1. Falkland Islands Interia Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ) had been replaced in 1986 by the slightly smaller Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ), in view of the vicinity of the Argentine island ‘Isla de los Estados’. See P. Willet, Fishing in the South-West Atlantic (Seminario International por EURAL y la Universidad de Warwick, Buenos Aires, April 19–21, 1988).

2. Horace, Walpole (1770) in F. Hassan, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland Islands 23 VJIL 53, n.2.Google Scholar

3. “Falkland Islands (Malvinas)” is the official UN-terminology when referring to the islands.

4. Destéfani lists ten potential discoverers; L.H. Destéfani, The Malvinas, The South Georgias and The South Sandwich Islands 35 (1982).

5. Id. at 53

6. In 1493 by the papal declarations of Pope Alexander VI ‘Inter Caetera’ and ‘Dudus Si Quidem’.

7. Statement by the representative of Argentina, H.E. Dr. José Maria Ruda, before the sub-committee III of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in; R. Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics 351 (1983).

8. R. Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics 5 n.13 (1983).

9. As to the secret promise, See J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, Chapter 7 (1971) and R.Zorraquin Becú, Inglaterra Prometió Abandonar las Malvinas (1982).

10. L.H. Destefani, supra note 4, at 72.

11. EJ. Htte, La Agressión Norteamericana a Las Islas Malvinas, 1966 Cronica Documental 17.

12. J. Goebel, supra note 9, at 454.

13. R. Perl, supra note 8, at 7.

14. Resolution 262S (XXV); The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state […]. As for the legal character of this resolution, See DJ. Harris, Cases and Materials in International Law 641 (1983).

15. R.J. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 28 (1963). Also Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Case, II UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards 845–846 (1928).

16. The Argentine fever for the Malvinas sometimes takes religious proportions. The British emotions with the sailing of the Task Force in 1982 did take equivalent proportions!

17. Hope, A., Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, 6 B.C. Inťl & Comp.L. Rev. 396 n.ll (1983).Google Scholar

18. Consejo Argentina para las Relaciones Internacionales (CART), Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur, Diplomacia del Grupo Latinoamericano en Naciones Unidas, Tomo I, at 5 (1985).

19. U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946).

20. CARI I, supra note 18, at 12–125.

21. U.N. Doc. A/4494: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.On the legal character of this Resolution and the right on decolonization, see Western Sahara case (request for advisory opinion), 1975 I.CJ. Rep. 31 (Order of May 22, 1975), which states this as an accurate statement of international law.

22. Resolution 1541 (XV) recognizes that people of a non-self-goveming-tenitory may choose integration with an independent state, or free association with an independent state, as an alternative to independence; 1960 U.N.Y.B. 509.

23. M. Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 295 (1984).

24. Resolution 2625 (XXV), supra note 14.

25. M. Ruda, supra note 7.

26. Franks Report (Report of a Committee of Privy Councellors) Falkland Island Review (FIR) 18 (1983).

27. U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).

28. However, it is noted again that Resolution 2065 (XX) speaks only of the ‘interests’ of the Islanders, not the ‘wishes’.

29. CARI III, supra note 18 at XVII and FIR, supra note 26, at 25.

30. The difference between ‘interests’ and ‘wishes’, is that the latter could implicate a veto, whereas the first cannot.

31. This lobby was only partly interested in the affairs of the inhabitants. Mainly they were interested in their own financial benefits from the islands. Because of this, to them it was of great importance that the islands were kept British.

32. CARI III, supra note 18, at XIX; the sovereignty umbrella means that both claims on the matter of sovereignty are not dealt with in this agreement.

33. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).

34. FIR, supra note 26, at 29.

35. This option would implicate the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, while at the same time ‘leasing’ the islands ‘back’ for a certain period of time to the UK, in the same way as this was done with Hong Kong between the UK and China.

36. CARI II, supra note 18, at 114 and FIR, supra note 26, at 35.

37. FIR, supra note 26, at 41.

38. U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).

39. Sandwich del Sur (Tule).

40. Supra note 35.

41. FIR, supra note 26, at 100.

42. Id..

43. R.E. Vinuesa, El Conflicto por las Isias Malvinas y el Derecho National, in la Conferencia Pronunciado el 5 de Mayo de 1982 en el Aula Magna de la Faculdad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 27 (1982). Also the former Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Camilion: “para Carringlon el tema Malvinas debe ser la prioridad 214. A partir de esa premisa a mi no me cablan dudas de que la alternativa de la Juerza por pane de la Argentina debta tenerse como urn hipdlesis idónea”.

