Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T14:10:15.668Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Daniel Terris, Cesare P. R. Romano, and Leigh Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases, Oxford, New York, and Hanover, NH, Oxford University Press and University Press of New England, 2007, 315 pp., ISBN-13 9780199238736/9781584656661, £26.99/$45.00.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2010

Gleider I. Hernández
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
BOOK REVIEWS
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 272 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 A recent book by Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (2008), carefully explores this point in Anglo-American common law whence the principle originates. The practice of the International Court of systematically referring to its cases and considering their findings is similar: see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) (Jurisdiction), Judgment of 18 November 2008, where the Court explained at para. 53 that ‘[t]o the extent that the decisions contain findings of law, the Court will treat them as it treats all previous decisions: that is to say that, while those decisions are in no way binding on the Court, it will not depart from its settled jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so.’