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Governmental liability in tort and the public and private law division

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel*
Affiliation:
Bristol Polytechnic
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Extract

The recent litigation arising out of the Spycatcher affair was bound by the very nature of the issues at stake to be controversial; yet whatever view is to be taken of the rights and wrongs behind these issues one aspect of the litigation that was always likely to give rise to difficulties and to leave the common lawyers open to criticism was the conceptual framework in which these issues were handled. Ought serious constitutional questions like press freedom - questions that involve not just the public ‘interest’, but also the public’s ‘right’ to information in a democracy - to be debated at the level ofprivate ownership? Indeed is it actually rational to treat a government body, in relation to another government body or to the press, as if it were a private citizen entitled to the same rights (for example a ‘right to privacy) the human legal subject?

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , November 1988 , pp. 277 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1988

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References

1. A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1987); 1 WLR 1248.

2. See, eg, R v Commission for Racial Equality, exp Hillingdon LBC (1982); AC 779 at 787–788 where Lord Diplock appears to treat as a private person one government body in relation to another government body.

3. See, eg, Home Office Harman (1981); QB 534 at 557.

4. The literature is enormous; for some discussions in English on the civilian distinction between public and private law, see: Jones, , Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford, 1940) pp 139–163Google Scholar; Jolowicz, , Roman Foundations of Modem Law (Oxford, 1957) pp 49–53Google Scholar; Lectures, on Jurisprudence (Athlone, 1963) pp 320–327Google Scholar; Szladits, ‘The Civil Law System’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Chap 2, Part II, paras 25–57. One of the best surveys of the distinction with regard to the common law is: Weir, ‘The Common Law System’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Chap 2, Part III, paras 115–134; cf Harlow, “‘Public” and “Private” Law: Definition Without Distinction’ (1980) 43 MLR 241. For some recent discussion on the division in English law see, Lord Justice Woolf, ‘Public Law - Private Law: Why the Divide? A Personal View’ (1986) PL 220; Cane, ‘Public Law and Private Law’, in Eekelaar & Bell (eds), Oxford Essy in Jurisprudence (Third Series) Oxford, 1987) pp 57 – 78.

5. Cf Re Norway's Application (1987); QB 433 at 473, (1988) 3 WLR 603 at 653–654.

6. On which see Daintith, ‘Legal Analysis of Economic Policy’ (1982); 9 Journal of Law & Society 191, 214–216.

7. See, eg, British Steel Corpn v Granada Television (1981); AC 1096 at 1168; Harman v Home Office (1983) 1 AC 280 at 299; Defence Secretary v Guardian Newspapers (1985) AC 339 at 345.

8. See generally, Harlow & Rawlings, Law and Administration (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984); pp 13 – 22. (Herein after cited Harlow & Rawlings.).

9. See, eg, Ex p Hillingdon, supra; Dunne v NW Gas Board (1964); 2 QB 806.

10. See, eg, Bognor Regis UDC v Campion (1972); 2 QB 169.

11. Harlow & Rawlings, pp 24, 78ff.

12. David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens, 3rd edn 1985); p 321.

13. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1981); pp 286 – 295.

14. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1979); pp 54 – 55.

15. Jones, op cit, p 141; van Caenegem in Burns (ed). The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought 350–1450 (Cambridge 1988); pp 178 – 179.

16. Milsom, op cit, pp 79 – 81.

17. Chevrier, ‘Remarques sur I'introduction et les vicissitudes de la distinction du “jus privatum” et du “jus publicum” dans les oeuvres des anciens jurists francais’ (1952) Arch de Phil du Droit 5, 50ff but cf Études Le Bras (Sirey 1965);, 11, pp 841–859.

18. Maitland, , The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge 1908); pp 530 – 539.Google Scholar

19. Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Sources of History 1975); p 299.

