), Framework Agreement on the Protection of the Environment (2001), and Protocol on Cultural Integration (1996).

19 On the relationship between MERCOSUR and internal legal orders, see Ipata, P. Labandera, ‘Aspectos jurídico-institucionales que operan como freno para la integración’, (1998) 2 Revista de Derecho Internacional y del MERCOSUR 63Google Scholar; A. Perotti, Habilitación constitucional para la integración comunitaria: estudio sobre los Estados del MERCOSUR (2004); and J. C. Cassagne, ‘El MERCOSUR y las relaciones con el derecho interno’, (1995) C La Ley 875.

20 See C. Pena and R. Rozemberg, ‘MERCOSUR: A Different Approach to Institutional Development’, (2005), available at www.focal.ca/pdf/mercosur_Pena-Rozemberg_different%20approach%20institutional%20development_March%202005_FPP-05-06_e.pdf.

21 See Third Report of the MERCOSUR Secretariat on the compliance with MERCOSUR law. Tercer informe sobre la aplicación del derecho del MERCOSUR por los tribunales nacionales (2005), Secretaría del MERCOSUR-Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2010.

22 MERCOSUR and Chile signed the ‘Acuerdo de Complementación Económica MERCOSUR – Chile’ on 25 June 1996 and MERCOSUR did the same with Bolivia by concluding the ‘Acuerdo de Complementación Económica MERCOSUR – Bolivia’ on 17 December 1996.

23 The basis for the participation of the associated countries was established through the decision adopted by the CMC. According to the special status of these third states, they can participate in meetings in an ad hoc capacity.

24 See J. Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Legal Certainty in the Mercosur: The Uniform Interpretation of Community Law’, 2000 (Winter) NAFTA Law and Business Review of the Americas 1.

25 Apart from the three bodies mentioned, the institutional set-up of MERCOSUR is completed with the MERCOSUR Parliament, the Economic-Social Advisory Forum, the MERCOSUR Secretariat, the Permanent Review Tribunal, the MERCOSUR Committee of Permanent Representatives (MCPR), the MERCOSUR Center for the Promotion of Rule of Law (MCPRL – Centro MERCOSUR de Promoción de Estado de Derecho) created by Decision 24/04 of the Common Market Council and the Administrative-Labour Court (ALC – Tribunal Administrativo-Laboral) established by Res. 54/03 of the Common Market Group. In 2010 (MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. N° 63/10), the High Representative of MERCOSUR was created as a new organ in the framework of the CMC.

26 The CMC (Consejo del Mercado Común) is the highest MERCOSUR body and is composed of foreign affairs and economy ministers of each of the member states.

27 The Common Market Group (Grupo Mercado Común) is a body with executive and technical functions and is composed of four representatives from each member state's foreign affairs and economy ministries and central bank.

28 The MERCOSUR Trade Commission (Comisión de Comercio del MERCOSUR) developed its functions in the implementation of trade policy instruments within the context of the custom union and is composed of four representatives from each member state.

29 Giupponi, M. B. Olmos, ‘Mercosur y ciudadanía, en América Latina’, in AMELA, Fundación (ed.), América Latina hacia su Unidad – Modelos de integración y procesos integradores (2008), 135Google Scholar. Barrado, C. M. Díaz and Giupponi, M. B. Olmos, ‘El establecimiento del Parlamento del Mercosur: Reflexiones desde la experiencia europea’, (2007) 6 Breviario de Relaciones Internacionales 1Google Scholar, available at www.cea.unc.edu.ar/boletin/n-anteriores/009/articulo1.pdf.

30 Art. 19 of the Protocol stipulates that the acts that the Parliament can adopt are opinions, statements, recommendations, reports, and provisions. In this list, it is necessary to distinguish between the acts adopted by the Parliament in the legislative process and the drafting of rules to be subsequently adopted by other bodies. The internal organization of the Parliament is regulated by the MERCOSUR/PM/SO/DISP07/2009. For a review of the functions of the MERCOSUR Parliament, see www.parlamentodelmercosur.org.

31 Protocol Establishing the Parliament of MERCOSUR, Art. 13.

32 In our comparison between the European Parliament and the ‘brand new’ MERCOSUR Parliament in 2006, we suggested increasing progressively its functions following the experience of the European Parliament: Díaz Barrado and Olmos Giupponi, supra note 29, at 5. On the evolution of the competence of the parliament in legislative procedures, see A. Rasmussen and M. Shackleton, ‘The Scope for Action of European Parliament Negotiators in the Legislative Process: Lessons of the Past and for the Future’, University of Copenhagen/European Parliament, paper prepared for the Ninth Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, 31 March–2 April 2005, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/2983/01/EUSA_Rasmussen_and_Shackleton1.txt.

