¹ As explained by Roberto Ago in reference to Bergbohm: ‘For legal positivists, positive law must be defined as created law. Positive quality is conferred on a legal rule by the fact that it derives its existence from an act of creation which took place in history and may be perceived objectively’; Ago, R., ‘Positivism’, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 7 (1984), 385, at 385Google Scholar; see C. Bergbohm, Staatsverträge und Gesetze als Quellen des Völkerrechts (1832). R. Ago's article provides a complete overview of legal positivism. Among an abundant literature, see, in particular, D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (1929); G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1922); H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899); A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1899). Regarding customary law and its informal nature, legal positivists have to use legal fictions to justify its categorization as a formal source; see P.-M. Dupuy, Droit international public (2008), 345.

² The proponents of the ‘New Haven’ school conceive of international law as an informal process of authoritative decisions regarding the choice and the realization of policy goals. While doing so, they neglect the instruments providing international rules. For an analysis of this school of thought, see, in particular, MacDougal, M., ‘International Law, Power, Policy: A Contemporary Perspective’, (1953/I) 82 RCADI 137Google Scholar; McDougal, M. and Lasswell, H., ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order’, in Falk, R. and Mendlovitz, S. (eds.), The Strategy of World Order: International Law (1966), 45Google Scholar; M. McDougal and W. M. Reisman, International Law in Contemporary Perspective (1980); Reisman, W. M., ‘International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication’, (1981) 86 PASIL 101Google Scholar.

³ As explained by Mary E. O'Connell: ‘International legal process emphasizes understanding how international law works. It concentrates not so much on the exposition of rules and their content as on how international legal rules are actually used by the makers of foreign policy.’ In relation to the promoter of the ‘New International Legal Process’ school, Harold H. Koh, she explains that ‘Koh's own work has both described the “dynamic”, “non-traditional”, and “non-statist” processes of international law and mentioned the normativity of these processes’; O'Connell, M. E., ‘New International Legal Process’, (1999) 93 AJIL 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 334, 338; see Koh, H. H., ‘Transnational Legal Process’, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181Google Scholar.

⁴ Even though the distinction between international law-making and international law is sometimes difficult to make, this paper focuses, as mentioned in the introduction, on the former. Therefore, here, the conceptual frameworks that help to understand the making of international law and not those that are dedicated to the thinking of international law as such are targeted. Regarding international law, there exist also conceptual tensions, e.g., between ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘formalism’; see Koskenniemi, M., ‘What Is International Law For?’, in Evans, M. (ed.), International Law (2010), 32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ For a similar argument regarding the theory of subjects, see d'Aspremont, J., ‘Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating between Concepts and Dynamics’, in d'Aspremont, J. (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (2011), 1Google Scholar.

⁶ See C. Perelman, Ethique et droit (1990), 742.

⁷ See N. Luhmann, La légitimation par la procédure (2001), XXIV.

⁸ See J. Ladrière, L'articulation du sens: Discours scientifique et parole de la foi, Vol. 1 (1970), 96.

⁹ ‘Le droit avant d’être norme, avant d'avoir trait à un ou plusieurs rapports sociaux, est organisation, structure, attitude de la société même dans laquelle il est en vigueur et qui par lui s’érige en unité, en un être existant par soi-même’; see S. Romano, L'ordre juridique (1975), 19.

¹⁰ For an analysis of secondary rules, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1997), 94.

¹¹ For a similar conceptualization of the legal order, see Abi-Saab, G., ‘General Course of Public International Law’, (1987/VII) 207 RCADI 15Google Scholar, at 19, 31.

¹² In that sense, R.-J. Dupuy argues that there exist two categories of rules in the international legal order, different in nature and belonging to the ‘droit relationnel’ and the ‘droit institutionnel’; see Dupuy, R.-J., Communauté internationale et disparités de développement, ‘General Course of Public International Law’, (1979/III) 165 RCADI 9Google Scholar, at 46.

