Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T17:10:31.514Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2009

Abstract

In this article, the author gives an overview of the main international legal norms that are relevant to imputiny for human rights violations, and their actual implementation, in order to answer the question whether imputiny is indeed in violation of present day general international law. In this context, attention will also be given to the development towards the establishment of an international criminal tribunal.

Type
Leading Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See inter alia, Dyke, J. Van & Berkley, G., Redressing Human Rights Abuses, 20 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 243267 (1992)Google Scholar; Goldman, R., International Law & Amnesty Laws, 12 Human Rights International Reporter, Winter 1988, at 9–11Google Scholar; Kokott, J., Völkerrechtliche Beurteilung des Argentinischen Gesetzes Nr.23.521 Ueber die Gehorsamspflicht, 47 Zeitschrift für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 506–536 (1987)Google Scholar; Latcham, A., Duty to Punish: International Law and the Human Rights Policy of Argentina, 7 Boston University International Law Journal 355–378 (1989)Google Scholar; Orentlicher, D., Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale Law Journal, 2537–2615 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roht-Arriaza, N., State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 California Law Review 451–513 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Justice, not Impunity: Proceedings of the International Meeting Concerning Impunity for Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations, Geneva (1993).

2 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 23.

3 See D. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2565.

4 Decision on admissibility, dated November 23, 1989, regarding communications nos. 1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/1988 (O.R., M.M. and M.S. ν. Argentina), Report of the Committee against Torture (1990), A/45/44, at 109–113.

5 Moreover, in an obiter dictum at the conclusion of the decision, the Committee considered the enactment of the laws to be incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention; one of the laws was enacted only 18 days before the entry into force of the Convention on June 26, 1987. The Committee noted that many perpetrators of torture remained unpunished as a result of the laws, and that this policy was in stark contrast to the attitude of the state towards the victims of the ‘dirty war’ of 1976–1983. On this basis the Committee urged Argentina to provide remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives.

6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2, para. 3; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 25; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 13.

7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2, para. 1; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1; African Charter, Art. 25.

8 See for instance the views adopted by the Committee in communications nos. 25/1978 (Amendola e.a. ν. Uruguay), 30/1978 (Bleier ν. Uruguay), 84/1984 (Barbato ν. Uruguay), 107/1981 (Almeida ν. Uruguay), 124/1982 (Muteba ν. Zaire), 146 and 148–154/1983 (Baboeram e.a. ν. Suriname) and 194/1985 (Muiyo ν. Zaire). Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol, vol. 1 (1985) and 2 (1990).

9 See for instance cases nos. 9810 (Ramos ν. El Salvador, Res. 24/89), 10,179 (Gutierez e.a. ν. El Salvador, Res. 26/89), 9918 (Giron ν. Guatemala, Res. 49/90), 9905 (David ν. Haïti, Res. 44/90), 10,163 (Lava Ramirez e.a. ν. Peru, Res. 75/90).

10 See the judgment in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, July 29, 1988 as well as the judgments in the cases of Fairen Garbis & Solis Conales, no. 7951 (1989) and Godinez Cruz, no. 8097 (1989).

11 General Comment no. 20, adopted during the Committee's 44th session in 1992.

12 Application of the law had led to the dismissal of 40 criminal cases in civilian courts which had been initiated by attorneys for victims of human rights violations. See the paper presented at the International Meeting concerning Impunity for Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations (Geneva, November 2–5, 1992): R. Goldman, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds Uruguay's 1986 Amnesty Law Violated the American Convention on Human Rights.

13 See, e.g., M. Bassiouni, infra note 15, 196–199.

14 It is interesting to note that the major peace treaties preceding Versailles, contained explicit amnesty clauses. However, the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 showed a reversal of the common practice: amnesty was no longer the rule, but an exception: in the treaty, those eligible for amnesty were specifically mentioned, while the amnesty was not applicable to others. On the contrary, following the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), which replaced the Treaty of SeAres which was never ratified, amnesty was granted for all crimes committed by Turkey between 1914 and 1922. See further J. Fisch, Krieg und Frieden im Friedensvertrag (1979).

15 On crimes against humanity see, e.g. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992); E. Zoller, La Définition des Crimes Contre l'Humanité, 120 Journal du Droit International 549–568 (1993).

16 By contrast, it is noteworthy that hundreds of Italian war criminals, listed as such by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, were never brought to justice. See M. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 227–228.

17 For war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Allied forces, see A. de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau (1989).

18 See D. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2588; M. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 39.

19 D. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2588, n.225.

20 In 1946, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 95(1), which affirms the principles of international law recognised by the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The principles were further affirmed by inter alia GA Res. 2583 (XXIV), 2712 (XXV), 3074 (XXVIII) and recently by SC Res. 808 (1993) and 827 (1993). See also the Principles of International Law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950.

21 As of February 1, 1994, 185 states were party to the Geneva Conventions, and 120 to its Second Protocol.

22 More than a million people were killed by Pakistan troops during the conflict. See M. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 229–230.

23 GA Res. 47/133.

24 GA Res. 1989/65.

25 Paragraph 344 of the 1990 report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1990/13) reads: “Perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the phenomenon of disappearances may be that of impunity. The Working Group's experience over the past ten years has confirmed the age-old adage that impunity breeds contempt for law. Perpetrators of human rights violations, whether civilian or military, will become all the more brazen when they are not held to account before a court of law. Impunity can also induce victims of these practices to resort to a form of self-help and take the law into their own hands, which in turn exacerbates the spiral of violence.”

26 Sub-Commission, Res. 1992/23. The rapporteurs are Mr. El Hadji Guissé and Mr. Louis Joinet.

27 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6.

28 On an International Criminal Code and Court see, e.g., Bassiouni, M. Cherif, Introduction to the Draft Statute of an International Criminal Tribunal, 9 Nouvelles Etudes Pénales 128 (1992)Google Scholar; Graefrath, B., Universal Criminal Jurisdictionand an International Criminal Court, 1 European Journal of International Criminal Law, 67–88 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thürer, D., Vom Nürnberger Tribunal zum Jugoslawien-Tribunal und weiter zu einem Weltstrafgerichtshof?, 3 Revue Suisse de Droit International et de Droit Européen, 491–516 (1993)Google Scholar; Hebel, H. von, An International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; an Act of Powerlessness or a new Challenge for the International Community?, 11 Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights, 437–456 (1993).Google Scholar

29 GA Res. 177(II). In the same resolution, the ILC was requested to formulate the principles of international law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in its judgment.

30 GA Res. 260 B (III) of December 9, 1948.

31 UN Doc. A/2693 (1954).

32 UN Doc. A/2645 (1954).

33 UN Doc. A/2638 (1954).

34 GA Res. 897 (IX) of December 4, 1954 and 898 (IX) of December 14, 1954.

35 GA Res. 3314 (XXIX).

36 GA Res.367106 of December 10, 1981.

37 UN Doc. A/46/10. The Draft Articles were transmitted to Governments for their observations. As of March 1, 1993, 23 replies had been received, which were published in a document prepared for the 44th session of the ILC, held from May 3 to July 23, 1993 (A/CN.4/448 and Add.I).

38 See Comments and Observations of Governments on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted on first reading by the International Law Commission at its 43rd session, A/CN.4/448 and Add.l.

39 GA Res. 47/33 of November 25, 1992.

40 A/CN.4/449.

41 A/CN.4/L.490.

42 SC Res. 827( 1993), adopted unanimously.

43 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of SC Res. 808(1993), May 3, 1993, S/25704.