33 This group was established through Decision MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 47/08, available at www.mercosur.int.

34 Agreements with third countries and international organizations must also be included in MERCOSUR secondary law.

35 See, e.g., MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. No. 08/95: Protocolo de armonización de normas sobre propiedad intelectual en el MERCOSUR, en materia de marcas, indicaciones de procedencia y denominaciones de origen.

36 The different resolutions adopted by the Common Market Group are available at www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/resolutions/indice.asp.

37 See, e.g., Resolución sobre los documentos de cada Estado Parte que habilitan en tránsito de personas en el MERCOSUR (Derogación de la Res. GMC No. 75/96).

38 See D. Perotti and D. Ventura, ‘El proceso legislativo del MERCOSUR, Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta del MERCOSUR’ (edited by Fundación Konrad Adenauer) (2004), 63.

39 Within 30 days, member states should publish the entry into force of the MERCOSUR norms in their official journals; see OPP, Art. 39, available at www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop_e.asp.

40 According to Decision 23/2000.

41 The issue of incorporation has become controversial in different disputes before the ad hoc arbitration tribunals. See the cases Brazil – Pork Subsidies (09/1999), Argentina – Poultry (05/2001), Brazil – Phytosanitary Products (04/2002) and Uruguay – Cigarettes (05/2002). The prevailing opinion in these cases was that secondary norms must be incorporated into national legal systems according to procedures established by member states’ constitutions.

42 In my view, arbitration tribunals in MERCOSUR have an inter-governmental nature, since they are composed of arbitrators chosen by the member states involved in the dispute and, most importantly, there is not provision like that in the European Union, the Andean Community, or the Central American Integration System. However, authors such as Perotti argue that arbitration tribunals in MERCOSUR have a supranational nature, because they do not represent member states, the awards are approved by majority, and they are binding on member states. Cf. Perotti, A., ‘Estructura institucional y Derecho en el Mercosur’, (2002) 1 RDIM 6Google Scholar, at 66.

43 On the reform of the dispute settlement system in MERCOSUR, see García, R. Olivera, ‘Dispute Resolution Regulation and Experiences in MERCOSUR: The Recent Olivos Protocol’, (2002) 8 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas 535Google Scholar.

44 For a detailed analysis on the new dispute settlement system after the reforms of the OP, see Giupponi, M. B. Olmos, ‘El Tribunal de MERCOSUR’ [‘The Tribunal of MERCOSUR’], in Liesa, C. Fernández (ed.), Tribunales Internacionales y espacio iberoamericano (2009), 135Google Scholar.

45 The Treaty of Asunción, the OPP, and the protocols and agreements concluded in the framework of the Treaty of Asunción, the CMC's Decisions, the Common Market Group's Resolutions, and MERCOSUR Trade Commission's Directives.

46 After starting the procedure under one system, no member states involved in the dispute will be able to go to other dispute settlement systems.

47 OP, Art. 4.

48 Ibid., Art. 6(2).

49 Ibid., Art. 7(1)(2).

50 The ad hoc tribunal is composed of three arbitrators. Two arbitrators are appointed by the parties on the basis of the list submitted previously by member states. The Presiding Arbitrator is selected by common agreement of the other two arbitrators: OP, Arts. 9–11.

51 OP, Art. 15.

52 Ibid., Art. 28.

53 Ibid., Art. 17(1).

54 Ibid., Art. 26(1).

55 The Permanent Review Tribunal was established on 13 August 2004, in Asunción, Paraguay, and its judges were nominated by Decisions 26/04, 18/06, 38/0749, and 42/0750 of the CMC.

56 OP, Art. 23.

57 Ibid., Art. 24 and Decision 23/04 of the CMC, Art. 1.

58 OP, Art. 3 and Annex to the Decision 37/03 of the CMC, Art. 2.

59 OP, Art. 17.

60 Ibid., Art. 17(2).

61 Ibid., Art. 22(1)(2).

62 Ibid., Art. 3 and Annex to the Decision 37/03 of the CMC, Art. 2.

63 OP, Art. 39.

64 Ibid., Art. 40(1).

65 Ibid., Art. 41(1).

66 Ibid., Art. 41(2).

67 Ibid., Art. 42(1).

68 Ibid., Art. 42(2)(3).

69 Ibid., Art. 44(1)(i).

70 Ibid., Art. 44(1)(ii)(iii).

71 Ibid., Art. 44(2).

72 Cf. A. Perotti, Tribunal Permanente de Revisión y Estado de Derecho en el MERCOSUR (2008), 14.

73 A. Perotti, ‘Elementos básicos para la constitución de un Tribunal de Justicia del MERCOSUR’, VI Encuentro del Foro Permanente de Cortes Supremas del MERCOSUR, Brasilia, 21 November 2008, available at www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/sextoEncontroConteudoTextual/anexo/Texto_dos_Exposiotres/Elementos_basicos_para_la_constitucion__Alejandro_Perotti.pdf.

