1. R Stewart ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harv LR 1667 at 1734–1747.

2. Cane ‘Standing up for the Public’ [1995] PL 276 provides an alternative classification in which representational standing (as opposed to cases of personal standing) is either associational, public interest or surrogate. The terms associational and ‘surrogate’ are understood in the way we employ them. As for ‘public interest’ standing, this occurs where an individual, corporation or group purports to represent the public interest. In general, he welcomes the trend in English administrative law towards entertaining public interest challenges in cases where the ‘fundamental rights’ of the public are concerned.

3. Indeed, it was in this capacity that their application in R v Inspectorate of Pollution and another, exp Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 was made: Greenpeace had been consulted, but they were arguing on behalf of those who had not been consulted (p 348).

4. The poor, here and abroad respectively. See R v Secretary of State for Social Services, exp CPAG and Greater London Council, The Times, 16 August 1985; R v Secretary of State for Social Services, exp CPAG [1989] I All ER 1047 and R v Secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, exp World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611.

5. This would include eg a welfare claimant-ie someone without a private right as such.

6. This may fall short of an interference with private rights such as nuisance.

7. See Stewart, above n 1, p 1734. The interest of Greenpeace, for example, will typically be an ideological one viz protecting the environment.

8. Stewart, above. The case of R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p Blackburn [1968] 1 All ER 763 which involved a challenge to a police policy of non-prosecution, is a good example of a law-enforcement interest. Of course, one might also class this as an ideological interest (Stewart p 1739). As we shall see later on, the categories of case which have caused most problem in relation to standing have been those where the applicant is associational or surrogate and asserts a general interest.

9. As Craig says, an adequate answer cannot be given to the question of what should count as a sufficient interest ‘without some understanding of the broader issues underlying locus standi. Indeed any answer which is given will implicitly, if not explicitly, presuppose a particular view of the function to be performed by standing.’ (Craig, Administrative Law, (London 3rd edn, 1994) p 499.

10. To label this a ‘private rights-influenced’ model is not to say that standing under this model is limited to those with specific contractual or tortious rights-as notes 4 and 5 above demonstrate, personal interests are wider than this. However, this model is a hangover from the days in which standing was thus limited.

11. Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford 1992) Oxford see esp chs 4,7,8 & 9.

12. Ibid at pp 206–210. Good examples of writing in the liberal normativist school include Allan Law, Liberty and Justice (Oxford 1993), and Jowell & lester ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law’ [19871 PL 368. According to Loughlin (at p 210) the leader of the judicial wing of the movement is Lord Browne-Wilkinson, largely it seems because of his dissent in the Court of Appeal in Wheeler v Leicesrer City Council [1985] AC 1054 at 1063.

13. See Craig, above n 9, pp 505–506; R Cranston ‘Reviewing Judicial Review’ in G Richardson & H Genn eds Administrative Law and Government Action (Oxford 1994) 45 at p 60; and Sir K Schiemann, ‘Locus Standi’ [1990] PL 342 at p 348. Schiernann does not rest his practical objections on an increase in the number of proceedings. The problem with that is that many of his practical arguments can be used against any judicial review action, whoever the applicant might be.

14. Cf Cane ‘Statutes, Standing and Representation’ [1990] PL 307,309 who states that it is time limits and not standing which ought to be used to deal with the problem of delay. However, even if time limits are observed, there is still some delay before an application for leave is made and during the course of the proceedings themselves, and the argument here is that wider right of standing would increase the number of judicial review cases and hence increase the number of such delays.

15. Mr Justice S Sedley ‘Governments, Constitutions and Judges’ in G Richardson and H Genn eds, Administrative Law and Government Action (Oxford, 1994) 35 at p 42; Sir K Schiemann, above n 13, at p 348. See also the celebrated Treasury Solicitors publication issued to civil servants-‘The Judge Over Your Shoulder’, (London: HMSO, 1993). Of course, it may be that administrators fireproof their decisions to protect against potential challenges by those with personal interests. However, the claim must be that, in broadening rights of standing to include those with general interests, the number of overall cases will increase which will make administrators more likely to react by fireproofing.

16. Craig, above n 9, p 506.

17. C Harlow and R Rawlings Law and Administration (London, 1984) chs 1–2. Whether the models developed by Harlow and Rawlings capture the complexities of the topic is open to question.

