1. Cf eg J Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J H Bum and H L A Hart (eds)) (London: Methuen, 1982) ch 12, paras 26–27.

2. Hume Commentaries vol 1 p 25.

3. Cf A Norrie Crime. Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1993).

4. It should be noted that this is not the only circumstance in which the use of the adverb outstrips the use of the verb. Cf the brief discussion of unreflective action below.

5. R A Duff Intention. Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

6. J Hornsby ‘On What's Intentionally Done’ in S Shute, J Gardner and J Horder Action and Value in Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

7. The methodology of this essay is one that would not be accepted by Nicola Lacey. She draws a distinction between ‘conceptual analyses’ and ‘ordinary language’ approaches. Cf ‘A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?’ (1993) 56 MLR 621. I think that this distinction is problematic. There are some ordinary uses of terms that articulate the concepts with which they deal and others which do not. The distinction between the ordinary use of a term and metaphor is only possible because of the existence of a concept. Eg if my dog eats too much, I might say that he intends to get fat. This is obviously not a literal use of the verb ‘to intend’ . On the other hand, when my dog is whining at the door, I say that he wants to go out. This is a literal use of the verb ‘to want’ . A dog cannot intend, at least in the sense that the term is used in the former example, for intending involves a conception of what will happen in the future and the possibility of it not occurring. This is not available to non-language users. On the other hand, my dog can want, for wanting, in the sense that it is used, can refer to purely behavioural phenomena (cf B Rundle Mind in Action (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) ch 3). An important part of my subsequent analysis will be to determine whether some ordinary uses of the adverb ‘intentionally’ are closely related to the general concept of intention or, alternatively, are used merely as substitutes for moral reprimands. The outcome of this discussion will help us to illuminate the ambit of the concept of intention and its relationship to moral responsibility. Consequently, I think that Lacey is mistaken in drawing a distinction between ‘conceptual’ and ‘ordinary language’ approaches. Furthermore, she is wrong to reprimand Antony Duff for conflating the two. As we shall see, it is not Duff's methodology that is mistaken.

8. There appears to be a further category of ‘wilful fire-raising’ that is used where particular types of property are ignited.

9. Cf A P Simester ‘Why Distinguish Intention from Foresight?’ in A P Simester and A T H Smith Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

10. Cf D Davidson ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ in Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). This has led to a debate about whether or not the reason is a cause for my action. We need not unpack that debate here.

11. Bede Rundle disagrees with this. He thinks that we are entitled to rephrase the sentence ‘Oedipus intends to marry Jocasta’ as ‘Oedipus intends to marry his mother’, even if Oedipus does not know that Jocasta is Oedipus's mother. Consequently, he argues that in the latter sentence there is ‘no commitment to saying that Oedipus realises that Jocasta is his mother’ (Rundle, above n 7. p 148). I think that this is mistaken. When told that Oedipus intends to marry his mother, eg there is no reason to doubt that Oedipus believes the woman that he is about to marry to be his mother. Consequently, the sentence only becomes true if we add a further clause ‘but he doesn't know that she is his mother’ . The former sentence is true without this further clause.

12. Simester, above n 9, thinks that there is no good reason to make the distinction, at least as far as the prima facie ascription of responsibility is concerned, although he thinks that advertent side-effects might be subject to defences where directly intended consequences are not. A Kenny, in ‘Intention and mens rea in murder’ in P M S Hacker and J Raz Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) and J Finnis, in ‘Intention and side-effects’ in R G Frey and C W Morris Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), argue that there is a good reason to do so.

13. J Raz Practical Reasons and Norms (London: Hutchinson, 1975) and J Gardner ‘Justifications and Reasons’, in Simester and Smith, above n 9.

14. Cf Gardner, above n 13.

15. ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’ in Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

16. Cf Raz, above n 13, p21.

17. M Bratman Intention, Plans mid Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) p 124.

18. Duff, above n 5, p 77.

19. The ambiguity in this sentence reflects the ambiguity in Duff's account as we shall see below.

20. Hornsby, above n 6, p 66.

21. ‘Moral Certainty and the Boundaries of Intention’ (1996) 16 OJLS 455.

22. Hornsby, above n 6, p 67.

23. Simester, above n 21, p 455. I have called this account ‘causal’, for the reason that it suggests that the cause of our inappropriate use of the adverb is the desire to reprimand the agent.

