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INSTRUMENTAL RULES AND MOTIVATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2007

Antony Hatzistavrou
Affiliation:
University of Cyprus and Clare Hall, Cambridge University

Abstract

In this paper I address the issue of the normativity of instrumental rules (for example, legal rules). On the one hand, I criticize Scott Shapiro's “constraint model” of instrumental rule-following according to which instrumental rules have motivational clout qua rules: the agent conforms to them simply because they are rules. On the other, I argue for a purely epistemic account of instrumental rule-following. According to this account, instrumental rules inform the agent which action she is required to perform but do not get her to act. Rather the agent is motivationally guided by the reasons for which she adopted the instrumental rules.

Type
ARTICLES
Copyright
© 2006 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a meeting of the Stirling Political Theory Group and at an Open Session of the 2006 Joint Meeting of the Mind and the Aristotelian Society at the University of Southampton. I am grateful to the participants of these events (especially Maria Alvarez, Antony Duff, Kathlyn Farkas, and Kent Hurtig) for comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Matthew Kramer and two anonymous referees of LEGAL THEORY for their written comments on an earlier draft. I owe a special debt to Scott Shapiro for a long discussion on his theory and a set of written comments on an earlier draft.