18. M Loughlin, above n 11.

19. Above n 9 at p 506.

20. Above n 15, at p 42. For an earlier assertion of the positive impact of judicial review see the remarks of Lord Donaldson MR in R v Lancashire County Council exp Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941 at 945.

21. M. Sunkin, L Bridges and G Mesazaros Judicial Review in Perspective-An Investigation of Trends in the Use and Operation of the Judicial Review Procedure in England and Wales, (London, 1993).

22. In 1987, 55.5% of all leave applications were granted. The equivalent figures for 1988 and 1989 are 60.7% and 60.6% respectively. As for the percentage of all leave applications which led to a substantive hearing the figures are: 1987–28.2%; 1988–34.8%; and 1989–31.4%. See Sunkin et al, ibid at pp46–54 and Diagram 4A therein. More recent figures covering the period from January-July 1994 can be found in Annexes 1 and 2 of the Law Commission's Report No 226 Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals (London 1994). Unfortunately, no separate category of environmental-related challenges is recorded. Actions commenced which related to planning permission and enforcement orders accounted for 33 cases on the Crown Office List as at end July 1994. This contrasts with the relatively high number of planning cases in the period 1987–89. The latter may, in part, be explained by increases in property values at that time which prompted heightened levels of activity in the house building sector.

23. The Australian Law Reform Commission's Report No 27, Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 1985, was similarly unconvinced by the argument that broad rules on standing would give rise to a flood of suits—see paras 188–196.

24. See further the discussion of motivation in J Vining Legal Identity: the Coming of Age of Public Law (London, 1978) pp 126–28.

25. On this, see P Craig Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, (Oxford, 1990).

26. See further D Feldman ‘Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative Perspective’ (1992) 55 MLR 44, pp 48–9: and Cane An Introduction to Administrative Law (Oxford, 1992) p 55. In the context of environmental law, a decision to grant standing to environmental pressure groups could therefore be justified by pointing to the limited opportunities open to such groups at the policy making stage. An interesting contrast may be made with Germany where the strong representation of environmentalists in the political sphere including the Bundestag may be juxtaposed alongside stringent tests for standing in the courts, especially at a federal level. See M Berger ‘The Rights of Environmental Organisations in Germany to Bring Suits and the Environmental Legal Assistance Fund eV’ in D Robinson and J Dunkley eds Public Interest Perspectives in Environmental Law (Chichester, 1995) p 109.

27. C Harlow & R Rawlings Pressure Through Law, (London, 1992) pp 293–8. Though how successful the strategy of the CPAG was has been doubted-see T Prosser Test Cases, for the Poor (1983).

28. Feldman, above n 26, pp 49–50.

29. Ibid.

30. See Stewart, above n 1.

31. The prioritization of good administration secures benefits for each citizen (qua funder and recipient of public services) in the form of minimum standards of state conduct. Whilst ‘good administration’ could have utilitarian overtones, our emphasis is upon the entitlement of the citizen to high standards, qualified by respect for the autonomy of the individual. This qualification may however be overridden by the utilitarian concept of the ‘national interest’.

32. For Loughlin, above n 11 Dicey is foremost among the conservative normativists in that he wished to control the executive (normativist) but regarded the ordinary law, applicable through the ordinary courts as sufficient to do this (conservative reliance on existing institutional and juristic arrangements). As Loughlin notes, the leading modern writer in this school is HWR Wade with C Forsyth (see his Administrarive Law (7th edn, Oxford, 1994) though in recent times he has shifted towards a liberal normativist stance (Loughlin, pp 213–214). Wade recognised that the growth of administrative powers post 1945, albeit regrettable, was inevitable and that a separate corpus of administrative law was needed to control this power. His conservatism stemmed from his general acceptance of the current approach to administrative law (unlike liberal normativists, who believe that a Bill of Rights is required and or that current decisions lack a principled basis). Though Dicey is a conservative normativist in Loughlin's terms, he is correctly viewed in a broader political sense as a liberal in his commitment to individual liberty and a minimal role for the state. It is in this latter sense that we have treated him as a liberal theorist.

33. (Oxford, 1992) Allan admits in his preface to an unashamed attempt to defend liberal normativism, though his version of course differs from our own.