¹³ In opposition, P. Weil argues that ‘Despite the profound transformations that international society has undergone, especially since the end of the Second World War, the functions of international law have remained what they have always been since the outset, and there could be no greater error than to contrast “modern” or “present-day” international law with “classic” international law in this respect’; Weil, P., ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’, (1983) 77 AJIL 413CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 419.

¹⁴ It is the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) which referred to the duality of objectives pursued by states that intend ‘to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims’, Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Rep., (7 November 2007) Series A No. 10, at 18. As argued by W. Friedmann, who uses the two paradigms of ‘coexistence’ and ‘co-operation’ to characterize not only the subject matters regulated by international law, but also the modalities of the formation of international law; see Friedmann, W., ‘General Course of Public International Law’, (1969/II) 127 RCADI 39Google Scholar, at 47–224.

¹⁵ In that sense, see the geological (rather than temporal) approach promoted by J. H. H. Weiler to describe and analyse the international legal system; Weiler, J. H. H., ‘The Genealogy of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’, (2004) 64 Zeitschrift für ausländliches öffenliches Recht und Völkerrecht 547Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Beyond the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, particularly the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, one can mention, for instance, Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties referring to ‘the international community as a whole’ or the Barcelona Traction case in which the ICJ refers to the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole; see, respectively, Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Res. 2625(XXV) (1970); 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331; Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1979, [1979] ICJ Rep. 3, at 32, para. 33.

¹⁷ See, in particular, on the international plane, UNGA, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Res. 217A(III) (1948); 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1967) 6 ILM 368; 1966 international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (1967) 6 ILM 360.

¹⁸ See, e.g., 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1037 UNTS 151; 1972 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1363 UNTS 3; 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 396.

¹⁹ In support of this ‘common-interest’ approach to these issues, see, in particular, d'Aspremont, J., ‘The Foundations of the International Legal Order’, (2007) 18 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 219Google Scholar; Onuma, Y., ‘In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: “Universal” vs. “Relative”’, (2000) 1 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law 53Google Scholar. Some of these issues, particularly human rights, are considered by a number of scholars as universal values; among an abundant literature, see, in particular, Simma, B., ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’, (1994-VI) 250 RCADI 217Google Scholar; Tomuschat, C., International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, ‘General Course of Public International Law’, (1999) 281 RCADI 9Google Scholar; de Wet, E., ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’, (2006) 19 LJIL 611CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an attempt to reconcile these two opposite views, see van Mullingen, J. G., ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order’, (2011) 24 LJIL 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ For reference to the behaviour of societies, see Romano, supra note 9.

²¹ Beyond the issue of the inter-state collaboration within IOs that this section analyses, the questions raised by the relations between IOs are addressed below; see subsection 3.3, infra.

²² For a discussion of the role of private entities in international law-making, see subsection 3.2, infra.

²³ ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not State’; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep. 174, at 178.

²⁴ The term negotium refers to the normative substance of legal rules. From this negotium, one distinguishes the instrumentum, which relates to the instrument that contains legal rules, e.g., a treaty.

²⁵ Dupuy, supra note 1, at 387 (translation provided).

²⁶ See, in particular, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, Art. 53.

²⁷ For an analysis of ‘soft law’, see sub-subsection 1.3.2, infra.

²⁸ See Weil, supra note 13, at 414–15.

²⁹ Abi-Saab, G., ‘“Humanité” et “communauté internationale” dans la dialectique du droit international’, in Dupuy, R.-J. (ed.), Humanité et droit international – Mélanges René-Jean Dupuy (1991), at 11 (translation provided)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Churchill, W., Speech at the House of Commons, 11 November 1947, (1947) 444 The Official Report, House of Commons 206Google Scholar.

³¹ See R. Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international: Esquisses d'herméneutique juridique moderne pour le droit international (2006), 91.

³² For the analysis of the normativity of IO output, see subsection 1.3, infra.

