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‘To the uttermost ends of the earth’? The War Crimes Act and international law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Andrew J. Cunningham*
Affiliation:
University of Reading

Extract

‘The National Socialist rulers of Germany invented new ways of controlling the policy and action of other countries without subjecting them to a formal military occupation, and some day it may be necessary for our courts to consider whether conduct equivalent to the German practice of establishing complete and effective domination over professedly neutral countries by insinuating agents and specialist troops into key positions, while permitting their governments nominally to continue to exercise their functions, as a prelude to plunging them into war, amounts to enemy occupation or not’

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1991

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References

1. HC Debs, vol 127, Cols 28–29, 8 February 1988.

2. War Crimes: Report of the War Crimes Inquiry (1989) (Cm 744) (hereinafter ‘Report’). The Report consists of two parts, only the first of which has been published. The second part contains a summary of the 301 cases that the Inquiry considered; these, according to para 9.50, ‘disclose horrific instances of mass murders’. For discussion, see Finnie, W.: ‘War Crimes’ (1990) Juridical Review 61 Google Scholar; Steiner, E.: ‘Prosecuting War Criminals in England and France’ [1991] Crim LR 180 Google Scholar.

3. Report, chs 9 & 10.

4. Report, para 10.3.

5. HC Debs, vol 163, cols 86a910, 12 December 1989.

6. HC Debs, vol 169, cols 887-975, 19 March 1990; HC debs, vol 171, cols 429-56, 25 April 1990. The vote on second reading was 273: 60; and on third, 135: 10.

7. HL Debs, vol 519, cols 1080-1208,4 June 1990

8. HC Debs, vol 188, cols23-118, 18 March 1991; HC Debs, vol 188, cols738-40, 25 March 1991.

9. HL Debs, vol 528, cols 619-744, 30 April 1991

10. HC Debs, vol 190, cols 315-17, 1 May 1991.

11. HC Debs, vol 190, col 848, 9 May 1991.

12. HC Debs, vol 191, Written Answers, col 487, 22 May 1991. The warcrimes investigation unit, established by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, comprises nine officers under Detective Chief superintendent Bathgate; investigations commenced formally on 28 May 1991, No arrests are immediately envisaged: Metropolitan Police spokeswoman, personal communication, 12 July 1991.

13. Respectively, the dates on which Germany invaded Poland; and the date of the signing of the quadripartite declaration of defeat and assumption of supreme authority by the allied powers: HC Debs, Standing Committee A, col 44, 3 April 1990.

14. Section 1(3).

15. Section 1(1).

16. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law 1856. Text in Roberts, A. & Guelff, R. (eds): Documents on the Laws of War (2nd edn) (1989) 24 Google Scholar.

17. Ibid, 44.

18. Hague Convention IV, Preamble, para 8; see, further, infra, n 28.

19. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Cmd 6964, 1946 (hereinafter ‘Nuremberg Judgment’) 65, 125; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Complete Transcript of the Proceedings, vol 20 (hereinafter ‘Tokyo Judgment’) 48442, 48457–8, 48490–1, 48497–8 (also reported as Re Hirota (1948) 15 AD no 118, 356); Re Krupp (1948) 15 AD no 214, 620, 622; Re Von Leeb (German High Command Trial) (1948) 15 AD no 119, 376, 383–4.

20. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1929, 118 LNTS 343; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 1929, Cmd 3940 (1931).

21. Nuremberg Judgment, 46; 48; 64; Tokyo Judgment, 48457-8; 48442; 48490-1; 49719-20; Re Notomi Suco ( 1947) 14 AD no 96,208,21 0; Re Milch ( 1947) 14 AD no 129,299,301; Re Von Leeb, supra, n 19, 384.

22. Re Von Leeb, supra, n 19, 384; von Knieriem, A.: The Nuremberg Trials (1957) 300 Google Scholar; Baxter, R. R.: ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of customary International Law’ (1965-66) 41 BYIL 275,280-3Google Scholar.