34. The ‘rights’ which Allan considers worthy of protection in public law include both ‘constitutional’ rights-liberty of the person, freedom of speech, assembly etc and a much less specific (but nonetheless significant) right-the right to fair treatment at the hands of the state. On an analysis of current case law in chs 8 and 9. Allan claims fair treatment is already protected to some degree.

35. See eg p 180, and pp 235–236.

36. A point made, for example, by Craig, above n 9, p 508.

37. See eg pp 59–61, and pp 230–336.

38. See pp 235–236 and see further Brilmayer (1977) 57 Boston ULR 807 cited with approval by Allan.

39. See Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (London, 1960) pp 200–201.

40. Specifically, the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

41. See Jowell and Lester, above n 12.

42. [1994] 1 All ER 457.

43. Because either of the overtly political nature of the dispute or the fact that the applicant sought to persuade the court to become involved in an assessment of the proper use of scarce resources or, finally, because of the existence of an alternative remedy. See further Cane ‘The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law’ [1980] PL 303, 327.

44. See J Gray The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (London, 1991).

45. An example based on an observation by Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337, pp 352–353. See also Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40.

46. The matter of holidays raises certain problems which we address later on.

47. R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, ex p People Before Profit (1983) 45 P & CR 364, pp 370–1. See also Sir K Schiemann above n 13, pp 346–7.

48. Of course, we recognise that there will often be difficult value judgments in deciding whether something is in the national interest in this way.

49. And this might include matters which would normally be regarded as of exclusively local concern, but which, because of their seriousness, ought to be overridden. For example, if local people decide not to challenge poor drinking water that is one thing, but if they decided not to challenge a decision which would lead to them catching the plague, that would be a matter where national paternalism might have a place.

50. Above n 13.

51. See the ruling in R v Darlington BC, ex p Association of Darlington Taxi Owners [1994] COD 424 where the question of capacity is stated to be separate and prior to the question of locus standi and is to be considered at the leave stage. The earlier authority of R v Liverpool Corporation, exp Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] I QB 299 seems to have assumed (presumably incorrectly) that the association did have the capacity to seek relief. The court in exp Association of Darlington Taxi Owners pointed out that in exp People before Profit (above, n 47) the association had formed itself into a limited company for the purposes of the judicial review action.

52. See eg R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, exp World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611, p 620. Use of the word ‘discretion’ might be thought to make the question one of fact rather than law. However, Comyn J has described standing as a ‘pure matter of law’ (People Before Profit, above n 47, p 371), and Lord Roskill has described it as a ‘mixed question of fact and law’ (R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617 at 659, otherwise known as the Fleet Street Casuals case). It is submitted that the latter is the most accurate description. First, it is a question of law insofar as the courts must follow what previous binding cases have said on when the standing question is to be addressed and what factors must be taken into acount. Some of the confusion on that point may have arisen from a comment made by Lord Diplock in Fleet Street Casuals above at p 642). He said that, since the draftsman of Order 53 had specifically chosen the new form of words ‘sufficient interest’ in place of the old ‘person aggrieved’ formula, the courts had an ‘unfettered discretion’ to decide on the meaning of the new test. In other words, they could ignore the case-law under the old formula. However, while the courts may have had unfettered discretion at the very beginning, now that a body of case-law has built up around the new wording, they no longer have such discretion and must follow that law. Next, when one actually looks at the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether to grant standing (which will be examined below in the text), some are questions of law and others are questions of fact.

53. [1989] I All ER 1047, p 1056.

54. That is if the respondents do not challenge the standing of the applicants.

55. R v Secretary of State for the Environment, exp Friends of the Earth Ltd and Another [1994] 2 CMLR 760, p 763. In the Court of Appeal, the fact that the High Court had granted standing was merely noted, see The Times, 8 June 1995. Query whether the court can accept jurisdiction in a case without explicitly discussing standing, or whether they must at least touch on the issue in every case. Even after Woolf LJ's judgment in the CPAG case, there have been a number of cases where the court has failed to broach the subject at all (either because standing has not been challenged or because, relying on a Fleet Street Casuals approach of fusing standing with the merits explained below in the text, the court tackles only the latter). Counsel in the WDM case certainly seems to have been under the impression that the court had to rule explicitly on the matter—see exp WDM, above n 4, p 6 19.

