Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
The Government's Consultation Paper does not have a question mark in its title. It does not purport to be a serious discussion of the role of a Supreme Court in a democracy. This is scarcely to be expected of such a document or its respondents, so I propose to respond in its own terms rather than on the loftier plane usually adopted by contributors to this journal. More unexpectedly, the Consultation Paper does not even put forward a serious set of options to consider. At the Law Commission, we always had (at least a metaphorical) question mark in our title because we almost always put forward two options which do not appear in this consultation: the ‘do nothing’ and the ‘let’s abolish it' options. Both have a lot to be said for them here.
1. Department for Constitutional Affairs Constitutional Reform: a Supreme Court, for the United Kingdom CP 11/03, July 2003 (‘CP’).
2. Cf President Aharon Barak ‘Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002) 116 Harv LR 19 and the numerous sources cited there.
3. Of which I was a member from 1 May 1984 to 31 December 1993.
4. CP, n 1 above, para 34; but the CP makes clear that they are still much in demand for chairing important committees and similar work.
5. [2003] UKHL 34; [2003] ICR 937.
6. CP, n 1 above, paras 53–56.
7. Access to Justice Act 1999, s 55(1). Only the Court of Appeal can grant such permission.
8. [2001] UKHL 61; [2002] I AC 800.
9. CP, n 1 above, para 58.
10. CP, n 1 above, para 59.
11. CP, n 1 above, paras 19–21.
12. [2000] 2 AC 59; 2000 SC (HL) 1. For a typically trenchant Scottish attack on Lord Steyn's ‘person on the underground’ test, see Professor J Thomson ‘Abandoning the law of delict’ (2000) 6 SLT 43–45.
13. Thus, eg, the House of Lords were not able to express their opinions on the difficult issues raised by the case of the conjoined twins (Re A (children) (conjoined twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961), surely one of the most important ever to have reached the courts.
14. Law Commissions Act 1965, s 3(1).
15. CP, n 1 above, para 2.
16. Although the CP, n 1 above, para 37, touches on whether those who have reached the very top of the judging profession should continue to be appointed to the House.
17. CP, n 1 above, para 4.
18. CP, n 1 above, para 3.
19. The Lord Chancellor's speech writers are well qualified to take their line from the former permanent secretary, Sir Claud Shuster, in a 1943 memorandum cited by R Stevens The Independence of the Judiciary: the View from the Lord Chancellor's Office (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p 3; see also R Stevens The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) p 91.
20. Lord Steyn ‘The Case for a Supreme Court’ (2002) 118 LQR 382.
21. CP, n 1 above, para 61.
22. A good recent example is Lloyds TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd v Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd [2003] UKHL 48.
23. CP, n 1 above, para 46.
24. R v Bow Street Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 61 at 119, 147.
25. CP, n 1 above, para 52.
26. There is an alarming account of the extent to which Senate confirmation hearings have become politicised around the issue of abortion in J Toobin ‘Advice and Dissent: The fight over the President's judicial nominations’The New Yorker, 26 May 2003, p42.
27. Department for Constitutional Affairs Constitutional reform: a new way of appointing judges CP 10103, July 2003.
28. CP 10/03, n 21 above, para 43.
29. CP 10/03, n 21 above, para 45.
30. CP 10/03, n 21 above, para 38.
31. H Kennedy Eve was Framed: Women and British Justice (1993) p 267. The Commission for Judicial Appointments also refers to the ‘cloning effect’ in its Annual Report (2003) para 4.31.
32. B Hale ‘Equality in the Judiciary: A Tale of Two Continents’ 10th Pilgrim Fathers' Lecture, 24 October 2003.
33. Barak, n 2 above, at 28–29.
34. Stevens (2002), n 19 above, p 152.
35. 347 US 483 (1955).
36. N Johnson Reshaping the British Constitution (forthcoming) ch 11.