³³ To illustrate the interactive procedure that standardization conceptualizes, one can usefully refer to procedures in force in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). See, in particular, 1945 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereafter, ‘UNESCO Charter’), UNESCO, Basic Texts (2010), 5; Rules of Procedure concerning recommendations to member states and international conventions covered by the terms of Art. IV, para. 4 of the Constitution (hereafter, ‘UNESCO Rules of Procedure’), 5 C/Res. 133–134, 7 C/Res. 109, 17 C/Res. 114, 25 C/Res. 194, 32 C/Res. 95, UNESCO, Basic Texts (2010), 111.

³⁴ As illustrated by the tendency of states to group together in light of their interests and by the technique of ‘package deal’, the rationalization does not equal the annihilation of states’ interest's expression. See, in particular, R. Y. Jennings, ‘Law Making and Package Deal’, in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter: Le droit international: Unité et diversité (1981), 347; Lee, S., ‘Multilateral Treaty-Making and Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal’, in Cheng, B. and Brown, E. D. (eds.), Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on His Eightieth Birthday (1988), 157Google Scholar.

³⁵ E.g., Art. 1 of the UNESCO Charter (‘Purposes and Functions’) provides that, to contribute to peace and security, the organization will: ‘(a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples through all means of mass communication . . . (b) [g]ive fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture . . . (c) [m]aintain, increase and diffuse knowledge’; see UNESCO Charter, supra note 33.

³⁶ See sub-subsection 1.3.2, infra.

³⁷ In that sense, see, in particular, P. Daillier, M. Forteau, and A. Pellet, Droit international public (2009), 190.

³⁸ Art. 1 (‘Scope of the Present Rules of Procedure’) of the UNESCO Rules of Procedure defined the recommendations as the instruments ‘in which the General Conference formulates principles and norms for the international regulation of any particular question’; see UNESCO Rules of Procedure, supra note 33. The preparation of non-normative resolutions obeys a procedure that is analogous but simplified. For a description of this procedure, see the multi-stage procedure for the elaboration, examination, adoption, and follow-up of declarations, charters, and similar-setting instruments adopted by the General Conference and not covered by the rules of procedure concerning recommendations to member states and international conventions covered by the terms of Art. IV of the Constitution, 33/C Res. 141, UNESCO, Basic Texts, supra note 33, at 117.

³⁹ For an analysis of this procedure of elaboration, see Yusuf, A. A., ‘Pratiques et procédures en vigueur à l'UNESCO pour l’élaboration des instruments normatifs’, in Yusuf, A. A. (ed.), Standard-Setting in UNESCO, Vol. 1: Normative Action in Education, Science and Culture (2007), 31Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ In case a convention is adopted only by a vote of a simple majority, the General Conference can decide to transform the project into a recommendation; see UNESCO Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, Art. 13.

⁴¹ Ibid., Art. 14.

⁴² UNESCO Charter, supra note 33, Art. IV(4); ibid., Art. 16.

⁴³ In UNESCO, the monitoring is organized every four years. One can mention that, apart from the fact that reports concerning conventions are prepared by states and those concerning recommendations by the Secretariat, the procedure of conventions and recommendations monitoring is identical; see UNESCO Charter, supra note 33, Art. IV(6); UNESCO Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, Arts. 17, 18.

⁴⁴ In that sense, see, in particular, Dupuy, supra note 1, at 560.

⁴⁵ As noted by G. J. H. van Hoof: ‘As a result of the configuration of the international society the functions of international supervisory bodies are often not limited to supervision stricto sensu, i.e. review and correction. Not seldom measures of the international “legislator” are very vague and/or abstract. In many cases they contain only broad directives with regard to the subject-matter to be regulated. Such directives need to be clarified or elaborated into more specific norms before they can be applied in practice. With respect to review, too, this clarification or elaboration is necessary, because review – and consequently correction – cannot be effective if the norm which must be used as a standard is too abstract or vague’; G. J. H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (1983), 261; see also von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I., ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers’, (2011) 12 German Law Journal 979Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See sub-subsection 1.3.2, infra.

