1 Amicus curiae briefs, legal advice, scholar opinions, taking part in non-expert environments (media and newspapers), policy papers, among others, are just a few examples of mechanisms through which academia might produce non-academic impact. See London School of Economics Public Policy Group, Maximizing the Impacts of Your Research: A Handbook for Social Scientists (2011), at 190–1. A policy paper is ‘a problem-oriented and value-driven communication tool’ which aims to provide a ‘comprehensive and persuasive argument justifying the policy recommendations presented in the paper’, or even, ‘to act as a decision-making tool and a call to action for the target audience’. See E. Young and L. Quinn, Writing Effective Public Policy Papers: A Guide for Policy Advisers (2002), at 18.

2 See Young and Quinn, ibid.; A. Pennock, ‘The Case for Using Policy Writing in Undergraduate Political Science Courses’, (2011) 44 PS: Political Science and Politics 141; B. Trueb, ‘Teaching Students to Write for “Real Life”: Policy Paper Writing in the Classroom’, (2013) 46 PS: Political Science and Politics 137.

3 The project will be better explained in Section 2, but only to the extent it serves the purposes of this article.

4 In order to ensure anonymity to the people who were contacted or interviewed, we do not disclose here any information (name, regulation, reports) concerning the international organization.

5 We will mention some international organizations in Section 3 as examples of this argument.

6 See M. Marzouki, Statement before the 67th General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 September 2012, available at gadebate.un.org/node/453; M. Marzouki, Statement before the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, 26 September 2013, available at gadebate.un.org/68/tunisia; M. Marzouki, Statement before the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations, 2014, available at downloads.unmultimedia.org/wss/ga69/en/69_TN_en.mp3.

7 From Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, among others. The debate concerning the convenience of an ICoC and its institutional design is not the object of this article. For more information on the original proposal see, e.g., G. Bandeira, ‘Tribunal Constitucional Internacional – Auto de Ciência’, (2016) Notandum 41; P. Cunha, ‘La Cour Constitutionnelle Internationale (ICCo) – Une Idée qui fait son Chemin’, (2015) Notandum 21; A. Grachem, ‘Plaidoyer pour une Idée Tunisienne: l’Institution d’une Cour Constitutionnelle Internationale’, (2016) 24 International Studies on Law and Education 43. For a critical appraisal of such discussion see also A. Giannattasio et al., ‘International Constitutional Court: Rise and Fall of an International Debate’, (2019) 16 Revista de Direito Internacional 130.

8 The main goal of the project was to sustain the idea that ICoC should base its legitimacy not on abstract legal goals (protection of Human Rights and Democracy), but on legal means (accountability mechanisms). The majority of ICoC proposals focus on the development of ‘efficient means’ – even the use of military power.

9 After all, if the draft proposal on the ICoC was originally presented by academic experts to the international organization, we presupposed that there should be an equal possibility to take part in this debate. That is the reason why the research team looked for the the regulation of the institution.

10 There are articles written by some scholars of this expert group in which general ideas for the ICoC are sketched – such as Cunha, supra note 7; M. Chemillier-Gendreau, ‘Le Projet de Cour Constitutionnelle, Un Espoir de Garantie Internationale pour les Mouvements Sociaux Porteurs de Démocratie’, in F. Sahli, A. El Ouazzanni and A. Peters (eds.), Droit et Mouvements Sociaux: Quelles Interactions? Le Cas des Revoltes dans le Monde Arabe (2017), 9.

11 The major discussed topics were (i) protection of persons in the event of disasters; (ii) immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction; (iii) provisional application of treaties; (iv) formation and evidence of customary international law; (v) the obligation to extradite or prosecute; (vi) the Most-Favoured-Nation clause; (vii) protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts; and (viii) protection of the atmosphere. This condition did not change before the first version of this article was prepared (July 2017).

12 The testimonials given by the respondents have just confirmed our original statement by the review of the Annual Reports from 2012 to 2016.

13 What seems to be the case of the draft proposal allegedly presented by the legal scholars in 2014.

14 See e.g., D. Koller, ‘… and New York and The Hague and Tokyo and Geneva and Nuremberg and …: The Geographies of International Law’, (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 97; T. Weiss, What is Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (2012); T. Weiss, T. Carayannis and R. Jolly, ‘The “Third” United Nations’, (2009) 15 Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 123. Some authors also criticize this idea of an obvious positive progression of international legal institutions, such as T. Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (2010).