20. See, eg, Lawson. Remedies of English Law (Butterworths. 2nd edn, 1980); pp 1ff.

21. D.l.1.12; J.3.13pr.

22. Buckland & McNair. Roman Law and Common Law (Cambridge. 2nd edn. 1965); P xvi.

23. Stein, ‘The Development of the Institutional System’, Studies in Justinian's Institutes in Memory of JAC Thomas (Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) pp 151 – 163; Legal Institutions (Butterworths, 1984); pp 125 – 129.

24. Villey, Lecons d'histoire de la philosophic du droit (Dalloz, 2e éd, 1962) pp 167–188; Seize essais dephilosophie du droit (Dalloz, 1969) pp 149–155; Le droit el les droits de l'homme (PUF, 1983) pp 69–79; Maine, Early Law and Custom (John Murray, 1883) pp 365 – 366.

25. Villey, Lecons, supra, pp 172 – 173.

26. Thus the ‘thing’, rather than some named defendant, was originally the ‘other party’ to the action: G.4.16–17, 87; Wenger Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure (Veritas Press, revised edn, 1940; trans Fisk) pp 164 – 165.

27. J.3.13pr.

28. D.6.1.9, 13; cf Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford 1936); pp 151ff.

29. de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Creek World (Duckworth 1981); pp 334, 425e Coleman in Bum, op cit, pp 607 – 625.

30. See, eg, D.2.14.38, 42.

31. Doubtless it is most misleading even to conceptualise Roman public law in terms of the ‘individual and the state’: Arangio-Ruiz, , Istituzioni di Diritto Romano Jovene, 4a edn 1937)Google Scholar; p 35; cf Ellul, Histoire des institutions: 1–2/L’ Antiquité (PUF, 6’éd, 1984) pp 477 – 478.

32. Jones, op cit, p 142.

33. This point is developed in a little more depth in: Samuel, Roman Law and Legal Theory, Mélanges Villey (PU d'Aix-Marseille 1985); pp 43ff. The point to be made is that if ownership in private law consisted of a bond between person-and-thing, then once one posed a question about who ‘controls’ (ie, ‘possesses’) public property one is soon going to think in terms of the factual bond between person-and-thing, then the legal bond (ownership) and finally the ‘owning unit’ - ie, public body as ‘legal person’.

34. G.2.11; D.8.l.lpr.

35. D.8.1.6.1; 41.2.22–2.

36. D.50.16.16.

37. See, eg, D.4.3.15.1.

38. See, eg, Ullmann, ‘Juristic Obstacles to the Emergence of the Concept of the State in the Middle Ages’ (1969); Annali di storia del diritto 43, 48 – 51.

39. See generally, D.49.14; Mestre, , Introduction historique au droit administratif francais (PUF 1985); pp 106 – 108Google Scholar; Jolowicz, Roman Foundations (op cit) pp 129–130; cf Duff, Personality in Roman Private LAW (Cambridge, 1938) pp 51 – 61.

40. See, eg, D.50.1.25.

41. See, eg, D.49.14.45.6.

42. See, eg, D.47.10.14.

43. See, eg, Buckland & McNair, op cit; Villey, Philosophie du droit: II (Dalloz 1979); p 159.

44. Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (Penguin, 1975) p 147; The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Methuen 1967); p 69.

45. Ullmann, Individual and Society, supra, p 96.

46. Milsom, op cit, p 56.

47. Baker, op cit, pp 1161 – 32.

48. D.49.1.19;C.1.14.11.1; Biondi, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Giuffre, 4a edn 1972); p 28.

49. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd edn 1973); p 513 quoted in, Stein, Legal Institutions, op cit, p 117.

50. Jones, op cit, p 14; and see generally, Legohérel, Histoire du droit public francais (PUF 1986); pp 30 – 47.

51. Villey, La formation de lu pensée juridique moderne (Montchrestien, 4e édn 1975); pp 533ff.

52. Stein, Legal Institutions, p 125.

53. See, eg, Levin, The Charter Controversy in the City of London 1660–1688 and its Consequences (Athlone 1969); pp 1–16. For the late Middle Ages see, Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton, 1957).