⁴⁷ In relation to this phenomenon, see, in particular, Guillaume, G., ‘The Use of Precedents by International Judges and Arbitrators’, (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jacob, M., ‘Precedents: Lawmaking through International Adjudication’, (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Art. IX(2) provides that: ‘The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreement’, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

⁴⁹ In that sense, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes that the peer-review system creates a ‘dialogue [qui] peut à son tour servir de base à un renforcement de la coopération, à travers par exemple l'adoption de nouveaux principes directeurs et recommandations, voire la négociation d'instruments juridiques’; ‘L'examen par les pairs: un instrument de coopération et de changement’; L'Observateur de l'OCDE (2007), 6.

⁵⁰ These vague rules are generally referred to as ‘standards’; for analysis of this concept, see, in particular, Kaplow, L., ‘Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’, (2007) 42 Duke Law Journal 557CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Korobkin, R. B., ‘Behavorial Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited’, (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 23Google Scholar; P. Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’, (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 379; Riedels, E., ‘Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?’, (1991) 2 EJIL 78Google Scholar; S. Rials, Le juge administratif français et la technique du standard (Essai sur le traitement juridictionnel de l'idée de normalité) (1980). For a challenge to the concept of ‘standard’ itself, see Y. Radi, ‘La standardisation comme procédure systémique de formation du droit: Contribution à la théorie générale du standard et à la théorie des modes de formation du droit international public’, PhD thesis (2010), 29.

⁵¹ This dichotomy has to be distinguished from that made in civil law between ‘norms of result’ and ‘norms of means’. Norms of result provide a result to be achieved, while norms of means call for its addressees to make all the effort to reach the objective provided in the norm. Beyond the differences between these two dichotomies, one can notice that norms of means are also tools used in co-operative frameworks to confer on co-operative international law some flexibility.

⁵² ‘Article 20 – Breach of an international obligation requiring the adoption of a particular course of conduct: There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to adopt a particular course of conduct when the conduct of that State is not in conformity with that required of it by that obligation’; Report of the International Law Commission, Doc. A/32/10, (1977) II(2) YILC 19.

⁵³ ‘Article 21 – Breach of an international obligation requiring the achievement of a specified result: 1. There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to achieve, by means of its own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve the result required of it by that obligation’, ibid. Among norms of result, Roberto Ago made a distinction between four categories of norms – a distinction based on the degree of permissiveness of norms for the means of execution available to states; see ibid., Arts. 21.2–21.5.

⁵⁴ J. Combacau, ‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement: Quelques questions et pas de réponse’, in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, supra note 34, at 193 (translation provided).

⁵⁵ In that sense, see, e.g., Burdeau, G. Bastid, ‘Le pouvoir créateur de la jurisprudence internationale à l’épreuve de la dispersion des juridictions’, (2006) 50 Archives de philosophie du droit 289, at 297Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ See sub-subsection 1.3.1, supra.

⁵⁷ On this concept, see, in particular, Beckett, J. A., ‘Behind Normative Relativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisite of Law’, (2001) 12 EJIL 627CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fastenrath, U., ‘Normative Relativity in International Law’, (1993) 4 EJIL 305CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tasioulas, J., ‘In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’, (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weil, supra note 13.

⁵⁸ As reminded by G. Abi-Saab: ‘A l'origine le terme soft law a été formulé par Lord McNair pour désigner le droit en forme de propositions ou principes abstraits, en opposition à la hard law qui est le droit concret, vécu ou opératoire, issu de l’épreuve judiciaire’; G. Abi-Saab, ‘Eloge du “droit assourdi”: Quelques réflexions sur le rôle de la soft law en droit international contemporain’, in Nouveaux itinéraires en droit: Hommage à François Rigaux (1993), 60.

⁵⁹ See sub-subsection 1.3.1, supra.

⁶⁰ As indicated in the introduction, this paper focuses on the analysis of the conceptual relations between standardization and (international) law-making; it does not aim at elaborating on the relation between standardization and (international) law. Regarding the latter, see Y. Radi, ‘Legal Normativity in International Law: A Reappraisal’, Amsterdam Center for International Law Working Paper, Working Paper on Postnational Rulemaking (2012).