74 See, e.g., Gari, supra note 10, at 103.

75 See Perotti, supra note 73.

76 This forum is integrated by judges of the member states’ supreme courts. The meetings have taken place on a regular basis since 2003. In the framework of this forum, various proposals seeking to improve the MERCOSUR legal system have been drafted.

77 Gari, supra note 10, at 89.

78 Ibid., at 103.

79 Ibid., at 95.

80 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N° 25/00 – Relanzamiento del MERCOSUR – Perfeccionamiento del sistema de solución de controversias del Protocolo de Brasilia, available at www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/dec2500s.asp.

81 On the advisory opinion system, see de Klor, A. Dreyzin, ‘La primera opinión consultiva del MERCOSUR Germen de cuestión prejudicial?’, (2007) 23 Revista Española de Derecho Europeo 437Google Scholar; and S. Czar de Zalduendo, ‘La Primera Opinión Consultiva en el MERCOSUR’, en Suplemento La Ley Constitucional, Buenos Aires, 26 June 2007, at 57.

82 Gari, supra note 10, at 91.

83 Vinuesa, R. E., ‘Enforcement of MERCOSUR Arbitration Awards within the Domestic Legal Orders of Member States’, (2005) 40 Texas ILJ 425Google Scholar, at 433.

84 Cardenas, E. J., ‘Mercosur's Fragile Dispute Resolution System at Work: First Decision Ever Made by an “Arbitration Panel” in a Dispute Arising among Sovereign Parties’, in Bronckers, M. and Quick, R. (eds.), New Directions in International Economic Law (2000), 281Google Scholar. See, likewise, Cárdenas, E. J. and Tempesta, G., ‘Mercosur, el derecho internacional y el estoppel propósito del laudo arbitral sobre prohibición de importación de neumáticos “remoldeados”’, (2002) 6 Revista de Derecho Internacional y del Mercosur 2Google Scholar, at 107.

85 Decisión 02/07, Consejo de Mercado Común, Reglamento del Procedimiento para la Solicitud de Opiniones Consultivas al Tribunal Permanente de Revisión por lo Tribunales Superiores de Justicia de los Estados Partes del Mercosur.

86 de Santa Cruz Oliveira, M. A. Jardim, ‘Judicial Diplomacy: The Role of the Supreme Courts in Mercosur Legal Integration’, (2007) 48 Harvard ILJ Online 93Google Scholar, at 97, available at www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/HILJ-Online_48_Oliveira.pdf.

87 The OP was regulated through CMC Decision 37/03, 15 December 2003.

88 Judicial diplomacy within MERCOSUR is defined as ‘the dialogue among Supreme Courts of Member States on legal matters relevant to Latin American integration’: Jardim de Santa Cruz Olivera, supra note 86, at 94.

89 Argentina – Poultry (05/2001), Brazil – Phytosanitary Products (04/2002) and Uruguay – Cigarettes (05/2002).

90 Oliveira analyses this from a judicial-diplomacy perspective ‘as collaborative action and communication among national courts, usually the highest judicial bodies, toward regional legal integration’: Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, supra note 86, at 93–4; see, likewise, Perotti, supra note 72, at 153.

91 Perotti, supra note 72, at 153.

92 A. Dreyzin de Klor and D. Perotti, ‘Los particulares en el Protocolo de Olivos’, in El rol de los tribunales nacionales de los Estados del MERCOSUR (2009), 76, at 79.

93 Olivera García, supra note 43, at 535.

94 E. J. Cárdenas and G. Tempesta, ‘Arbitral Awards under MERCOSUR's Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 337, at 345. In the same vein, Dreyzin and Perotti underline that ‘lamentablemente no se ha modificado la vía contemplada para el reclamo de los particulares, pese a que Uruguay insistió férreamente en este punto que por lo demás, era mayoritariamente solicitado por todos los sectores’ (unfortunately, the access of private parties to the procedure has not been modified, despite the strong insistence of Uruguay on this point, which was asked for by all sectors): Dreyzin de Klor and Perotti, supra note 92, at 76, 79.

95 Petersmann, U., ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships’, (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 39.