54. Roman law was of the utmost importance in municipal law on the Continent and municipal law in its turn provided a foundation for much of the modern Continental administrative law: Mestre, op cit, pp 55 – 58, 89ff.

55. Gough, The Social Contract (Oxford, 2nd edn, 1957) pp 126q Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford 1979); pp 36 – 60.

56. Early Law and Custom, op cit, p 389.

57. See generally, Ullmann, Low and Politics (op cit) pp 25–116; Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150–1650 (Cambridge 1982); pp 8 – 28.

58. Stein, Legal Institutions, p 108.

59. Maitland, op cit, p 538.

60. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1885); pp 79ff; see generally, Fasso, Histoire de la philosophic du droit: XIXe et XXe siècles (Storia della filosofia del diritto, Vol III) (LGDJ, 1977; trad C Rouffet) pp 21 – 25.

61. Harlow & Rawlings, pp 67ff.

62. Hugo Young, The Guardian (18 June 1985);, p 21.

63. Cf Weir, ‘A Strike Against the Law ?’ (1986); 46 Maryland LR 133.

64. (1863); 14CB (NS) 180; 143 ER 414.

65. In the Roman classical sense that legislation was about public law ‘commands’: D. 1.3.7; Biondi, op cit, p 64.

66. C.1.14.11.1 (1.14.12.3).

67. See, eg, de Ste Croix, op cit, pp 383–392; Class in Marx's Conception of History, Ancient and Modern (1984); 146 New Left Review 94, 110.

68. D.1.3.16.

69. D.1.3.7.

70. Ellul, Histoire des institutions: 3 –Le Moyen Age (PUF, 9e édn 1982); pp 22 – 23.

71. Cairns, ‘Blackstone, An English Institutist’ (1984); 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 318.

74. ‘Classification of Law - II’ (1983 Part 1] City of London Law Review 13, 27–31.

73. On which see also Samuel, ‘Le Droit Subjectif and English Law’ (1987); CLJ 264.

74. Ionescu, La notion deroit subjectif dans le droit privé (Bruylant, 2e édn 1978); pp 141 – 149.

75. Cf Samuel (1984); 100 LQR 537; Re KD (a minor) (1988) 1 All ER 577 at 588, HL.

76. Lawson, Selected Essays: 1 (North-Holland 1977); p 180.

77. Samuel, Le Droit Subjectif op cit; cf Ionescu, op cit, pp 141k149.

78. Roubier, , Droits subjectifs ct situations juridiques (Dalloz 1963); pp 73ff.Google Scholar

79. On which see, Samuel, ‘Classification of Law - IV’ (1984 Part 1) City of London Law Review 3 10 – 13.

80. Fry in Fritz v Hobson (1880); 14 Ch D 542 at 552.

81. See, eg, Gaunt v Fynney (1872); LR 8 Ch App 8 at 11. For the civilian notion of an abus de droit see generally, Ghestin & Goubeaux, Traité de droit civil: introduction générale (LGDJ, 2nd éd, 1983) pp 612 – 662.

82. (1963); 2 QB 502.

83. Financings Ltd v Baldock (1963); 2 QB 104 at 115.

84. (1963); 2 QB at 520 per Pearson LJ.

85. Ibid at 523 per Davies LJ.

86. Ibid at 522 per Pearson LJ.

87. See now, Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (1982); AC 173.

88. Francom v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd (1984); 1 WLR 892 at 897; Samuel (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 300.

89. This does now seem to be a key conceptual basis to the Western idea of law: David, ‘The Different Conceptions of Law: Introduction’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol I, Chap 1, Part I, paras 14–24.

