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INTERPRETATION AND CONVERSATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2003

Marcos Barbosa Pinto
Affiliation:
Universidade de São Paulo

Extract

The objectivity of legal interpretation has often been denied from a linguistic perspective. According to some, legal interpretation cannot be objective because law consists of language, and language is naturally indeterminate. In my view, there is something odd about this argument. For its conclusion to be warranted, language should always be indeterminate, that is, all words, sentences and texts in our language should be indeterminate, and indeterminate at all times. Yet this is clearly not the case. If language were always indeterminate, we would not be able to have a conversation; if language were indeterminate at all times, you would not be able to understand me if I told you loud and clear right now to stop reading this article. But we do have conversations; and you would understand what I meant if had told you to stop reading. In fact, our language seems to be determinate enough for the purposes of most of our daily conversations. If I said “hi” to you, you would, I suppose, say “hi” back. If I told you to pick up a pen right now, you would know exactly what to do. Most of our conversations work, that is, they serve their purposes. And our language seems to be as determinate as these purposes require.

Type
ARTICLES
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Thanks to Joaquin Acuna, Eduardo Boulos, Harisson Clay, Brian Chase, Owen Fiss, Marcelo Ferrante, Calixto Salomão and Joann Sy for helpful comments to earlier versions of this article. Special thanks to Bruce Ackerman, who supervised the research which resulted in this article during my year of studies at the Yale Law School.