⁶¹ See ‘Introduction’, supra.

⁶² This reference to the ‘behaviour of society’ is borrowed from Romano, supra note 9.

⁶³ Aristotle, Topics (2004). For commentaries of Topics, see, in particular, Owen, G. E. L. (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aritotelicum (1968)Google Scholar; W. A. De Pater, Les Topiques d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne, méthodologie de la définition (1965); Y. Pelletier, La dialectique aristotélicienne: Les principes clés des Topiques (2007).

⁶⁴ As noted by J. Lenoble and F. Ost, ‘la philosophie du droit d'Aristote . . . constitue un modèle de la pensée juridique occidentale, à tout le moins dans son versant iusnaturaliste. Non seulement nombre de théologiens s'y réfèrent explicitement, quoique à des degrés divers; mais surtout de multiples représentations véhiculées par les juristes ne peuvent se comprendre que comme des reprises, souvent inconscientes et caricaturales, des positions du Stagirite, ne retenant de ces dernières qu'une version naturaliste simplifiée et dogmatique aux dépens des tensions qui animent de part en part la pensée aristotélicienne’; J. Lenoble and F. Ost, Droit, mythe et raison: Essai sur la dérive mytho-logique de la rationalité juridique (1980), 356.

⁶⁵ Aristotelian philosophy of law is not compiled in specific books but is rather the product of a cross-reading of Aristotle's works, whose The Nicomachean Ethics constitutes the cornerstone; Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (1998). For an analysis of his philosophy of law, see, in particular, Lenoble and Ost, supra note 64, at 354–438; M. Villey, Philosophie du droit: Définitions du droit: Les moyens du droit (2001), 43.

⁶⁶ Emphasis added.

⁶⁷ It is mainly because commentators forget this ‘as if’ that they misunderstand Aristotle. And yet, as argued by P. Aubenque: ‘[C]e comme si que les commentateurs ont negligé, introduit la distinction capitale entre la réalité d'un rapport intelligible et l'impossible idéal d'un monde qui aurait retrouvé son unité’; P. Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote (2009), 401.

⁶⁸ ‘Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions . . . . Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature . . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such objects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better’; Aristotle, supra note 65, at 1.

⁶⁹ J.-M. Le Blond, Logique et méthode chez Aristote: Etude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotélicienne (1939), 15.

⁷⁰ In that context, contrary to a common opinion shared by C. Perelman, for instance, the specificity of dialectic syllogism with respect to analytic syllogism is not only (and mainly) the uncertainty that characterizes its premises, but the fact that the formalism of the relation between the terms of the syllogism relies on the certainty of the relation of inference; see C. Perelman, Logique juridique: Nouvelle rhétorique (1999), 6.

⁷¹ As defined by Y. Pelletier: ‘le lieu est une affinité d'attribution attachée aux corrélatifs d'une relation logique’; Y. Pelletier, supra note 63, at 312.

⁷² This topos does not give any truth to this argument. For the same issue, a different topos can provide an argument that contests the legality of smoking in the open air. This is the discussion of numerous arguments based on numerous topoi that leads to reaching a plausible and coherent conclusion for the issue at stake.

⁷³ E.g., G. Tarello identified in legal practice 13 arguments that allow the establishment of premises on the basis of texts, among which are the argument a contrario, the argument a simili, the argument a fortiori, the argument a completudine, and the argument a coherentia; G. Tarello, ‘Die juridische Argumentation’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, complementary volume (1972), 103, quoted in Perelman, supra note 70, at 55.

⁷⁴ As argued by Y. Pelletier: ‘[L]a raison possède . . ., à peu de frais, simplement grâce à l'expérience interne de sa propre activité de connaître, de former concepts et propositions, et, grâce à son attention à ceux de ces concepts et propositions les plus en circulation pour chaque chose, un moyen de connaître plus accessible que la science, un autre style de puissance qui lui permet de sortir un peu de l'ignorance et de s'approcher tout de même assez des choses pour en préparer une connaissance plus véritablement scientifique’; Pelletier, supra note 63, at 74.

