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Corporations before International Criminal Courts: Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2016

JOANNA KYRIAKAKIS
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Abstract

The debate over whether the International Criminal Court should have jurisdiction over corporations has persisted over the years, despite the failure of the legal persons proposals at Rome. For its part, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon determined that it has jurisdiction over corporations for the purpose of crimes against the administration of the Tribunal, albeit not for the substantive crimes over which it adjudicates. Most recently, the African Union has adopted a Protocol that, should it come into operation, would create a new international criminal law section of the African Court of Justice and Human and People's Rights with jurisdiction over corporations committing or complicit in serious crimes impacting Africa. In light of the enduring nature of the proposal that international criminal institutions should directly engage with the problem of commercial corporations implicated in atrocity, this article explores the possible implications for the international criminal justice project were its institutions empowered to address corporate defendants and prosecutors emboldened to pursue cases against them. Drawing on the expressive goals of international criminal justice and concepts of sociological legitimacy, as well as insights from Third World Approaches to International Law, the article suggests that corporate prosecutions, where appropriate, may have a redeeming effect upon the esteem in which some constituent audiences hold international criminal law, as a system of global justice. The article's thesis is then qualified by cautionary thoughts on the redemptive potential of corporate prosecutions.

Keywords

corporationsinternational criminal courtlegitimacyselectivityThird World Approaches to International Law
Type
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 221 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2016 

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References

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7 According to Art. 46E bis, the criminal division of the ACJHPR would exercise jurisdiction over conduct committed on the territory of a state party, where the victim or offender is a national of a state party, or where the conduct in question threatens a vital interest of a state party: Proposed ACJHPR Statute, supra note 6. Practically, however, there are enforcement challenges should the Court attempt to proceed with a case against a corporation without a presence in a state party's territory: see, e.g., J. Gobert and M. Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (2003), 146–78 (discussing legal and practical considerations in prosecuting transnational corporate groups).

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40 Ibid., at 89.

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52 Ibid., at 268.

53 Ibid., at 276.

54 Ibid., at 268.

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73 See, e.g., Glasius, supra note 46.

74 See, e.g., Ryngaert, C., ‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Law’, in Noortmann, M. and Ryngaert, C. (eds.), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (2010), 69 Google Scholar.

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77 Art. 121 of the Rome Statute.

78 Art. 11 of the Malabo Protocol.

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89 Ibid., at 7–8.

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94 Targeting subsidiary companies may also be of limited value as subsidiaries may be under-capitalized and second- or third-tier companies can be dissolved in order to avoid liability.

95 On the case for an enterprise approach to piercing the corporate veil see Blumberg, supra note 92, at 311–16; Muchlinski, P., ‘Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case for Reform’, (2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 915, at 919–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mwaura, K., ‘Internalization of costs to corporate groups: part-whole relationships, human rights norms and the futility of the corporate veil’, (2012) 11 Journal of International Business and Law 85, at 102–5Google Scholar.

96 See, e.g., Priemel, K.C., ‘Tales of Totalitarianism: Conflicting Narratives in the Industrialist Cases at Nuremberg’, in Priemel, K.C. and Stiller, A. (eds.), Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography (2012), 161 Google Scholar (demonstrating how the defence and Tribunal constructed such a reductive narrative in the industrialist trials at Nuremberg). See also Baars, G., ‘Capitalism's Victor's Justice? The Hidden Stories behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII’, in Heller, K. and Simpson, G. (eds.), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (2013), 163 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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98 Ibid., paras. 45–6.

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