15 See P. Casella, Fundamentos do Direito Internacional Pós-Moderno (2008); W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964); F. Quadros, Direito das Comunidades Europeias (1984); J. Salcedo, El Derecho Internacional en un Mundo en Cambio (1985); J. Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’, (2004) 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 547. Weiler even uses the metaphor of geology to present an image of overlapping layers of international legal relations.

16 See M. Goldmann, ‘Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority’, (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1865.

17 See J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000); A. Cardia and A. Giannattasio, ‘O Estado de Direito Internacional na Condição Pós-Moderna: A Força Normativa dos Princípios de Ruggie sob a Perspectiva de uma Radicalização Institucional’, in M. Benacchio (ed.), A Sustentabilidade da Relação entre Empresas Transnacionais e Direitos Humanos (2016), 127; A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006); J. Habermas, A Constelação Pós-Nacional (2001); A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); G. Teubner, Global Law without a State (1997).

18 A. Bogdandy, M. Goldmann and I. Venzke, ‘From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority’, (2016) MPIL Research Paper Series 1.

19 See, e.g., Casella, supra note 15; Clapham, supra note 17; Friedmann, supra note 15; Habermas, supra note 17; Salcedo, supra note 15; Slaughter, supra note 17; Weiler, supra note 15. See also Cardia and Giannattasio, supra note 17.

20 See L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life – The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development (2015); J. Faria, Direito e Conjuntura (2008).

21 See, e.g., A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Court’s Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification’, (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law; Bogdandy, Goldmann and Venzke, supra note 18.

22 See, e.g., Cardia and Giannattasio, supra note 17; Z. Laïdi, La Norme sans la Force (2008).

23 See, e.g., A. Bogdandy, P. Dann and M. Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’, (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1375.

24 Specifically concerning the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in international law by international criminal courts, we could mention as examples the following non-academic references: J. Bavier, ‘Gambia announces withdrawal from International Criminal Court’, Reuters, 26 October 2016, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-icc-idUSKCN12P335?il=0; International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘President of the Assembly regrets withdrawal of any State Party from the Rome Statute and reaffirms the Court’s fight against impunity’, ICC, 22 October 2016, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1248; International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Forthcoming Official Meetings’, Assembly of State Parties Journal, 15 November 2016, available at asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ASP15-Journal.15nov16.2100.ENG.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA), The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law, 25 June 2016, available at www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698.

Examples from the academic environment on the issue should also be mentioned here: S. Anoushirvani, ‘The Future of the International Criminal Court: The Long Road to Legitimacy begins with the Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, (2010) 22 Peace International Law Review 213; A. Cassese, The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice, (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 491; M. Gibert, ‘La Cour Pénale Internationale et l’Afrique, ou l’instrumentalisation punitive de la justice internationale?’, (2015) 97 Revue Internationale et Stratégique 111; M. Glasius, ‘Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?’, (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 43; S. Koller, ‘La Cour Pénale Internationale: ses Ambitions, ses Faiblesses, nos Espérances’, (2003) 398 Études 33; F. Mégret, ‘Cour Pénale Internationale et Néocolonialisme: au-delà des Évidences’, (2014) 45 Études Internationales 27; V. Peskin and M. Boduszynski, ‘The Rise and Fall of the ICC in Libya and the Politics of International Surrogate Enforcership’, (2016) 10 International Journal of Transitional Justice 272; J.-B. Vilmer, ‘Introduction: Union Africaine versus Cour Pénale Internationale: Répondre aux Objections et Sortir de la Crise’, (2014) 45 Études Internationales 5. Such discussion goes beyond the criticism of international criminal institutions: it touches even the basis of international law – see, e.g., A. Anghie, M. Koskenniemi and A. Orford, Imperialismo y Derecho Internacional (2017); M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (2000).

For this reason, authors are developing analytical frameworks to assess and improve the legitimacy of international institutions; see, for instance, A. Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (2010); A. Giannattasio, ‘A Legalidade e a Legitimidade da Autoridade Pública Internacional da OEA nos Casos Brasil e Venezuela: Do Soft Power a um Direito Político Internacional’, in E. Gomes, F. Xavier and T. Squeff (eds.), Golpe de Estado na América Latina e Cláusula Democrática (2016), 124; M. Goldmann, Internationale öffentliche Gewalt – Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (2015); J. Habermas, ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und die Legitimationsprobleme einer verfassten Weltgesellschaft’, in W. Brugger, U. Neumann and S. Kirste (eds.), Rechtsphilosophie (2008), 360.

25 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking’, in A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (2012), 475; A. Bogdandy and M. Goldmann, ‘Die Ausübung internationaler öffentlicher Gewalt durch Politik bewertung’, (2009) 69 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 51.