56. See also Lord Donaldson in R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, exp Argyll Group plc [1986] 2 All ER 257, p 265. Cf Scots law (eg Lord Clyde in Scottish Old People's Welfare Council Petitioners [1987] SLT 179, p 184; see further CMG Himsworth, ‘Judicial Review in Scotland’ in Supperstone & Goudie eds, Judicial Review, (London, 1992), p 418.

57. M Purdue ‘A Harpoon for Greenpeace?: Judicial Review of the Regulation of Radioactive Substances’ (1994) 6 JEL 297, pp 338–340.

58. Unless one takes the view that autonomy is protected by denial of a remedy.

59. As Lord Diplock emphasised in Fleet Street Casuals [1982] AC 617, p 644.

60. As in exp CPAG, above n 4.

61. Ibid and exp Greenpeace, above n 3, p 350. Bearing in mind the apparent favouring of groups over individuals in exp Greenpeace considered later in the text, this would presumably lend weight to a sole applicant if he could show that an appropriate group did not exist or that a group was not prepared to take action.

62. Lord Wilberforce in Fleet Street Casuals [1982] AC 617, p 630.

63. See exp CPAG, above n 4.

64. Lord Wilberforce, Fleet Street Casuals [1982] AC 617, p 633.

65. Ibid at 631. See also exp Greenpeace, above n 3, pp 349 and 351.

66. See eg exp Greenpeace, above n 3; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, exp Rose Theatre Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 504, and R v Secretary of State for Employment, exp Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] 1 All ER 910. Note however Craig's observation that: ‘The very process of statutory construction, looking to the nature of the duties therein and the subject matter of the claim, will often not be self-executing: the answer will not leap out from the relevant materials … (i)n reaching a conclusion on this issue the court will, therefore, have to fall back on more general beliefs about the role which standing should perform’ (Craig, above n 9, p 497).

67. Most planning and environmental cases will therefore be place cases.

68. R v MAFF, exp Roberts [1991] 1 CMLR 555.

69. Above n 4.

70. However, standing was not explicitly discussed.

71. Above n 4, p 620.

72. R v Legal Aid Board, exp Bateman [1992] 3 All ER 490, esp pp 495–6 and 500. See also R v Director of the Serious Fraud OfJice. exp Johnson [1993] COD 58.

73. As it happens, the applicant appears to have been a ‘frontman’ for the firm of solicitors-the client was legally aided and the solicitors were attempting to avoid the risks associated with litigating the matter themselves.

74. If the taxpayers were at fault in evading payment (as in the Fleet Street Casuals case itself), then, it might be said that their wrongdoing makes their autonomy less deserving of respect by the courts.

75. Again, for the reasons put forward in the previous note, the suspect arguably ought to lose any claim to autonomy here; only the autonomy of the victim is worthy of respect. Consider as well the case where the victim of an offence accepts the decision of the CPS not to prosecute at all and a latter-day Raymond Blackburn seeks review. The exp Blackburn cases (R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner exp Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118; R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, exp Blackburn (No 3) [1973] QB 241) do not offer much guidance on this point as in none of these was there another person more directly affected by the non-enforcement of illegal gaming or obscene publications laws who did not wish the police to enforce the relevant law. In neither case was Mr Blackburn's standing questioned.

76. R v Shefield CC. exp Russell and Others [1994] 68 P & CR 331.

77. R v North Herts DC, exp Sullivan [1981] JPL 752-admittedly a pre-Fleet Street Casuals case. On standing in planning law cases (both statutory appeals and judicial review) see Hough ‘Standing in planning permission appeals’ [1992] JPL 319.

78. R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, exp Duddridge and Others, The Independent, 4 October 1994.

79. Covent Garden Community Association v Greater London Council [1981] JPL 183; R v Stroud District Council, exp Goodenough (1982) 43 P & CR 59 and R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, exp People before Profit, above n 47.

80. The difference between these cases and the type of case in (i) above in which standing would be denied to general interests, lies in the broad impact of the planning permission on the local community. Because of the broad impact on the local community, the wider local interest deserves to override the autonomy of those with personal interests in these cases.

81. Covent Garden. For another example of the grant of standing to a litigant with a close local interest see R v Dyfed County Council, exp Manson [1994] COD 366 where the applicant, representing the Newport Beach Action Group, sought to impugn the validity of byelaws made by the Council as contrary to the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949. The applicant lived in a house adjoining the area to which the byelaws applied and he used the beach for a number of purposes which were regulated under the byelaws.