⁷⁵ ‘Dialectic’ refers both to a science and to the object of this science – a distinction that corresponds to the scholastic division between the dialectica docens and the dialectica utens; according to T. Aquinas: ‘La dialectique peut être considérée selon qu'elle enseigne (“secundum quod est docens”) et selon qu'elle fait usage (“secundum quod est utens”). Selon qu'elle enseigne, elle fait considération de ces relations logiques et institue un mode grâce auquel on puisse en venir, dans chaque science, à des conclusions établies de manière probable. Cela, la dialectique le fait démonstrativement, et, en cela, elle est science. Selon qu'elle fait usage, cependant, elle se sert de ce mode constitué et conclut quelque chose de manière probable dans chaque science. En cela, elle décline du mode de la science’; T. Aquinas, Metaphysic, at 4 #576, quoted in Y. Pelletier, supra note 63, at 87.

⁷⁶ See Villey, supra note 65, at 197–201.

⁷⁷ ‘A norm that determines the creation of another norm is applied by the creation of that other norm. Application of law is at the same time creation of law. These two concepts are not in absolute opposition to each other as assumed by traditional theory. It is not quite correct to distinguish between law-creating and law-applying acts. Because apart from the borderline cases – the presupposition of the basic norm and the execution of the coercive act – between which the legal process takes place, every legal act is at the same time the application of a higher norm and the creation of a lower norm’; H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2009), 234.

⁷⁸ In that sense, M. Virally opines that: ‘On ne saurait affirmer a priori qu'une norme ne peut en aucun cas modifier celle dont elle tire sa validité . . . la jurisprudence peut compléter la loi – ce qui en définitive est la modifier’; M. Virally, La pensée juridique (1998), 172.

⁷⁹ See sub-subsection 1.3.1, supra.

⁸⁰ See Amselek, P., ‘Réflexions critiques autour de la conception kelsénienne de l'ordre juridique’, (1978) 1 Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger 5, at 13–14Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Michel van de Kerchove and François Ost recourse here to the concept of the ‘strange loop’ developed by D. Hofstadter; see, in particular, D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1979).

⁸² ‘La présence d'une gradation, d'une relation de supériorité, d'une position de commandement est, en droit, indubitable, même si elle est le plus souvent déjouée. En cela consiste l’étrangeté des boucles observées: elles sont étranges car elles déçoivent une attente naturelle, celle précisément d'une hiérarchie respectée, d'une supériorité en acte. . . . A l'idée d'un sens et d'une obligatoriété a priori imposés par l'organe supérieur se substitue dès lors l'idée d'une collaboration entre organes de création et d'application du droit, voire, dans certains cas, d'une prééminence de l'organe inférieur qui décide, en dernier ressort, de la portée réelle du texte juridique. Si jurisprudence et administration continuent donc de souscrire aux postulats de “souveraineté” et de “rationalité” du législateur, cette discipline apparente n'empêche cependant pas ces autorités de prendre une part active et parfois non prévue au processus de création juridique, faisant ainsi apparaître la systématicité réelle du droit sous la forme d'un enchaînement de boucles étranges’; M. van de Kerchove and F. Ost, Le système juridique entre ordre et désordre (1988), 107.

⁸³ See sub-subsection 2.1.2, supra.

⁸⁴ As argued by N. MacCormick: ‘[T]he coherence of norms consists in the fact that, by recounting them rationally, as a whole, they “make sense” intrinsically or instrumentally, or in the realization of one or several common values, or in the achievement of one or several common principles . . . this coherence is always a matter of rationality, but not always a matter of truth’; MacCormick, N., ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’, in Weinberger, O. and Krawietk, W. (eds.), Theorie der Normen, Festgabe für Ota Weinberger (1984), 41Google Scholar, at 53, quoted in J. Lenoble and A. Berten, Dire la norme: Droit, politique et énonciation (1990), 99.