96 As Gari correctly underlines, current inter-governmental institutional arrangements could risk ‘government encapsulation’: Gari, supra note 10, at 100.

97 Perotti, supra note 72, at 69.

98 Gari, supra note 10, at 101.

99 Vinuesa, supra note 83, at 442.

100 Petersmann, E. U., ‘International Economic Theory and International Economic Law: On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International Economic Order’, in Macdonald, R. S. J. and Johnston, D. M. (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (1983), 227Google Scholar, at 251. In accordance with this broad definition of international economic law, the following instruments can also be included: UN Declaration on the Permanent Sovereignty of States over Their Natural Resources 1962, UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992. See also E. U. Petersmann, ‘Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas’, (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 189, at 189–248.

101 See Ventura, D., ‘First Arbitration Award in MERCOSUR: A Community Law in Evolution?’, (2000) 13 LJIL 447CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 450.

102 See Petersmann, ‘Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law’, supra note 100, at 189.

103 NAFTA dispute settlement is established in NAFTA Chapter 11 refers to investor arbitration following traditional investor–state arbitration schemes in bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Chapter 11, Section A refers to the substantive obligations assumed by NAFTA state parties, establishing rules relating to performance, requirements, discrimination, expropriation, and violation of the minimum standard of treatment established by international law. Chapter 11, section B contains enforcement provisions allowing individual investors of state parties to bring arbitration actions (provided that certain criteria are met) against host governments regarding investment disputes.

104 Brasilia Protocol, English version available at www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/brasilia/pbrasilia_e.asp.

105 OP, Art. 34. A similar provision can be found in NAFTA Art. 102(2), which states that NAFTA parties ‘shall interpret and apply’ its provisions ‘in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of international law’.

106 See Cárdenas and Tempesta, supra note 94, at 358; and Vinuesa, supra note 83, at 442.

107 On the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), see Fizmaurice, M., Elias, O., and Merkouris, P. (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (2010)Google Scholar.

108 Cárdenas and Tempesta, supra note 94, at 351.

109 The awards are originally in Spanish, with translation into English by the author.

110 MERCOSUR arbitration awards are available (in Spanish) at www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/controversias/laudo.html.

111 Dispute concerning the Releases No. 37 of 17 December 1997 and No. 7 of 20 February 1998 of the Department of Foreign Trade Operations (DECEX) of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (SECEX). In Spanish: Laudo sobre Controversia sobre Comunicados No. 37 del 17 de diciembre de 1997 y No. 7 del 20 de febrero de 1998 del Departamento de Operaciones de Comercio Exterior (DECEX) de la Secretaría de Comercio Exterior (SECEX): Aplicación de Medidas Restrictivas al Comercio Recíproco.

112 I Arbitration Award, para. 51.

113 Ibid., para. 64.

114 Cárdenas and Tempesta, supra note 94, at 350.

115 I Arbitration Award, para. 65.

116 Argentina's position is quoted in Section H of the arbitration award.

117 Ibid.

118 III Arbitration Award.

119 The ‘principle of autonomy’ can be interpreted in different ways. In EU law, the principle of autonomy emerged as one of the main pillars of European Community law. In this context, the principle has a specific meaning. Indeed, the principle of autonomy in the EU legal order was elaborated by the European Court of Justice in Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 and Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. The principle of autonomy, together with the principles of direct effect and supremacy, constitute the core of the EU constitutional doctrine. When it comes to MERCOSUR, one can observe attempts to ‘transplant’ such a principle and apply it to explain the autonomous nature of MERCOSUR law.

120 A similar provision can be found in the NAFTA Treaty, Art. 1131.

121 VI Award (01/2002): Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc del MERCOSUR Constituido para Entender de la Controversia Presentada por la República Oriental del Uruguay y a la República Federativa del Brasil sobre ‘Prohibición de Importación de Neumáticos Remoldeados Procedentes de Uruguay’.

122 V Award (09/2001): Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc de MERCOSUR Constituido para Entender de la Controversia Presentada por la República Oriental del Uruguay a la República Argentina sobre ‘Restricciones de Acceso al Mercado Argentino de Bicicletas de Origen Uruguayo’.

123 Award No. 1/2005 of the Permanent Review Tribunal on the motion for review submitted by Uruguay against the 25 October 2005 arbitral award of the ad hoc Tribunal concerning the dispute ‘Prohibition of Remoulded Tires Imports from Uruguay’ (Laudo del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión Constituido para Entender en el Recurso de Revisión Presentado por la República Oriental del Uruguay contra el Laudo Arbitral del Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc de fecha 25 de Octubre de 2005 en la Controversia ‘Prohibición de Importación de Neumáticos Remoldeados Procedentes del Uruguay’).

