While conflict management is an important part of any international treaty, it is particularly important in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will enter into force on 29 April 1997. Disarmament is the primary goal of the Convention and, therefore, by definition, it will encroach on the sovereignty and security interests of its state-parties. Negotiated by the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament over more than 20 years, the Treaty was finally approved by that body in September 1992 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December of that year. The Convention's provisions reflect the new world into which it was born. The regime established by the Convention to verify compliance with its terms is unprecedented in terms of its scope and depth, and because state-parties will have no right to refuse verification activities specified in the Convention. It is also unprecedented in that all state-parties are treated equally, unlike some other multilateral regimes related to the control of weapons of mass destruction negotiated earlier. Nonetheless, such an extensive regime, made possible by the politics of a post-Cold-War world, will inevitably encounter unexpected complications and unforeseen difficulties. This will be so particularly with respect to compliance and interpreting the results of verification activities; therefore, the provisions in the Convention for managing potential or actual conflict will be cruical for it to operate effectively.