23. In Re Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen Trial) (1948) <15 AD no 217, 656, 658, the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (USMT), having noted Germany's obligations under art 46 of the Hague Regulations, stated that ‘the jurisdiction of this Tribunal … does not depend alone on this specific pronouncement of International Law. … all nations have held themselves bound to the rules or laws of war which came into being through common recognition and acknowledgement, Without exception, these rules universally condemn the wanton killing of non-combatants’.

24. Hereinafter ‘murder, etc’.

25. Article 4: ‘Prisoners of war… must be humanely treated’; art 46: ‘… the lives of persons … must be respected’. See also art 50.

26. Article 2: ‘Prisoners of war … shall… be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence … Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden’; art 3: ‘Prisoners of war are entitled to respect for their persons and honour …’; art 46: ‘All forms of corporal punishment…and… all forms of cruelty whatever are prohibited. Collective penalties for individual acts are also prohibited’.

27. The term ‘war crime’ was used in the Nuremberg Judgment to designate what was previously referred to as a ‘violation of the laws and customs of war’. In this technical sense, a ‘war crime’ is to be distinguished from a ‘crime against humanity’: Report, para 1.12; see, further, infra, nn 3541 and accompanying text.

28. Hague Convention IV, Preamble, para 8; this, the so-called De Martens Clause, was included in the Preamble in an attempt to ensure protection for civilian populations and belligerents in cases where the Hague Regulations were insufficiently specific. See, eg Re Krupp, supra, n 19, 622: ‘The Preamble is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages established among civilised nations, the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions of the Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare’ for examples of the use made of the clause by domestic tribunals, see Re Rauter (1949) 16 AD no 193, 526, 541 (Netherlands); Auditeur Militaire v Krumkamp (1950) 17 ILR no 122, 388; Re Köppelmann (1950) 17 ILR no 126, 397 (Belgium).

29. Infra, n 33, on reprisals.

30. As contained in the Hague Regulations, arts 1 and 2.

31. In Re List (the Hostages Trial) (1948) 15 AD no 215, 632, 639–41, the USMT held that if members of partisan bands not meeting the requirements of lawful belligerency were captured, having participated in fighting, they were not entitled to he treated as prisoners of war, and the defendants could not be charged with their killing. Cf Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II: Disputes, War and Neutrality (Lauterpacht, ed) (7th ed) (1952) 591, n 5 (hereinafter Oppenheim, ii). On spies, see, ibid, 421–5.

32. A prisoner of war suspected of war crimes may he tried and, if found guilty, executed by the belligerent by whom he is captured: Schwarzenberger, G.: International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol II: The Law of Armed Conflict (1968) 453–4Google Scholar. Prisoners of war might also be killed in accordance with military necessity: Execution of Prisoners of War (Germany) Case (1952) 19 ILR no 127, 596, 597–8; Military Prosecutor v B and van E (1951) 18 ILR 536.

33. Various defences were pleaded in war crimes trials after the Second World War, including self-defence, reprisals, military necessity, act of state, tu quoque and, though not strictly a ‘defence’, superior orders. Usually, these defences failed on the facts although, clearly, had the facts been different, any of them might have been successful. See, Oppenheim, ii, passim; Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 507–523; for specific examples, see Nuremberg Judgment, 41–2, 10&9; Re Von Leeb, supra, n 19, 395-8; Re Krupp, supra, n 19, 628-32; Re List, supra, n 31, 644–7, 649–52; Re Ohlendorf supra, n 23, 662–3, 665–8; Re Krauch (I.G. Farben Trial) (1948) 15 AD no 218, 668, 679–80; see, generally, the post-World War II volumes of the Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases.

34. Although s 1(1) of the Act states that proceedings may be brought against a person ‘irrespective of his nationality at the time of the alleged offence’, the intent here is only to confer jurisdiction on British courts over offenders who, at the time of the alleged offences, were not of British nationality.

35. Report, para 5.20: ‘There is no provision in any of the international treaties considered … for punishment of crimes committed by a State against its own citizens or committed in territory occupied by an annexation which was militarily unopposed’. See also Handel v Artukovic (1989) 79 ILR 396.

36. Cf Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, texts in Roberts and Guelff, supra, n 16.

37. Article 6(c) of the IMT's Charter; the Tribunal concluded that it could not ‘make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter…’: Nuremberg Judgment, 65.