90. See, Samuel, ‘Classification of Law - II’, op cit, p 30.

91. Samuel, ‘Le Droit Subjectif, op cit..

92. Harlow & Rawlings, pp 261ff.

93. See, eg, Harlow & Rawlings at p 262.

94. Ibid at p 264.

95. O'Reilly v Mackman (1983); 2 AC 237.

96. Weir, A Casebook on Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edn, 1983); p 150.

97. Hargreaues v Bretherton (1959); QB 45.

98. Jolowicz, Lectures, op cit, pp 345 – 347.

99. (1981); AC 446.

100. (1980); QB 105.

101. A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1987); 1 WLR 1248 at 1303–1307.

102. Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale 1919; reprint, 1966) pp 3638.

103. But cf Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, s 54(1); Housing Act 1980 s 1.

104. Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, s 4.

105. Roubier, Droits subjectifs, op cit, pp 11–12, 56ff, 299–299; cf Motulsky, ‘Le droit subjectif et l'action en justice’ (1964) Arch de phil du droit 215.

106. See, eg, Cocks v Thanet DC (1983); 2 AC 286.

107. See, eg, Annr v Merton LBC (1978) AC 728; Thornton v Kirklees Metropolitan BC (1979) QB 626; cf Cocks, supra; Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd (1988); 1 All ER 163, PC. And see, Weir, Casebook (op cit) pp 162–163.

108. Cocks, supra.

109. See, eg, Griffith, The Politics of the judiciary (Fontana, 3rd edn 1985); p 102.

110. Weir (1982); 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 440.

111. Casebook, p 56.

112. (1983); 2 AC 286.

113. O'Reilly v Mackman (1983); 2 AC 237 at 275, 277.

114. Per Lord Diplock in Mackman, supra, at 277.

115. (1983); 2 AC at 292–293. And see also the Privy Council's view on the relationship between a Minister's alleged duty to seek legal advice before exercising a discretion under a statute and a duty of care in tort arising out of such an exercise: Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd (1988) 1 All ER 163 at 173–174.

116. Anns v Merton LBC (1978); AC 728; cf Investors in Industry Ltd v South Beds DC (1986) 2 WLR 937 at 959.

117. Tate & Lyle Ltd v GLC (1983); 2 AC 509; and see, Fellowes v Rother DC (1983) 1 All ER 513; Takaro Properties, supra..

118. Wandrworth LBC v Winder (1985); AC 461 at 509–510.

119. Davey v Spelthorne BC (1984); AC 262 at 276.

120. Weir, ‘Complex Liabilities’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol XI, Chap 12, para 67. With regard to the common law's dilemma, see Takaro Properties, supra, pp 171 – 172.

121. (1985); AC 461.

122. Woolf (1986); PL 220, 234–235.

123. Jolowicz (1983); CLJ 15.

124. Turpin, ‘Public Contracts’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol VII, Chap 4, para 42; Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities (LSE 1954); pp 24 – 26.

145. (1985); AC at 508, 510.

126. Although the tide seems now to be turning: Investors in Industry Ltd v South Bed DC (1986); 2 WLR 937; Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd (1988) 1 All ER 163 at 173, PC.

127. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent (1941); AC 74.

128. Annr v Merton LBC (1978); AC 728 at 756–757, 764–767.

129. Weir, OJLS, op cit; Takaro Properties, supra..

130. See now, Lomb v Camden LBC (1981) QB 625; Peabody Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd (1985); AC 210; Weir (1985) CLJ 26; Takaro Properties, supra..

131. Smith v Scott (1973); Ch 314.

132. Compare Tate & Lyle v GLC (1983) 2 AC 509 with Smith v Scott, supra; and see also, Allen v Gulfoil Refining Ltd (1981); AC 1001.

133. Milsom, op cit, pp 398 – 399.

134. Haydon v Kent CC (1978); QB 343.

135. Anns v Merton LBC (1978); AC 728.

136. Mitchell v Ealing LBC (1978); 2 All ER 779.

137. D.9.2.13pr.

138. Roubier, Droits subjectifs, pp 282 – 299.

139. D.9.3.l.5–6.

140. Compensation is payable only for ‘personal injury’: see Hepple & Matthews, Tort: Cues & Materials (Butterworths, 3rd edn 1985); p 801.

