1. OJ. Eur.Comm. 1984, L 252/1.

2. The third complaint. Hied on I ho Imsis of the New Instrument, has been declared inadmissible by the Commission. The Complainant npix-iilcd against the lu-gnli vc decision with the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg (Fcdiol v. Commission (case 7O/K7) was announced in O.J. Eur. Comm. 1987, C 96/8). The decision to refuse to commence die investigation unfortunately has not been published by the Commission. The Commission also declined to initiate the investigation in the case of the fourth complaint. This decision has, however, been published (OJ. liur. Coniin. 1989, L 30/67).

3. See notably. Bourgeois, & Laurent, , Le “Nouvel Instrument de Politique Commerciale”: Un pas en avant vers I'damnation des obstacles muc (cluinges inttrnalionaux, 21 Revue Trimestrielle du Droit Europeen 41 (1985); Hiir & Roll, lias “Neue Instrumentder” EG: Eine rechtsstaatliche Startling der gemeinsamen llandelspolilik?, Rechl tier Imcriiatioiuilcii Wirtschaft 297 (1985); Steenbergen, The New Commercial Policy Instrument, 22 Common Market Uiw Review 421 (1985); Bronckers, Private Response to Foreign Unfair Trade Practices. United Status and EC Complaint Procedures, 6 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 714(1984). ‘I lie latter article gives, apart from a comprehensive study of the drafting history of the Now Instrument, nlso a comparative analysis of US Section 301 and the EC's New Trade Policy liiKlriiiuc.nl. Section 301 ol llie US Trade Act is the counterpart of the New Policy Instrument. It has been most recently amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Publ. L no. 100–418, par. 1301) (1988).Google Scholar

4. It should be noted that the Commission, contrary to the opening of an investigation pursuant to the New Instrument, is not to lake into account “Community interests” this early in examining a complaint filed under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty Regulation (Reg. /2423/S8,0 J. Eur. Comm. 1988, L 209/1.

5. So far, the merits or Akzo's compliiinl have been discussed in Demon, The New Commercial Policy Instrument and Akzo v. Du Ponl, 3 European Luw Review (1988); Knight, Section 337 and the GATT: A necessary protection or an unfair trade practice?, 1K Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 47 (1988).

6. OJ. Eur.Comm. 1986, C 25/2.

7. OJ. Eur. Comm. 1987, L 117/18.

8. The dispute settlement system of Article XXIII GATT has been worked out in the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, adopted on November 28, 1979, (L/4907), Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Suppl., Geneva, March 1980.

9. For a practical analysis of this process see Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Sol, 29 Swiss Review of International and Comparative Law 81 (1987).

10. The panel report is on File in ihc offices or the authors. It will not be published by GATT before the Council has taken its decision thereon. The authors believe that it may be of interest to summarize the main conclusions thereof.

11. The factual aspects, the arguments of the parties and the findings and conclusions of the panel report have been based on Section 337 as it was effective before the enactment in August 1988 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Publ. L no. 100–418). This Act embodies, inter alia, a number of changes in Section 337, that has been summarized by the panel and which seem to exacerbate the discriminating character of Section 337.

12. Article XX d GATT reads, summarized in condensed form and in so far as applicable to this case: Nothing in this Agreement i.e. the (iATI'l shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting parly of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws (in this case the patent-laws of the US), which arc not inconsistent with the provisions of Ihc GATT, provided that these measures are not so applied as to constitute a menus of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.

13. See Masuo, Oiwa, Thoughts on US-Japan I'aienl Friction, AIPPI Journal, Dec. 1988, 146.Google Scholar

14. These allegations of IFPI were triliciilly reviewed hy Alexander, Indonesian Copyright Law as “Illicit Commercial Practices”, Bar liiiroiKJin News 8–9 (f-'elmiary 1988).

15. OJ. Eur. Comm. 1987, C 136/3. This announcement sets forth IFPI's allegations in some detail.

16. OJ. Eur. Comm. 1987, L 335/22.

17. OJ. Eur. Comm. 1988, L 123/51.

18. Most recently, llic Ivtiropain C'ourl of Justice asserted such substitution in Joined Cases 267–269/81, Amminislrazionc (Idle h'inan/e ilcllo Sluto v. SocicUl Pclrolifera luiliana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI), ECR I9K3.80I.

19. See supra note 3.

20. See, e.g.. Art 28 of the Paris Convention, providing for recourse to the International Court of Justice in case of disagreements arising under the Convention. Apart from questions relating to the Community's competence under the various international dispute settlement mechanisms, problems might also arise if the respondent country docs not consider itself hound to the jurisdictions clause of an international agreement on which the EC would want to rely in a particular case. Indonesia, for example, has made such a reservation to (he Paris Convention. Sea ruxlcnlumscn. Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 217 n. I (1968).

21. Ait 2(1) of the Commission proposal of I March 1W.1, published in OJ. Eur. Comm. 1983, C 84/6.

22. See the Commission's notice of initiation of its investigation, OJ.Eur.Comm. 1987, C 136/3. At that time, 76 countries were party to the Rcrnc Convention ami 78 countries to the Universal Copyright Convention.

23. Art 34 of the V ienna Convention on the Law or Treaties provides: “A treaty does not create either obligations or righLs lor ;i third Suite without its consent”.

24. See Arts. XXII juncto XI GAIT.

25. Art. 10(2) Reg. 2641/84. See also Hotirgcois, & Laurent, , supra note 4, at 52–53.Google Scholar

26. Hilf, & Rolf, , supra note 4, ill 301–302.Google Scholar

27. See notably Art. 7(9)(a) of Reg. 2423/KK, supra note 5). It provides that the Commission's investigation shall “normally” be concluded wilhin one year or the initiation of the proceeding. These Commission investigations, however, regularly Like more lime.

28. see 76Arts. ll(2)(b)and 12 of Reg.2641/K4.

29. The aforementioned fourth complaint was Hied in June 1988 and declared inadmissable by the Commission on December 23,198X; sen the publication thereof, supra note 3.

30. See text, supra note 23), discussing Art. 10(2) Reg. 2641/84.

31. Denton, , supra note 6, at 21.Google Scholar

32. Exceptions to the GATT Conducting Parties’ remarkable record or compliance with panel rulings have notably occurred in disputes IxMwcen the European Community and the United States in the agricultural sector.

33. See generally. Bello, & Holincr, , Section 301 of the Tnule Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures and Developments, 7 Northwestern Joiirnul of International Uiw and Business 633 (1986).Google Scholar

34. See text, supra, following note 2.3.

35. Regulation 2641/84 provides, in Art. 10(3), that the Community as such may take “any commercial policy measure”. While this provision docs not cover all conceivable retaliatory measures, it arguably covers more than restrictions on trade in goods (which ihc Regulation itself highlights) and could extend, for instance, to services. See, e.g., Timmermans, Common Commercial Policy (Article 113) and International Trade in Services, Du Droil Inicmutionul au Droil dc I'lntcgration - Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore 675 (1987). Furthermore, it cannot he excluded, when it comes to retaliation following proceedings under the New Instrument, thai (sonic) Member Suites nuiy resort to retaliatory restrictions that the Community itself would not be competent lo lake.