Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T07:42:26.477Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A NEW INTERPRETIVIST METASEMANTICS FOR FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DISAGREEMENTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2020

François Schroeter ,
Laura Schroeter  and
Kevin Toh
François Schroeter
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne
Laura Schroeter
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne
Kevin Toh
Affiliation:
Faculty of Laws, University College London
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of the representational practice within which the thought or utterance is located. In thus favoring a “relational model” in metasemantics, we share Ronald Dworkin's goal of explaining fundamental legal disagreements, and also his reliance on constructive interpretation. But what we delineate is a far more general and explanatorily resourceful metasemantics than what Dworkin articulated, which also bypasses some controversial implications for the nature of law that Dworkin alleged.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 62 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Early drafts of this paper (with different titles) were presented at the Workshop on Law and Language at the University of Surrey School of Law in January 2017, the Workshop on Conceptual Analysis and the Future of Jurisprudence (as a part of the Edinburgh Legal Theory Festival) at the University of Edinburgh Law School in June 2018, and the UCL-Yale Symposium on the Future of Jurisprudence at University College London in June 2018. We thank those in the audience on these occasions for helpful questions and feedback. We also thank Eliot Michaelson for an instructive discussion and helpful advice.

References

REFERENCES

Appiah, K. Anthony. 1996. Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections. In Color Conscious, ed. Anthony Appiah, K. & Gutman, Amy, 30–105. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler. 1998. Memory and Self-Knowledge. In Externalism and Self-Knowledge, ed. Ludlow, Peter & Martin, Norah, 351–371. Palo Alto: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
Chalmers, David. 2006. The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics. In Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, ed. Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel & Macia, Josep, 55–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chan, Winnie & Simester, A.P.. 2011. Four Functions of Mens Rea. Cambridge Law Journal 70: 381–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chow, Kat. 2018. If We Called Ourselves Yellow. https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/09/27/647989652/if-we-called-ourselves-yellow?t=1595628472058.Google Scholar
Copp, David. 2019. Legal Teleology: A Naturalist Account of the Normativity of Law. In Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, ed. Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott & Toh, Kevin, 45–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cumming, Samuel. 2013. From Coordination to Content. Philosophers' Imprint 13: 1–17.Google Scholar
Devitt, Michael. 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dickie, Imogen. 2010. We Are Acquainted with Ordinary Things. In New Essays on Singular Thought, ed. Jeshion, Robin, 213–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dowell, J.L. 2015. The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11, ed. Shafer-Landau, Russ, 1–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 87–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Gareth. 1973. The Causal Theory of Names. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. 47: 187–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. New York: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Foot, Phillippa. 1959. Moral Beliefs. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59: 83–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forbes, Graeme. 1989. Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of Belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14: 84–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1892. On Sinn and Bedeutung. In The Frege Reader, ed. Beany, Michael, 151–171. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.Google Scholar
Gibbard, Allan. 1992. Moral Concepts: Substance and Sentiment. Philosophical Perspectives 6 (Ethics): 199–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Allan. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Glanzberg, Michael. 2014. Explanation and Partiality in Semantic Theory. In Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, ed. Burgess, Alexis & Sherman, Brad, 259–292. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hare, R.M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Hare, R.M. 1986. A Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism. In Philosophy in Britain Today, ed. Shanker, Stuart. London: Croom Helm.Google Scholar
Hart, H.L.A. 1961/1994. The Concept of Law, 2nd ed.Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Haslanger, Sally. 2000. Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? Noûs 34: 31–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heim, Irene. 1982. The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. Ph.D. dissertation in Linguistics, University of Massechussetts, Amherst.Google Scholar
Horgan, Terence & Timmons, Mark. 1992. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthèse 92: 221–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jeshion, Robin. 2010. Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumentalism, and Cognitivism. In New Essays on Singular Thought, ed. Jeshion, Robin, 105–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kamp, Hans. 1981. A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation. In Formal Methods in the Study of Language, ed. Groenendijk, J. A. G., Janssen, T. M. V. & Stokhof, M. B. J., 277–322. Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre.Google Scholar
King, Jeffrey C. & Lewis, Karen S.. 2018. Anaphora. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, Edward N.. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/anaphora/.Google Scholar
Kitcher, Philip. 2007. Does ‘Race’ Have a Future? Philosophy and Public Affairs 35: 293–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lawlor, Krista. 2001. New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts. New York: Garland Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 1970. How to Define Theoretical Terms. Journal of Philosophy 67: 427–446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mallon, Ron. 2006. Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic. Ethics 116: 525–551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2017. Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Michael. 1990. Choice, Character and Excuse. Social Philosophy and Policy 7: 29–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, Michael & Hurd, Heidi. 2011. Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5: 147–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, Thomas. 1997. The Last Word. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Peacocke, Christopher. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Perry, John. 1980. A Problem About Continued Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 317–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, John. 2001. Reference and Reflexivity. Palo Alto: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
Pietroski, Paul. 2010. Concepts, Meanings, and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature, and Hard Work. Mind and Language 25: 247–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pinker, Stephen. 1994. The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York: William Morrow.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, David & Sundell, Tim. 2013a. Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13: 1–37.Google Scholar
Plunkett, David & Sundell, Tim. 2013b. Dworkin's interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes. Legal Theory 19: 242–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7: 131–193.Google Scholar
Railton, Peter. 2019. “We'll see you in court!”: The Rule of Law as an Explanatory and Normative Kind. In Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, ed. Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott & Toh, Kevin, 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1975. The Independence of Moral Theory. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48: 5–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Recanati, François. 1993. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Recanati, François. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Recanati, François. 2016. Mental Files in Flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1911. Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 108–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schroeter, Laura. 2007. The Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 597–618.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura. 2008. Why Be an Anti-Individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 105–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura. 2012. Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying. Synthèse 189: 177–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura. 2013. Are Concepts Creatures of Darkness? Critical Discussion of Robert Stalnaker's Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Analytic Philosophy 54: 277–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura & Schroeter, François. 2009. A Third Way in Metaethics. Noûs 43: 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeter, Laura & Schroeter, François. 2014. Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model. Philosophers' Imprint 14: 1–26.Google Scholar
Schroeter, Laura & Schroeter, François. 2015. Rationalizing Self-Interpretation. In Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, ed. Daly, Christopher. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Schroeter, Laura & Schroeter, François. 2016. Semantic Deference vs. Semantic Coordination. American Philosphical Quarterly 53: 193–210.Google Scholar
Simester, A.P. 2000. Can Negligence Be Culpable? In Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th series, ed. Horder, Jeremy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Simester, A.P. 2013. A Disintegrated Theory of Culpability. In The Sanctity of Life and the Crimial Law: The Legacy of Glanville Williams, ed. Baker, Dennis J. & Horder, Jeremy, 178–203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singer, Peter. 1972. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–243.Google Scholar
Stavropoulos, Nicos. 1996. Objectivity in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stevens, Robert. 2007. Torts and Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P.F. 1974. Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Toh, Kevin. 2005. Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project. Legal Theory 11: 75–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toh, Kevin. 2011. Legal Judgments as Plural Acceptances of Norms. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 1, ed. Green, Leslie & Leiter, Brian, 103–137. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Toh, Kevin. 2019. Legal Philosophy à la carte. In Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, ed. Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott & Toh, Kevin, 221–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2006. Conceptual Truth. Aristotelian Society supp. 80: 1–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zack, Naomi. 2002. Philosophy of Science and Race. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar