The debate over judicial review of legislation is profuse. But differences are often due to the lack of a common methodology. This article discusses the proper way to evaluate judicial review and confronts central challenges raised against it. It develops the two main models that can be used for analyzing the intersection between democracy and constitutional decision-making and shows that judicial oversight may not be rejected, regardless of how we interpret that connection. The article discusses in detail the model developed by Jeremy Waldron. A nice attempt to answer methodological questions, Waldron's model wrongly tips the balance against judicial review. Its excessive level of abstraction and idealization renders it inoperable. Few systems meet its standards, and those that do pay a high price: they contradict the concept of democratic legitimacy that underlies the model. Paradoxically, a system with judicial review may end up being more legitimate than one without it.

The article considers what Kant's theory of property, as set out in Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom, contributes to contemporary property theory. I argue that by drawing our attention to a new set of questions concerning the basis of the state's authority, a Kantian approach provides an important alternative to the dominant instrumentalist approach to the moral problems that private ownership introduces (specifically, the problems of poverty and dependence). I consider the extent to which the Kantian framework is normative appealing. After raising a number of objections to the Kantian division of labor in response to the problem of material dependence, I suggest a way to restore some harmony between the rights of owners and the interests of others within a Kantian framework.

Lawyers and philosophers have misunderstood the rights of bequest and inheritance within Locke's theory of property. While lawyers assume these are unqualified natural rights, philosophers find Locke's account of them so inadequate as to cast their existence into serious doubt. But on Locke's theory, the rights of bequest and inheritance are neither absolute nor incoherent. Locke treats inheritance as a form of imputed bequest, whereby natural law imputes to the intestate an intention to leave his goods to his closest family members. Both bequest and inheritance find their justification in the prerogatives of owners to dispose of their property. These prerogatives are not without limit, however. The needs of a decedent's dependents trump specific bequests, and both bequest and inheritance are subject to the duty of charity. Bequest and inheritance thus order the relative claims of owners and others so that they are consistent with Locke's more general theory of property.