⁸⁵ In that sense, standardization could be linked by the reader to the Dworkinian ‘chain of law’. But, beyond the fact that, under the concept of standardization, this chain does not link only judges, but all the normative authorities and also has a procedural dimension; it does not pursue the objective of unity that underlies Dworkinian theory; see R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). As for the ambiguity of R. Dworkin concerning unity, see Lenoble and Berten, supra note 84, at 104.

⁸⁶ This theory does not consider IO resolutions as a source, though it considers decisions by international tribunals as supplementary sources. This traditional theory is well illustrated by Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute: ‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto’; 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice.

⁸⁷ See sub-subsection 1.3.2, supra.

⁸⁸ The creative role of IO resolutions is contemplated in the specific context of the dynamic procedures analysed here. It is only in this procedural ‘context’, and not regarding IO resolutions in general, that one puts forth this role. In that sense, this paper does not address the issue of IO resolutions in relation to the general soft-law debate.

⁸⁹ See the example of UNESCO, supra note 40.

⁹⁰ See the statement of OECD, supra note 49.

⁹¹ See sub-subsections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, supra.

⁹² See G. Abi-Saab, ‘La coutume dans tous ses Etats ou le dilemme du développement du droit international général dans un monde éclaté’, in Le droit international à l'heure de sa codification: Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago (1987), at 53–65.

⁹³ G. Abi-Saab defines ‘ancient custom’ in this way: ‘Il s'agit . . . d'un processus exogène, autonome, d'une dynamique émanant directement du corps social, en dehors de tout cadre spécifique, qui n'est ni règlementé, centralisé ou canalisé. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'un procédé, d'une procédure prescrite et règlementée par le système juridique lui-même en vue de produire certains effets . . .. C'est aussi un mode spontané ou inconscient de création du droit . . .. Enfin, il s'agit d'un processus hétérogène, il n'y a ni identité, ni continuité, ni prévisibilité quant à ceux qui y participent, ni quant aux modalités de son déroulement, y compris dans l'espace et dans le temps’; ibid., at 60.

⁹⁴ It is important to emphasize that dynamic procedures work ‘stage by stage’ for the generalization of norms (negotia) provided in treaties or resolutions (instrumena). These instrumena constitute only the starting point of this procedural generalization.

⁹⁵ See, in particular, B. Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law’, (1965) 5 Indian Journal of International Law 35.

⁹⁶ ‘En internationalisant et en institutionnalisant le processus de création du droit international général, [the international community] s'est en fait forgé un procédé ou mécanisme législatif réunissant tous les caractères de celui-ci: une procédure claire et préétablie, utilisée consciemment en vue d’élaborer des normes de caractère et à effet général. Mais – et c'est un grand mais – cet effet reste au-delà de sa portée. En d'autres termes, vu le faible degré d'intégration de la communauté internationale, celle-ci n'a pas pu développer, parallèlement à ce procédé, un “pouvoir législatif” correspondant, de sorte que ce procédé législatif ne débouche pas sur un “effet législatif”. Et c'est là qu'intervient la coutume. On fait appel à cette boîte noire, à cette force mystérieuse, pour parfaire ce procédé, remplacer le chaînon manquant et combler le ‘hiatus’ entre le “procédé” et le “pouvoir”, en attribuant un “effet législatif” à ce qui a été conçu comme un “acte législatif”, sans pouvoir atteindre son but par ses propres moyens’; Abi-Saab, supra note 92, at 63.

⁹⁷ See, in particular, d'Aspremont, J. (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (2011)Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ Among an abundant literature on the issue of legitimacy in international law, see, in particular, d'Aspremont, J. and De Brabandere, E., ‘The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise’, (2010) 34 Fordham ILJ 101Google Scholar; Buchanan, A., ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in Besson, S. and Tasioulas, J. (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2009), at 80Google Scholar; Franck, T., ‘Legitimacy in the International Legal System’, (1988) 82 AJIL 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kumm, M., ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’, (2004) 15 EJIL 907CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J. Tasioulas, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds.), supra note 98, at 97; Wölfrum, R. and Röben, V. (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁹ For an analysis of what the authors called the ‘legitimacy of origin’ and the ‘legitimacy of exercise’, see d'Aspremont and De Brabandere, supra note 98.

