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LEGAL PROOF AND FACT FINDERS' BELIEFS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2007

Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Affiliation:
University of Girona (Spain)
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Abstract

In procedural-law scholarship as well as in the theoretical analysis of the notion of proof as a result of the joint assessment of all items of evidence introduced in a trial, reference is frequently made to notions such as the conviction, belief, or certainty of a judge or a jury member about what happened. All these notions underscore the mental states involved in the process of determining the facts on the part of a judge or a jury. In this analysis, I look at the links between beliefs and the justification in the findings of fact provided by the judge or jury in her or its verdict.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 2006 , pp. 293 - 314
Copyright
© 2006 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

I would like to express my thanks to two anonymous reviewers from the journal for the comments and suggestions they provided about a previous version of this paper. Their input enabled me to make improvements and reconsider some important points. José Juan Moreso, Daniel González Lagier, and Daniel Mendonca endlessly read and/or discussed the ideas of this paper with me. Thanks.

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