38. (1947) 14 AD no 38, 100, 102; R v Finta (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 85, 101. See also R. K. Woetzel: The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (1962); Wright, Q.: ‘The Law of the Nuremberg Trial’ (1947) 41 AJIL 38 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Proponents rely particularly on the De Martens Clause, supra, n 28.

39. Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 496–9.

40. Report, para 9.7.

41. Statement by Minister of state, Home Office, HL Deb, vol 519, col 1084, 4 June 1990.

42. Infra, n 120.

43. Brownlie, I.: Principles of Public International Law (1990) (4th edn) 661 Google Scholar; Oppenheim's International L w , Vol I: Peace (Lauterpacht, ed) (8th edn) (1955) (hereinafter ‘Oppenheim, i’) 5514; 571-3; cf Weis, P.: Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (1979) (2nd edn) 135-160, 142-4Google Scholar.

44. Cf War Crimes Cases (Israel) (1951) 18 ILR no 169, 538, 541; see also discussion in the Belsen Trial, in Friedman, L.: The Law of War: A Documentaty History- Volume II (1972) 1499, 1507-8; 1511-2Google Scholar.

45. Infra, nn 163–65 and accompanying text.

46. HC Debs, Standing Committee A, cols 10; 18, 29 March 1990. Cf Distribution of German Enemy Property Act 1949, s 8( 1).

47. Prior to 1 September 1939, Germany acquired the Saar, the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel. Thereafter, she occupied at one time or another all or part of the following: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom (Channel Islands), Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland.

48. The following areas were annexed and incorporated into the German Reich: (i) prior to 1 September 1939: Austria, the Sudetenland, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and Memel: infra, nn 55–57; 59; (ii) on or after 1 September 1939: the Free City of Danzig: Lemkin, R.: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944) 7 Google Scholar; 154-6; 375-6 (hereinafter Lemkin); large parts of Poland: Lemkin, 7; 221–5; 506-22; the districts of Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet in Belgium: Lemkin, 7; 125; 313–16; the northern Yugoslavian provinces of Carniola, Carinthia and Lower Styria: Lemkin, 7; 243-5. Other territories were not formally annexed, but rather loosely incorporated into the Reich; for Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, see Lemkin, 7; 171–3; 385–9. Still others were slated for eventual incorporation: Shirer, W. L.: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), 1121 Google Scholar; Calvocoressi, P., Wint, G. & Pritchard, J.: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, Vol I: The Western Hemisphere (1989) (2nd edn) 264 Google Scholar.

49. Supra, n 47. On occupied territories, see Lemkin, passim; Verzjil, J. H. W.: International Law in Historical Perspective, Volume IX-A: The Laws of War (1978) 197207 Google Scholar; A. Dallin: German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (1981) (2nd edn), passim; Joesten, J.: ‘German Rule in Ostland’ (1943-44) 22 Foreign Affairs 143 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. J. Toynbee & V. M. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs 1939-46: Hitler's Europe (1954), passim; Calvocoressi, supra, n 48, passim; Shirer, supra, n 48, passim.

50. On the term ‘puppet’, see Marek, K.: Identity and Continuity of states in Public Internntional Law (1968) (2nd edn) 110 Google Scholar (hereinafter Marek; Crawford, J.: The Creation of States under International Law (1979), 64–5Google Scholar; Re G (1943–45) 12 AD no 151, 437.

51. Puppet states were created in Slovakia, in March 1939, and in Croatia in April 1941; puppet governments were numerous and varied: see, further, infra, nn 166–174 and accompanying text.

52. Infra, nn 125–139 and accompanying text.

53. For historical background, see Crawford, supra, n 50, 160-1; Shirer, supra, n 48,passim.

54. For historical background, see Wright, Q.: ‘The Rhineland Occupation and the Enforcement of Treaties’ (1936) 30 AJIL 486 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shirer, supra, n 48, passim.

55. For historical background, see Lemkin, 108-16; 283-99; Fenwick, C. G.: ‘Fuit Austria’ (1938) 32 AJIL 312 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, Q.: ‘The Munich Settlement and International Law’ (1939) 33 AJIL 12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reut-Nicolussi, E.: ‘The International Legal Status of Austria since 1918’ (1953) 39 TGS 119 Google Scholar; A. J. Toynbee & V. M. Boulter: Survey of International Affairs 1938: Vol I (1952), passim; Shirer, supra, n 48, passim, esp pp 396-436.