141. Harlow & Rawlings, pp 383ff.

142. Fellowes v Rother DC (1983); 1 All ER 513 at 517–522; Weir, Casebook, pp 4 5, 55–56, 62–64.

143. Weir, Casebook, pp 5, 267–272, 343–344.

144. Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180; 143 ER 414: Bayce v Paddington BC (1903); 1 Ch 109 at 114.

145. Rookes v Barnard (1964); AC 1129 at 1226 per Lord Devlin.

146. Spartan Steel and Allays Ltd v Martin & Co (1973); 1 QB 27; Weir, Casebook, pp 33–34, 49.

147. See, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn (1948); 1 KB 223.

148. See, eg, Gregory v Camden LBC (1966); 1 WLR 899.

149. Cf David v Abdul Cader (1963); 1 WLR 834, PC.

150. Hedley Byme & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964); AC 465; Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd (1983) AC 520.

151. Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp (1970); 2 QB 223.

152. Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982); AC 158, PC.

153. Ben Stansfield (Carlisle) Ltd v Carlisle City Council (1982); 265 EG 475; Murdoch (1983) 99 LQR 178.

154. Weir (1985) CLJ 26; Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd (1988) 1 All ER 163, PC; and see, Stephens v Anglian Water Authority (1987); 1 WLR 1381, CA.

155. Takaro Properties, supra, pp 172–173. Perhaps one should also mention habeas corpus: Ex p Ann Turner (1872); 41 LJQB 142 (is this a private or a public law case?).

156. Weir, Casebook, pp 268 – 269.

157. See generally, Lawson, Remedies (op cit); Lord Templeman in R v IRC, ex p Preston (1985); AC 835 at 864–866 (my thanks to Dr John Bell for bringing this speech to my attention).

158. Chief Constable of Kent v V (1983); QB 34; Tettenborn (1983) CLJ 51; cf Chief Constable of Hampshire v A Ltd (1984) 2 WLR 954; Samuel (1984) 100 LQR 537.

159. (1983); QB 34 at 43, 46.

160. Ibid at 43.

161. Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v jones (1968); 2 QB 299.

162. Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No 2) (1979); Ch 344.

163. This is well brought out by the Spycatcher injunction case: A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1987) 1 WLR 1248; and see also Samuel, ‘Equity and the Legal Divisions - Part II’ (1986); 37 NILQ 315, 328–330.

164. R v IRC, exp Preston (1985); AC 835 at 851, 852, 864. And see especially on this point, at 852, Lord Scarman: ‘judicial review should in principle be available where the conduct of [a public officer] … would have been equivalent, had they not been a public authority, to a breach of contract or a breach of a representation giving rise to an estoppel. Such a decision could be an abuse of power…’.

165. See, eg, Barraclough v Brown (1897); AC 615.

166. Carbonnier, Droit civil: 3– Les Biens (PUF, 10e édn 1980); pp 106 – 110.

167. (1980); 1 WLR 582.

168. See, eg, Boyce v Paddington BC (1903); 1 Ch 109 at 114.

169. See, Weir, Casebook, p 158.

170. See, eg, Stroud v Bradbury (1952) 2 All ER 76; Kenlin v Gardiner (1967); 2 QB 510.

171. On which see, Harlow & Rawlings, pp 284ff.

172. See, eg, Townley v Rushworth (1963); 62 LGR 95.

173. See, eg, Hubbard v Pitt (1976); QB 142. And see also, Frank Robinson v The Queen (1985) 3 WLR 84, PC.

174. Villey, Droits de l'homme, op cit, pp 12 – 14.

175. Harlow & Rawlings, pp 311ff.

176. Roubier, Théorie générale droit (Sirey, 2e édn 1951);, pp 252ff, 266ff, 300ff, etc. All the same this is not to suggest that the notion of ‘abuse’ has no place in private law or that the idea of a ‘wrong’ has no place in public law, for both dominium and imperium are sources of power: see, eg, Roubier, supra, pp 258ff.