82. Goodenough.

83. People Before Profit. It appears that the applicants were not residents or ratepayers but the judge was not troubled by this (above n 47, pp 370–371).

84. Above n 3.

85. Above n 55.

86. Although they were more affected than other people nationally. Does that give them a personal interest? Otton J implies that the members in Greenpeace do have a personal interest (above n 3 p 351); and in exp WDM, counsel for the respondents attempted to distinguish Greenpeace on the ground that the individual members in that case were asserting a personal interest (above n 52, p 6 19). However, in neither of these cases was the matter argued in any detail. If they were held to have a personal interest wouldn't that mean that the applicants in the Covent Garden line of cases above also have a personal interest? And the appellants in the Twyford Down case considered below? After all, in those cases, the litigants have no greater interest than the local population but a greater interest than the national population. Or is health special? In the end, the issue is really only one of having to choose some means of classification: it just so happens that to fit our framework set out at the beginning, we refer to the interest in Greenpeace as a general one.

87. For details of the substance of the challenge, see further Purdue, above n 57.

88. Of course, unconsented emissions arising from an accident (as in Chernobyl) have the capacity to affect those beyond the region, but while this might give them standing to challenge the original planning permission, it need not give them standing to challenge (as in Greenpeace) the decision to grant authorisation for consented emissions. But what of holidaymakers to Cumbria? It is submitted that they ought not to have standing in this type of case because exposure to low-dose radiation for a short holiday period is very unlikely to lead to damage to health.

89. A high-sulphur fuel which is thought to pose some health risk (eg asthma) to local communities.

90. Sadly, now deceased.

91. Thames Water Utilities Ltd and Anglian Water Services Ltd were supply drinking water with pesticide levels above the maximum admissible concentrations in the Drinking Water Directive 80/778. Under the Water Industry Act (WIA) 1991, s 18 the Secretary of State is under a duty to issue an enforcement order if conditions have been breached, unless, under s19(1)(b), he accepts an undertaking from the company that they will take the necessary steps to secure compliance. The Secretary of State accepted such an undertaking from Thames Water and Anglian Water on 4 October 1991 and hence allowed them to continue to supply water in breach of EC standards. It was this decision to accept the undertakings which was challenged by the applicants.

92. What if the applicant holidays there? Serious breaches of quality standards may give him standing, but he ought not to have standing in relation to relatively minor breaches of the type found in the FOE case, because exposure over a short holiday period would probably be insufficient to lead to long-term damage.

93. Above n 66.

94. There were local residents in the company (ibid, p 521), but a significant proportion of the membership consisted of the cultural great and the good.

95. Or might the court have taken the view that while a local case can be of national importance, a national case cannot be of local importance?.

96. R v Poole Borough Council, exp Beebee [1991] JPL 643.

97. Although in the event, consent was given for it to be joined as an applicant after leave had been granted in order to provide a costs guarantee.

98. Twyford Parish Council v Secretary of State for Transport (1992) 4 JEL 213; the case was actually decided on 26 October 1990.

99. Admittedly, this was a statutory appeal under the Highways Act 1980 where the test for standing is whether the appellant is a ‘person aggrieved’ (Sch 2, para 2) rather than the ‘sufficient interest’ formula involved in Order 53 cases. However, the courts seem to be moving towards a uniform standing test for both types of case.

100. On the Community law aspects of the case, see A Ward ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy in European Community Law and Environmental Protection: A Case Study of United Kingdom Judicial Decisions Concerning the Environmental Assessment Directive’ (1993) 5 JEL 221, pp 232–235.

101. Although see above n 86.

102. Would the same approach be taken in a pollution control case which posed no direct threat to health? For example, would standing be granted to challenge the legality of the National Rivers Authority's consent setting process? On the basis of the Twyford Down decision, the answer may be that a local individual or group would be granted standing.

103. The Twyford Down case came some time before Greenpeace, after which a group may argue that they have an interest through having members in the area—unless that part of the Greenpeace decision only applies where health interests are at issue (considered later in the text).

104. Standing was granted to the ‘Oxleas Nine’ who were challenging the East London River Crossing (see S Grosz, ‘When we can't see the wood for the fees’, The Guardian, 2 March 1993; The decision and Grosz's article are significant in that they rest on the premise that environmental groups would not have had locus standi to challenge these roads cases because of the lack of a local connection.