26 See, e.g., M. Varaki, ‘Effectiveness Considerations between Legitimacy and Prosecutorial Discretion’, (2014) 108 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, at 309–10; A. Murdoch, ‘UK statement to ICC Assembly of States Parties 17^th session’, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Speech, 5 December 2018.

27 S. Dothan, ‘How International Courts Enhance their Legitimacy’, (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquires in Law 455.

28 See, e.g., A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (2013); Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 25, N. Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’, (2009) 41 George Washington International Law Review 107; J. Habermas, ‘O Projeto Kantiano e o Ocidente Dividido’, in J. Habermas, O Ocidente Dividido (2006) 115.

29 See M. Badin, ‘Breves considerações sobre os mecanismos de participação para ONGs na OMC’, (2006) 4 Sur 103; M. Badin, ‘Mudanças nos paradigmas de participação direta de atores não-estatais na OMC e sua influência na formulação da política comercial pelo Estado e sociedade brasileiros’, (2007) 3 Revista DireitoGV 77; M. Badin, ‘É possível pensar em sociedade civil no Mercosul?’, (2007) 9 Cena Internacional 37; Y. Onuma, Direito Internacional em Perspectiva Transcivilizacional (2016); B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below (2003).

30 Something odd to expect especially from international institutions who claim democratic governance from national governments. This was already perceived by B. Simma, ‘Foreword’, in Bogdandy and Venzke supra note 25. See also B. Schöndorf-Haubold, ‘The Administration of Information in International Administrative Law – The Example of Interpol’, in Bogdandy et al., supra note 24.

31 The main idea of this argument is that political participation can be exercised by other means than elections. Political accountability of public authorities would have a broader reach of alternative actions. See I. Young, ‘Representação Política, Identidade e Minorias’, (2006) 67 Lua Nova 139.

32 A. Orsini, ‘The role of non-state actors in the Nagoya Protocol negotiations’, in S. Oberthür and K. Rosendal (eds.), Global Governance of Genetic Resources (2013), 64

33 For a broader approach of this argument see, e.g., Onuma, supra note 29; A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (2017). In a different perspective see, e.g., A. Anghie, ‘Imperialism and International Legal Theory’, in A. Orford, F. Hoffman and M. Clark (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of The Theory of International Law (2016), 156. These are, of course, some recent contributions to the matter, but other authors have already developed this idea: see, e.g., C. Alexandrowicz, The Law of Nations in Global History (2017); M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (1979), at 50.

34 See M. Koskenniemi, ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?’, (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 229; S. Pahuja, ‘The Postcoloniality of International Law’, (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 459.

35 See A. Lorca, Mestizo International Law (2014); L. Obregón, ‘Completing Civilization: Creole Consciousness and International Law in Nineteenth-century Latin America’, in A. Orford (ed.), International Law and its Others (2006), 247.

36 See Roberts, supra note 33.

37 See Onuma, supra note 29.

38 See M. Badin, G. Morosini and I. Oliveira, ‘Direito Internacional Econômico no Brasil - Quem somos e o que fazemos? Evidências empíricas de 1994 a 2014’, (2016) 13 Revista de Direito Internacional 27; A. Giannattasio, ‘Editorial - What does it mean to apply history in international law studies?’, (2018) 15 Revista de Direito Internacional 8, at 8–9.

39 Onuma, supra note 29.

40 See also Rajagopal, supra note 29; Onuma, supra note 29.

41 This condition was already perceived by the Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference (held in Indonesia, in 1955), as it stated ‘fuller use should be made of the existing international organisations’, as this would secure the proper representativeness in international law in terms of equitable geographical distribution. This idea is continuously reiterated by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) – an international organization which inherits the so-called spirit of Bandung of reshaping the legal basis of international law. See for instance that AALCO is regarded as an important institution for ‘enabl[ing] Asian-African States [to] develop … enlightened international legal policies and positions’, in order to ‘shap[e] a just and equitable world order’ (2009, Putrajaya Declaration) and ‘ensur[ing] that the Asian-African voices are heard in the United Nations and other international fora’ (2016, New Delhi Declaration).

42 Be as it may, based on an extensive literature review on the ICoC and international constitutionalism, we presented in another paper a general criticism on the existing and publicly available academic proposals on the ICoC.

43 This condition is perceived in several international organizations: see, e.g., Rajagopal, supra note 29.

44 Ibid.

45 Onuma, supra note 29.

46 Ibid.