56. For historical background, see Lemkin, 131-3; 341-2; V. S. Marnatey & R. Luža (eds): A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948( 1973), passim; Noakes, J. & Pridham, G. (eds): Nazism 1919-1945 Vol 3, (1988) 718-20Google Scholar; R. G. D. Laffan: Survey of International Affairs 1938: Vol II (1951), passim; Shirer, supra, n 48, passim, esp pp 437-554.

57. For historical background, see Lemkin 133-9; 342-52; R. G. D. Laffan: Survey of International Affairs 1938: Vol III (1953), passim; Noakes & Pridham, supra, n 56, 727-8; Mamatey & Luža, supra, n 56, passim.

58. For historical background, see Lemkin, 139-44; 353-60; Laffan, supra, n 57, passim; Noakes & Pridham, supra, n 56, 725-6; Crawford, supra, n 50, 63; Shirer, supra, n 48, 523-54; Mamatey & Luža, supra, n 56, passim.

59. For historical background, see Lemkin, 198-9; 444-5; Laffan, supra, n 57, 357-90; Kalijarvi, T.: ‘The Problem of Memel’ (1936) 30 AJIL 204 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shirer, supra, n 48, passim; Interpretation of the Statute of Memel Territory (1932) Pub PCIJ Ser A/B No 49, 300.

60. Supra, n 53; Crawford, supra, n 50, 160, n 104.

61. Status of Saar Tem.tory Case (1929-30) 5 AD no 17, 33; Status of the Saar Territory Case (1929-30) 5 AD no 18, 34; Saar Territory (Trade Marks) Case (1933-34) 7 AD no 24, 59.

62. Liuy v époux Bodot (1933-34) 7 AD 62.

63. Wright, supra, n 54, 487.

64. Agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, cited in Wright, H.: ‘The Legality of the Annexation of Austria by Germany’ (1944) 38 AJIL 621, 626CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65. Treaty of Versailles, art 80; Treaty of St Germain, art 88.

66. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 1928 (1929) UKTS no 29.

67. Contained in a Note of 7 January 1932 from the United States to the governments of China and Japan following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; text in Brownlie, I.: International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 412 Google Scholar (hereinafter Brownlie).

68. Ibid, 412.

69. With respect to the Covenant and the Pact, it is a matter of some controversy whether they prohibit measures involving the use of force short of a formal recourse to war; similarly, controversy attaches to the question whether, if the obligations prohibit the use of force, they also prohibit any threat of use thereof: Brownlie, 84; Oppenheim, ii, 184. The Stimson Declaration probably did not itself create an obligation not to recognise forcible acquisition of territory; state practice in the period immediately thereafter was certainly inconsistent: Brownlie, 418–22. Resolutions of the League Assembly were, technically, not binding.

70. Marek, 343-6; E. Reut-Nicolussi, supra, n 55, 125; Crawford, supra, n 50, 310; Frankfurther v Exner Ltd [1947] Ch 629, 631.

71. By the Netherlands: infra, n 84.

72. Garner, J. W.: ‘Questions of State Succession Raised by the German Annexation of Austria’ (1938) 32 AJIL 421, 422–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that the United States recognised the annexation de jure. See also Woolsey, L. H.: ‘Nazi Laws in United States Courts’ (1950) 44 AJIL 129, 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Reut-Nicolussi, supra, n 55, 125, notes that ‘the attitude taken by Great Britain and France at the Munich Conference … has been interpreted as a tacit recognition of the facts of March 1938’. In a Statement dated 27 July 1942, the US Secretary of state said that ‘this government has never taken the position that Austria was legally incorporated into the German Reich’. In the Moscow Declaration of 1 December 1943, the Allied Powers declared that they regarded the annexation as null and void; Kelsen, H.: ‘The International Legal Status of Germany to be Established Immediately upon Termination of the War’ (1944) 38 AJIL 689, 689-90Google Scholar, argues the Declaration had ‘hardly more than a political character’; cf Heller v La Soie de Paris (1954) 21 ILR 262; Security for Costs (Austria) Case (1955) 22 ILR 58; Nemec v Établissements LAB (1955) 22 ILR 100.