¹⁰⁰ Although not in the context of dynamic procedures under scrutiny here, Global Administrative Law (GAL) emphasizes the legitimating effect of procedural principles; see, in particular, Kingsbury, B., ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 41–50; from a different conceptual perspective, see van Bogdandy, A. et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (2008)Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ See Barr, M. S. and Miller, G. P., ‘Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel’, (2006) 17 EJIL 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alexander, K., ‘International Banking Law and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: An Alternative Form of International Law-Making’, in Komori, T. and Wellens, K. (eds.), Public Interest Rules of International Law: Towards Effective Implementation (2009), 377Google Scholar.

¹⁰² See subsection 2.1, supra.

¹⁰³ See International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification of International Law’, Doc. A/CN.4/L.682. Among an abundant literature, see, in particular, M. Craven, ‘Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law’, (2003) 14 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 3; Dupuy, P.-M., L'unité de l'ordre juridique international, ‘General Course of Public International Law’, (2002) 297 RCADI 1Google Scholar, at 429–78; Koskenniemi, M. and Leino, P., ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, (2002) 15 LJIL 553CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prost, M., ‘Discours sur le fondement, l'unité et la fragmentation du droit international: A propos d'une utopie paresseuse’, (2006) 39 RBDI 621Google Scholar. Prost, M. and Clark, P. K., ‘Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?’, (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 341CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Simma, B. and Pulkowski, D., ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’, (2006) 17 EJIL 483CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Singh, S., ‘The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’, (2011) 24 LJIL 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ In that sense, see J. P. Trachtman, ‘Fragmentation and Coherence in International Law’, (2011) available at www.ssrn.com.

¹⁰⁵ E.g., both the 1996 Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers and the 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel were prepared and adopted by UNESCO and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

¹⁰⁶ The application of the above-mentioned 1996 Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers is monitored both by UNESCO and the ILO.

¹⁰⁷ The Economic and Social Council can address only recommendations. For an analysis of this structural weakness, see D. Williams, The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations (1987), 17.

¹⁰⁸ Under Art. 63.2 of the UN Charter: ‘It [the Economic and Social Council] may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies [specialized agencies], and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations’; 1945 Charter of the United Nations. In that sense, Art. IV(3) of the Agreement concluded by the United Nations and UNESCO provides that: ‘The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization affirms its intention of cooperating in whatever further measures may be necessary to make coordination of the activities of specialized agencies and those of the United Nations fully effective. In particular, it agrees to participate in, and to cooperate with, any body or bodies which the Council may establish for the purpose of facilitating such coordination and to furnish such information as may be required for the carrying out of this purpose’; 1946 Agreement between the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, Basic Texts, supra note 33, at 175.

¹⁰⁹ Even though these propositions to set bridges between IOs can be compared to those made in the literature, particularly by GAL, constitutionalist, and pluralist theories, it is important to emphasize the formal procedural dimension of these propositions and their original conceptual underpinning, i.e., Aristotelian dialectic logic. Regarding the above-mentioned literature, see, in particular, Kingsbury, B. et al. , ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15Google Scholar; J. Klabbers et al., The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009); N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2011).

¹¹⁰ For propositions in that sense regarding the International Court of Justice, see, in particular, G. Guillaume, ‘Quelques propositions à l'occasion du cinquantenaire de la CIJ’, (1996) RGDIP 323; O. Vicuna and C. Pinto, ‘The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century’, Preliminary Report Prepared for the 1999 Centennial Commemoration of the First Peace (1999).

¹¹¹ For an example regarding the ‘place’ of human rights in investment treaty arbitration, see Radi, Y., ‘Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law “Toolbox”’, (2012) 37 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, forthcomingGoogle Scholar.