105. A difficult value judgment will of course present itself in these roads cases: to some, a stretch of countryside will only be of national importance if it affects a site of special scientific interest (SSSI) or the like; to others, any countryside (particularly beautiful countryside) is of national importance. With increased national anti-road sentiment, the latter seems most appropriate. In other words, things may change with time, and the courts must beware of losing touch with the prevailing national mood.

106. In granting standing, Otton J placed some emphasis on the fact that Greenpeace had been treated as a consultee during the consultation process (above n 3, p 351). He was apparently unconvinced by counsel for BNFL's argument (which echoed that of Schiemann J in Rose Theatre, where the company had also been involved in consultation of sorts-above n 66, p 521) that to grant standing on the ground that the group has been involved in consultation, would effectively discourage statutory authorities from consulting groups beyond the limits of their express statutory duty to do so (p 348).

107. [1991] 2 A11 ER 10. As with Twyford Down, a statutory appeal case (under s 245 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971-now s 288 of the TCPA 1990) where the relevant test for standing is whether the appellant is a ‘person aggrieved’.

108. [1991] JPL 39.

109. See Ward, above n 100, pp 232–233.

110. Although with Rose Theatre, bearing in mind n 95 supra, one might question whether any issue of local autonomy is raised in the first place.

111. In planning and environmental law, most groups will be associational (ie a group representing the interests of its members). Surrogate groups (where the group is re-presenting the interests of others) raise particular problems in terms of the analysis which follows.

112. Pressure Through Law, (London, 1992) p 144.

113. This final one-(c)-would be needed to explain the decision in exp CPAG, above n 4-although the CPAG has members, it is primarily a surrogate group representing the interests of others. Its members (as opposed to welfare claimants) would probably have had no standing individually, and yet the group still had standing (cf exp WDM, where, as it happens, the members probably would have had standing as individuals—see n 118, below). On the other hand, (b) may be appropriate if, for surrogate groups, one states that the group has the same rights of standing, not as its members, but as those if seeks to represent (but this would raise difficulties in the WDM case).

114. This paragraph owes much to Harlow and Rawlings, Pressure Through Law, p 144.

115. Rose Theatre, above n 66, p 521. However, Schiemann J commented that ‘(i)t would be absurd if two people, neither of whom had standing could, by an appropriately worded memorandum, incorporate themselves into a company which thereby obtained standing.’.

116. Ibid.

117. In doing so, he was acting in accordance with some authority. After all, Lord Wilberforce in the Fleet Street Casuals case had stated that: ‘an aggregate of individuals each of whom has no interest cannot of itself have an interest’-[1982] AC 617 at 633.

118. However, the position in exp WDM is different because, as will be seen below in the text, all the members of the group would, it seems, have had standing.

119. See Greenpeace, above n 3, p 351.

120. The case was not in fact argued in precisely this way.

121. And would it make a difference if a local branch of Greenpeace brought the action? Presumably, they would be unable to finance it themselves, but if national Greenpeace contributed funds, would the courts ‘pierce the corporate veil’?.

122. Indeed, Otton J counsels that ‘it must not be assumed that Greenpeace (or any other interest group) will automatically be afforded standing in any subsequent application for judicial review in whatever field it (and its members) may have an interest’ (above n 3, p 351).

123. Cf Cane above n 2 who does not think it right to allow an assessment of competence or resources to determine standing in his public interest type challenge.

124. Above n 55, p 762-emphasis added. Note the mention in the quote of the founding date may indicate the importance of longevity-a point which will be discussed below in the text.

125. Above n 4, p 620.

126. Above n 3, p 351.

127. See also exp FOE, above n 55, and exp WDM(the WDM is described, above n 4, p 617 as being over 20 years old).

128. In a slightly different context.

129. Pressure Through Law, London, 1992) pp 304–305.

130. Ibid.

131. It should be remembered that place cases are not confined to environmental/planning law. A decision of a licensing authority for example would also be tied to a particular locality.

132. Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals (London, 1994) para 5.20 et seq.

133. ‘Judicial Review-A Possible Programme for Reform’ [1992] PL 221.

134. Law Commission above n 132, para 5.22.