73. Brownlie, 414–5; see also Lauterpacht, H.: Recognition in International Law (1947) 397–400 Google Scholar.

74. Nuremberg Judgment, 43; 106.

75. In Re Krauch, supra, n 33, 671-2, the USMT held the Hague Regulations inapplicable, since a state of actual warfare did not exist in either Austria or the Sudetenland; in Re Weizsaeckcr (Ministries Trial) (1949) 16 AD no 118, 344, 347, the Tribunal held that the invasions constituted an act of war; but cf dissenting judgment of Judge Powers, cited at 361-2. See also Brownlie, 399.

76. Infra, n 84.

77. In the United States of America, for example, see Johnson v Briggs (1938-40) 9 AD no 33, 87; Seery v United states (1955) 22 ILR 398; cf Land Oberoesterreich v Gude (1938-40) 9 AD no 34,89; see also Eck v NV Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomuart Maatschappij ( 1946) 13 AD no 13, 32. See, further, Marek, 345 n 4.

78. At least implicitly: see, eg Re Weiss (1938–40) 9 AD no 154, 407 (Argentina); State Immunity (Switzerland) (No 2) Case (1941–2) 10 AD no 62, 235 (Switzerland); Z v B (1950) 17 ILR no 97, 312 (Italy).

79. See, eg Security for Costs (Austria) Case, supra, n 72; Nemec v Établissements LAB, supra, n 72; Bruni v Pizzomo, cited in Marek, 358; cf Double Taxation Agreement (Austria) Case (1956) 23 ILR 123. See also Kleihs v Republic of Austria (1948) 15 AD no 18, 51; cf Jordan v Austrian Republic and Taubner (1947) 14 AD no 15, 41. See, generally, D. P. O'Connell: State succession in Municipal Law and International Law; Vol I; Internal Relations; Vol II: International Relations ( 1967), passim.

80. Recidivism (Germary) Case (1953) 20 ILR 89.

81. Nationality (Separation of Austria from Germany) Case (1948) 15 AD no 56,215; Nationality (State Succession) Case (1948) 15 AD no 57, 217; Austrian Nationality Case (1951) 18 ILR no 62, 248; Austrian Nationality Case (1953) 20 ILR 251; Nationality (Secession of Austria) Case (1954) 21 ILR 175; Aurtrian Nationality Case (1955) 22 ILR 430; Austro-Geman Extradition Case (1956) 23 ILR 364; Re Feiner (1956) 23 ILR 367. Cf Nationals Abroad (Racial Legislation) Case (1919-42) 1 1 AD (supp) no 89, 172.

82. R v Home Secretary, exp L [1945] 1 KB 7;(1943-45) 12 AD no 59, 199; Re Mangold's Patent (1951) 18 ILR no 59, 244; for criticism see, respectively (1946) 23 BYIL 378-81; Johnson, D. H. N. (1951) 28 BYIL 406-7Google Scholar; Weiner v Central Fund for German Jewry [1941] 2 All ER 29. Cf Application for Patents by AB (1944) 61 RPC 89; Distribution of German Enemy Property Act 1949, s 8(1). See also F. A. Mann: Foreign Affairs in English Courts (1986) 34 n 42.

83. US ex re1 Zdunic v Uhl (l941-42) 10 AD no 164, 530; see also US ex rel D'Esquiua v Uhl (1943-45) 12 AD no 8, 23; US ex re1 Schwarzkopf v Uhl (1943-45) 12 AD no 54, 188. See, further, Borchard, E.: ‘Collective Naturalization after Conquest - Its Inapplicability to Non-Residents’ (1943) 37 AJIL 634 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marek, 345 n 4; O'Connell, supra, n 79, I, 506.

84. Re Ten Amsterdam Oil Cos (1946) 13 AD no 20,46; Veenendaal v Pommcranz ( 1948) 15 AD no 55, 214; Public Prosecutor v KAHK (1957) 24 ILR 433.