124 Ibid., Section C3.

125 Ibid., para. 23.

126 See M. B. Olmos Giupponi and E. Ulate Chacón, Diálogo judicial y gobernanza global: La influencia del derecho comunitario europeo en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Centroamericana de Justicia [Judicial Dialogue and Global Governance: The Influence of the EU Law in the Case Law of the Central American Court of Justice] (2012), and Central American Court of Justice, Ruling on the violation of Community law (lawsuit against Costa Rica), 8 September 2008.

127 VIII Award of the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal on the dispute between Paraguay and Uruguay on the application of ‘IMESI’ (excise tax) to cigarettes (05/2002).

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 See M. B. Olmos Giupponi, Derechos humanos e integración en América Latina y el Caribe (2006).

131 There were different awards on the same issue (‘prohibition of remoulded tires imports’) involving Argentina and Uruguay: Arbitration Award XI of 25 October 2005 (in favour of Argentina, overthrown by the Permanent Review Tribunal); Award No. 1/2005 of the Permanent Review Tribunal on the motion for review submitted by Uruguay; Award No. 1/2006 of the Permanent Review Tribunal on the clarification of the previous award; and Award No. 1/2008 of the Permanent Review Tribunal on the ‘Divergence on the Implementation of the Award No. 1/2005 Initiated by Uruguay (Article 30OP)’ (Laudo del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión en el Asunto No. 1/2008 ‘Divergencia sobre el cumplimiento del laudo No. 1/2005 iniciada por la República Oriental del Uruguay (Art. 30 Protocolo de Olivos)’).

132 Award No. 1/2005 of the Permanent Review Tribunal.

133 Award No. 1/2008 of the Permanent Review Tribunal, at 3.

134 The main reason to restrict the imports related to the hazardous, difficult, and costly waste disposal generated by the use of remoulded tyres.

135 The ‘remoulded tyres’ controversy between Argentina and Uruguay was subject of three different awards as noted above. In this case, the quotation is from Award No. 1/2008 of the Permanent Review Court.

136 Ibid., Section B, at 12.

137 Ibid., Section C.

138 MERCOSUR ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal constituted to solve the dispute between Uruguay and Argentina on the ‘failure of Argentina to adopt appropriate measures to prevent and/or eliminate the impediments to free movement of goods due to cuts in Argentine territory of the way of access to the international bridges General San Martin and General Artigas connecting the Republic of Argentina and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay’. The background of this case is the controversy between Argentina and Uruguay regarding the construction of pulp mills on the Uruguay River. Environmental organizations and citizens protested against the installation of pulp mills blocking the road and affecting tourism and transportation. Argentina brought proceedings before the International Court of Justice: Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=135.

139 In particular, Uruguay mentioned the International Road Transport Agreement in force between MERCOSUR member states and third states, ‘Acuerdo sobre Transporte Internacional Terrestre’ (ATIT) signed on 1 January 1990 in the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).

140 ECJ Judgment of 12 June 2003, Case C-112/00. In the Schmidberger case, the Austrian government granted permission to close the Brenner Pass in order to allow a demonstration against the levels of pollution caused by heavy traffic on the motorway to the Alps. The German company Schmidberger, which transported goods in this region, argued that the closure interfered with the free movement of goods. The ECJ recognized that the closure restricted the free movement of goods and considered whether the restriction of the free movement of goods could be justified due to the concerns of the Austrian authorities to protect the right of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The ECJ examined the relation between Arts. 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (freedom of expression and freedom of assembly) on the one hand and the free movement of goods as expressed by the EC Treaty on the other. The ECJ held that the restriction of the free movement of goods was justified and, therefore, that the national authorities were entitled to authorize the demonstration.

141 XII Award (2006), para. 133.

142 Ibid, para. 139.

143 Ibid, para. 134.

144 See the analysis of the influence of EU law on Latin American integration in Giupponi and Chacón, supra note 126.

145 OP, Art. 3; Rules of Procedure for the Request of Advisory Opinions to the Permanent Tribunal of Revision by the Superior Tribunals of the Member States CMC Decision 02/2007, adopted on 18 January 2007; and Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, supra note 86.

146 Advisory Opinion No. 1/2007, originated in the request of the Paraguayan Supreme Court, available at www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/PrimeraOpinionConsultiva-Versionfinal.pdf.

147 Advisory Opinion No. 1/2008, issued following the request of the Supreme Court of Uruguay, available at http://asadip.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/oc-1–2008-ms-primacia-d-del-ms.pdf.

148 Original text in Spanish, author's translation.