177. Robert Goff in Fellowes v Rother DC (1983); 1 All ER 513 at 518.

178. On which see, Anns v Merton LBC (1978); AC 728 at 754ff; and now Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd (1988) 1 All ER 163, PC.

179. Roubier, Droits subjectifs, p 19. Cf Lord Keith's use of the ‘public interest’ in Takaro, supra, p 173; and on the abuse of the notion of ‘public interest’ see Hugo Young, The Guardian (28 January 1988);, p 23.

180. Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1881); 6 App Cas 193 at 201, 203, 208.

181. MS&L Ry v Brown (1883); 8 App Cas 703 at 716–720.

182. See, eg, Hipkins v Birmingham & Staffordshire Gas Co (1861); 30 LJ Exch 60; Ricket v Metropolitan Ry (1867) LR 2 HL 175 at 202–203; Atiyah, Rise and Fall, op cit, p 94.

183. See, eg, Lord Denning MR in Allen v Gulf Oil Refining (1980); QB 156 at 168–169; cf (1981) AC 1001.

184. On which see, Griffith, op cit, pp 129 – 130.

185. Ibid, p 203; and see A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1987); 1 WLR 1248 at 1302.

186. Griffith, supra, pp 139–140.

187. Lord Wilberforce in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers (1978); AC 435 at 482.

188. The Ideologies of Planning Law (1981);, quoted in Harlow & Rawlings, p 363.

189. (1983); 2 AC 237.

190. Supreme Court Act 1981, s 31; Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53.

191. (1983); 2 AC at 275.

192. Ibid.

193. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985); AC 374 at 401, 408, 411, 415; Ganz, Legitimate Expectation, in Harlow (ed), Public Law and Politics (Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) pp 145 – 162.

194. See, eg, (1983); 2 AC at 277, 283–284.

195. Certoma, The Italian Legal System (Butterworths 1985); pp 20 – 24.

196. Ionescu, op cit, p 131; Roubier, Droits subject, pp 19–20. However both of these authors do not themselves subscribe to the view that the subjective right is limited to private law. And see, Certoma, supra, pp 2CL24.

197. Roubier, Droits subjectif, pp 11 – 12.

198. Weir, Casebook, pp 5, 26g269.

199. Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers (1978); AC 435.

200. See, eg, Lord Roskill in CCSU v Minister for Civil Service (1985); AC 374 at 420. The security services seem to be claiming that this right gives them the liberty to break the law on occasions: The Independent (13 January 1988) p 1.

201. Weir, Casebook, pp 4 – 5.

202. Perhaps indicating a change of values: Champaud, Le Droit des affaires (PUF, 2e éd 1984); pp 38 – 39; cf Weir, ibid..

203. Reich, The New Property (1964); 73 Yale LJ 733, 785787, quoted in, Harlow & Rawlings, pp 48–49.

204. Using the terms in their wider sense to include constitutional rights: see generally, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977); Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford, 1984).

205. Compensation and Government Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1982);, pp 117c Harlow & Rawlings, pp 383ff.

206. Stein, Legal Institutions, p 109; cf Weir, The Common Law System, op cit, para 115.

207. Demichel & Lalumère, Le droit public (PUF, 3e éd 1979); p 12; Brown & Garner, French Administrative Law (Butterworths, 3rd edn, 1983) pp 113, 132 – 161.

208. It must also be remembered that the English common law has not yet worked out a legal concept of the State; by thinking in terms of the ‘Crown’ it is still in the position that French politico-legal thought was in during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: Legohérel, op cit, pp 52, 65.

209. See, eg, Hugo Young, The Guardian (22 December 1987); p 13.

210. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, op cit, pp 25 – 29.