24. Duff, above n 5, p 78.

25. Above n 5, p 78-9. Cf J Gardner and H Jung ‘Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duffs Account’ (1991) 11 OJLS 559 at 571.

26. Duff, above n 5, p 77. It should be noted that it is correct to say that I mark the snow voluntarily. See my conclusions below.

27. It might be argued that there was a guiding reason that ought to apply in this case: I ought not to walk across snow that I believe to be sacred. This cannot be the case. There are some beliefs which are not merely neutral but abhorrent. Even if one has those beliefs, one ought not to regard them as reasons for actions. Eg if I am a racist who believes black people to be intellectually inferior to white people, this reason ought not to apply to my decision whether or not to employ a black person. Cf also my example of the terrorist who saves his aeroplane. In this case, he intentionally saves the passengers even though he ought not to regard this as a reason against warning security.

28. Duff, above n 5, p 134.

29. Simester, above n 21, p 455 (my emphasis). See also the quotes in the opening passage of this section.

30. Hornsby, above n 6, p 66. In fact, the concept of a ‘state of mind’ is inappropriate as far as ascribing intentions is concerned. The reasons are similar to those discussed by PMS Hacker in relation to beliefs in ‘Malcolm and Searle on “Intentional Mental States”’ (1992) 15:3 Philosophical Investigations 245. He argues that, whereas mental states have genuine duration, beliefs do not. Hence, whilst asleep I cannot be in a state of fear but I can believe that the world is round. Similarly, I can intend to become a rock-star whilst asleep. Better would be to argue that it is subjective criteria that determine whether or not an agent has a particular intention.

31. Above n 6, p 68.

32. Gardner and Jung, above n 25, p 571.

33. Gardner, above n 13, p 110.

34. Simester, above n 21, p 452.

35. Gardner, above n 13, p 111.

36. That is not to say that these categories are mutually exclusive. We commonly use moral terms both to describe and ascribe: consider saying that someone is jealous or greedy. However, unlike some of the authors that I have discussed here, I do not think that the terms associated with the concept of intention fall into this intermediate category. I think that they are purely descriptive.

37. This form of the sentence is not appropriate where X has made an epistemological rather than ethical mistake about regarding C as a reason not to V. In that case, we tend to include the word ‘believe’ in the sentence. Eg suppose that John did not go to the party even though he believed that his friend would be there. If it turned out that the friend was in fact not there, we would tend to say that ‘John did not go to the party despite believing that his friend would be there’.

38. Just to reiterate a point that I made earlier, we also use the adverb in relation to unreflective actions. What I have said here is not intended to have any bearing on the concept of intention as it applies to those actions. It may be that this theory is still appropriate in such circumstances.

39. We should note that there is still some asymmetry between the reasons for and the reasons despite (in the appropriate sense) which one acts. One can intend a consequence if that is the reason for which one acts even if there is a significant chance that it will not come about. However, one does not intentionally bring about a consequence despite which one acts if there is a significant chance that it will not come about. Eg suppose that I am being followed by a friend. I realise too late that I need to take a turn to the left. I know that there is a chance that my friend will lose me. If the reason I make the turn is to lose my friend, we say that I intend to lose my friend, even though there is a chance he will make the turn. If I make the turn despite the fact that I might lose my friend we are not inclined to say that I lost him intentionally if he did not manage to follow me. In this case, we tend to say that I brought about a risk or a chance intentionally without committing ourselves to saying that the consequence was brought about intentionally when that risk or chance was realised.

40. This also helps to explain the phenomenon of the agent who or believes that he had a reason to V but does not act for that reason. In the example where my fascist uncle is coming to visit, this was a reason for me to go out and I had that reason to go out but the fact that I did not act for that reason meant that I did not intend to leave the house empty. Neither did I leave the house empty intentionally. This would only be the case if leaving the house was put into the balance; it was a part of the reasoning process. To say that I did not leave the house intentionally expresses the fact that I put this reason aside in order to make my decision. In other words, I thought that there was an exclusionary reason not to consider the reason that my fascist uncle was about to arrive.

41. Belief that one's action will cause a particular consequence is not necessary. For that would exclude cases where the agent intends a particular consequence but only has a chance of succeeding. Eg if A shoots at B. uncertain of his success, he is commonly held equally as morally responsible as C, who shoots at B with a greater chance of success.