85. PulencIKS v AUGUSTOUSKIS (1951) 18 ILR NO 20, 49, 50; O'CONNELL, SUPRA, N 79, I, 508.

86. Wasseruogel v Federal Department of Justice d Police (1949) 16 AD no 52, 184, 188.

87. Re Tancredi (1950) 17 ILR no 50, 203.

88. R v Prouincial Government of Upper Austria (1952) 19 ILR no 61, 335.

89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, arts 5CL51; (1980) UKTS no 58, Cmnd 7964.

90. Lord McNair: The Law of Treaties (1961) 207–8; Brownfie, 404–5.

91. On the Czech Parliament's failure to consent to the cession, see Lemkin, 132; Wolff, E.: ‘Municipal Courts of Justice in Enemy Occupied Territory’ (1943) 29 TGS 99, 102–3Google Scholar. Cf Marek, 283, 309–11; Q. Wright, supra, n 55, 28. See also Oppenheim, i, 889–90. Other grounds cited include the effect of subsequent German actions in Czechoslovakia in 1939: Lemkin, 132.

92. Brownlie, 415; cf Lemkin, 131.

93. Particularly the recognition of the Czechoslovak government in exile by the United Kingdom in 1941 and the repudiation of the Munich Agreement by that state and by the French National Committee in 1942: see Oppenheimer, F. E.: ‘Governments and Authorities in Exile’ (1942) 36 AJIL 568 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brownlie, 415; Pergler, C.: ‘The Munich “Repudiation”’ (1943) 37 AJIL 308 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94. Albeit recognised by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers: subra, n 59.

95. Cf State Succession (Lithuania) Case (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 44, 74.

96. Supra, nn 74–75.

97. Ratz-Lienert & Klein v Nederlands Beheers Instituut (1957) 24 ILR 536; cf Nederlands Beheers-Instituut v Nimwegen and Männer (1951) 18 ILR no 63, 249.

98. Weber and Weber v Nederlands Beheers-Instituut (1957) 24 ILR 431; Amato Narodni Podnik v Julius Keilwerth Musikinstmrnentenfabrik (1957) 24 ILR 435; cf Re Baroness von Scharberg (1951) 18 ILR no 67, 257; see, further, supra, n 97.

99. Land Registry of Waldsassen v Towns of Eger (Cheb) and Walhassen (1972) 44 ILR 50; cf German Nationality (Annexation of Czechoslovakia) Case (1952) 19 ILR no 56, 319.

100. Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans Case (1948) 15 AD no 12, 24; Confiscation of German Property in Czechoslovakia Case (1953) 20 ILR 31; Collective Naturalisation Case (1981) 61 ILR406.

101. Bohm v Czemy (1940) 190 LT Jo 54.

102. US ex re1 Reichel v Cancsi (1946) 13 AD no 49, 119.

103. Supra, n 69.

104. Lemkin, 1334; McNair, supra, n 90, 207-8.

105. Including the UK: Marek, 289; Brownlie, 414-6; Oppenheim, ii, 252. For the USA, see Werfel v Ziunostenska Banka (193WO) 9 AD no 32, 84; reversed: (1941-42) AD no 17, 78.

106. For the text of the German-Slovak Treaty of Protection of 24 March 1939, see Lemkin, 353–4.

107. Including the UK: Marek, 289; Mamatey & Luza, supra, n 56, 277; cf Bromnlie, 416.

108. Marek, 290.

109. Nuremberg Judgment, 125. Cf Marek, 301-2, criticising this dictum; and Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 511. In Re Weizsaecker, supra, n 75, 349, the USMT catcgorised the ‘invasion of Bohemia and Moravia’ as ‘in violation of international law’.

110. Re Lawin's Claim (1955) 22 ILR 152.

111. Anglo-Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen (194M5) 12 AD no 1 I , 43, 47.

112. Jellinek v Levy (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 12,24; X v Leuit and Walter (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 13, 25; Hollart v Moravia (1949) 16 AD no 7, 14.

113. German Nationaliy (Annexation of Czechoslouakia) Case, supra, n 99.

114. SARL ‘Koh-I-Noor-L et C. