1. Pp 253–254. References to page numbers, save where otherwise indicated, are references to the book under review.

2. Report of the Committee on Legal Education (Cmnd 4595, 1971) Appendix F, at p 208.

3. pp 16–17.

4. p 5.

5. p 15.

6. P 17. See also pp 264–265.

7. On this description, see Jacob, ‘The Reform of Civil Procedure’ in the volume of his collected papers bearing the same title, 1, 24. The article was first published in The Law Teacher (1980).

8. Eg Stalev, ‘El Proceso Civil en los Estados Socialistas’ in LXXV Años de Evolución Jurídica en el Mundo III (1978) 167 at 186.

9. See, eg, for France, Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law (3rd edn, 1983) p 57; Debbasch, Contentieux administratif (3rd edn, 1981) No 19. These, and other, authors draw attention also to elements of administrative procedure which reflect the ‘adversary’ rather than the ‘inquisitorial’ approach.

10. ‘In their basic conceptions, the civil procedure systems of France, Germany, and the United States were - and remain - adversarial’: Von Mehren, ‘The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks’ in Europäisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrifl für Helmut Coing (1982) 361, no 3; Langbein, ‘The German Advantage in Civil Procedure’ (1985) 52 U of Chi LR 823, 824. Questions of degree are involved, and it is probably true that German civil procedure is more ‘inquisitorial’ than the French. In truth, however, no system of procedure can be wholly adversarial or wholly inquisitorial in character: Jolowicz, ‘Adversarial and Inquisitorial Approaches to Civil Litigation’ in Baldwin (ed), The Cambridge Lectures 1983 237.

11. Eg, France, new code of civil procedure (hereafter ‘ncpc’) art 9. The court may not itself order a fact finding procedure (‘mesure d'instruction’) so as to cure a party's failure: art 146. What is more, the principle of contradiction - that nothing, not even legal reasoning, may be used by the judge in coming to his decision if the parties have not had the opportunity to debate it - is rigorously observed in many countries. In its original version the ncpc, introduced in 1975, purported to allow the judge to base his decision on a point of law taken by him of his own motion even without first inviting the parties' observations on it. This was annulled by the Conseil d'Etat as contrary to ‘general principles of law:’ CE, 12 Oct 1979, D 1979, 606, note Bénabent; JCP 1980. II. 19288, concl Franc, note Boré. For the present rule see art 16.

12. Devis Echandia, ‘Facultades y deberes del juez en el moderno proceso civil’ in (1968) Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal 393 at 395–396.

13. It is now normal that each case is assigned from its inception to a judge who oversees and has responsibility for its preparation for decision by, usually, a collegiate court of which he is but one member, and in comparatively recent times the powers of this judge have been enhanced. Considerable power was, it is true, already accorded to the judge by the Prussian Code (Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung) of 1793-1795, but this lasted only until 1833. The German Code of 1877 and, to a larger extent, the Austrian Code of 1895 contain provisions which are based on the idea that the court has a role to play in discovery of the truth. In France and, to a greater degree, in Germany, the judge of today has the power not only to refuse a party's request for a particular mesure d'instruction - the examination of witnesses or the appointment of an expert to investigate and report, for example (ncpc, art 147) - but, subject to what is said, supra n 11, to order a mesure d'instruction of his own motion: ncpc, arts 19, 143-144.

14. This power has now been introduced for proceedings in the Chancery Division, in the Commercial and Admiralty Courts and for Official Referees' business: RSC, Ord 38, r 2A. It is recommended by the Lord Chancellor's Department's Civil Justice Review; General Issues (hereafter ‘General Issues') para 200, that witness statements should be provided as a matter of course in all classes of civil litigation.

15. pp 63–66.

16. P 183. See also pp 74–75.

17. Eg Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329 at 333, per Lush LJ; Letang v Cooper (1965) 1 QB 232 at 242-245, per Diplock LJ See Couture, ‘The Nature of Judicial Process’ (1950) 25 Tulane Law Review 1 at 2-9;Jolowicz, ‘The Dilemmas of civil Litigation’ (1983) 18 Israel Law Review 161 at 162-166.

18. Ncpc, arts 122, 125.

19. This is, to all intents and purposes, acknowledged at p 126.

20. [1978) AC 435. See also Ashby v Ebdon (1985) Ch 394.

21. R v IRC, exp Fed of Self-Employed (1982) AC 617 at 644.

22. [1983) 2 AC 237.

23. Gillick v West Norfolk AHA (1986) AC 112.

24. [1986) AC at 207. See Wade (1986) 102 LQR 172; Jolowicz (1986) CLJ 1.

25. Couture, Ioc cit, supra n 17 at p 5.

26. Sir Jack himself recognises the urgent need ‘for extending the ambit of representative or class actions, particularly for the purpose of safeguarding the public interest’ pp 81–82. The whole subject of civil actions brought ‘in the public interest’ is attracting increasing attention on a world wide scale. See, eg, Cappelletti and Garth, ‘The Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation’ in Habscheid (ed) Effectiveness of Judicial Protection and Constitutional Order I (’ The General Reports’) 112 (a general report submitted to the VII th International Congress of Procedural Law, Wurzburg, 1983) and ibid II (’ The Discussions) 55. See also, Jacob, ‘Safeguarding the Public Interest in English Civil Proceedings’ (1982) 1 CJQ 312; Jolowicz, ‘Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation: English Law’ (1983) CLJ 222.

27. [1966) 1 QB 273.

28. p 157.

29. p 160.

30. p 160.

31. See p 20 and General Issues paras 201-202, 205.

32. To say nothing of Sir William Blackstone who considered that trial by jury would save the liberties of England from the fate that befell those of Rome, Sparta and Carthage: III BI Comm 379.

33. ‘The Present Importance of Pleadings’ in Jacob, op cit, supra, n 6, 243. The article was first published in Current Legal Problems (1960).

34. pp 85–86.

35. p 92.

36. RSC, Ord 25, rr 1(2); 9. Sir Jack himself recommends its general abolition: p 106.

37. ‘Accelerating the Process of Law’, op cit, supra, n 6, 91, 100. The article was originally prepared for and presented as a general report to the VIth International Congress of Procedural Law, Ghent, 1977.

38. Eg, Summary judgment under RSC, Ord 14; Strikng out under RSC, Ord 18, r 19; Dismissal for want of prosecution; and, no doubt, some cases of default.

39. RSC, Ord 22. The law relating to ‘without prejudice’ correspondence is also useful.

40. P 118, quoting the (Winn) Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation (Cmnd 3691, 1968) para 511.

41. See pp 45–47.

42. p 116.

43. Eg, France, ncpc, arts 21, 127-131. Formerly an attempt at conciliation was mandatory in all cases, but this was not successful and the law was changed in 1949.

44. See Bender and Strecker, ‘Access to Justice in the Federal Republic of Germany’ in Cappelletti and Garth (ed) Access to Justice I, 529 at 551-553; Bender, 018;The Stuttgart Model’, ibid 11, 433. The Simplification Amendment (Vereinsfachungsnovelle) of 1976 gives a legal basis to some, but not all, of the features of the Stuttgarter Modell.

45. ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073.

46. Ibid, at p 1089.

47. Most importantly, perhaps, the sections that deal with costs and legal aid (pp 45–50, 273–276), with the enforcement of judgments (pp 185–210, 271–273) and with the creation of a single court of civil judicature (pp 259–263).

48. P 285. The quotation is attributed to Daniel Webster: ibid n 54.