44. CARI II, supra note 18, at XXVIII, n.68.

45. FIR, supra note 26, at 124.

46. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Costa Mendez, denies that he knew of these military plans at this stage; “we knew absolutely nothing about the military plans that were being prepared”, in Cardoso- Kirschbaum - van der Kooy, La Trama Secreta 33 (1987).

47. Busser, C., Motivas y Circunstancias. La Recuperation de Malvinas, 748 Boletin de Centra Naval 17 (1987).Google Scholar

48. FIR, supra note 26 at 138. Also Cardoso, et al., supra note 47 at 41 and Costa Mendez, who has denied that this implicated the use of force.

49. C. Busser, supra note 47, at 18 and Cardoso, el al., supra note 46, at 32.

50. The United States were the most obvious choice, as they were allied to Argentina through the OAS and IATRA (Inter American Treaty of Mutual Assistance) and to the United Kingdom through NATO.Only after the escalation did the American Secretary of State intermediate, without result, however, as the United States did not want to intervene in this matter of sovereignty.

51. Busser, supra note 47, at 23. At 22.00 hrs. of the 1st of April, the American President Reagan calls his collegue, the Argentine President Galtieri, in order to prevent a military action. According to Busser this was one hour to late, as the Argentines did disembark at 21.00 hrs. and as of 18.00 hrs. it was not possible to give anymorecontra-orders (Busser, supra note 47 at 29). According to Cardoso however, Galtieri waited with answering the call untill it was to late to call off the entire operation (Cardoso, et al., supra note 46 at 81–83).

52. The ‘hit & run-action’ was only intended to attract the attention of the world-community, to force a meeting of the Security Council and, if such would be required, the use of peace-keeping troops under UNflag.But after the sailing of the British Task Force and the reaction of the Argentine people, the Argentine Junta changed its plan; in this way, Costa Mdndez. Also Cardoso: “that what he (Costa Méndez) judged as the original intention simply to recover the islands had started to change into something different”(Cardoso, et al., supra note 44, at 125).

53. UN. Doc. S/RES/502 (1982).

54. H. Gutierrez Posse, Consideraciones sobre la Practica, la Jurisprudencia y la Doctrina de la Descolonizacion 20 (1985).

55. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 178 (1963).

56. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.CJ. Rep. 98–101.

57. Typical would be the American invasions in Grenada and Panama.

58. The Goa Case is a clear example, in which the enclave in the middle of Indian territory wasconsidered by the international community as part of India anyway and no longer as a Portuguese colony. Although one did not approve of the use of force by India, no steps were taken as the new status quo was desired anyway.

59. As to the legal implications of this resolution, see Harris, supra note 3 at 641.

60. H. Gutierrez Posse, supra note 54 at 12 and Akehurst who only recognizes the armed struggle in cases of the right to self-determination, as a rebellion against the surpressor, by which the use of force gets a national character, which is not included under the prohibition of article 2(4); M. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 299.

61. R.B.Lillich, Forcible Self-help Under International Law 22 NWC Rev. (1970)

62. J. Stone, Aggression and World Order 97 (1958)

63. Id. at 98.

64. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) 1949 I.CJ. Rep. 4, at 35

65. Verwey, W., Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, XXIV NILR 386 (1985).Google Scholar

66. Skubiszewski, K., Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and Neutrality, in;M.Sorensen (ed), Manuel of Public International Law 764 (1968).Google Scholar

67. Reisman, M., The Struggle for the Falklands, 93 Yale Law Journal 314 (1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

68. RJ. Jennings, supra note 5 at 67.

69. A. Hope, supra note 17 at 393.

70. supra note 47.

71. supra note 52.

72. However Costa Méndez admits afterwards that it would have been wiser to put the case before the ICJ.And as Jennings puts it: “And it would seem reasonable to suggest that where a State does believe that it has a good legal title to territory presently in the possession of another State, it ought to challenge the latter State by making a unilateral application to the Court, before it can feel justified in taking forcible action” (RJ. Jennings, supra note 5, at 73).

73. One of them was the difficulty of ‘selling’ the arbitration-alternative to the Argentine people, shortly after another highly emotional territorial dispute was lost to Chile by arbitration (Beagle-arbitration).

74. Argentina has not accepted the optional clause under Article 36(2) of the Statute. The UK only on a basis of reciprocity.

75. Kelsen, H., Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, AJIL 784 (1948).Google Scholar

76. By the end of 1982 there was already a new Resolution stating, inter alia, the request for new negotiations on the matter of sovereignty; UN Doc.A/RES/37/9 (1982). More recently GA Resolution 43/ 25 of November 17th, 1988 and the Special Committee, which is “[d]istressed that, notwithstanding the time that has elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX), this prolonged dispute has not yet been settled” in UN Doc.A/AC.109/1008.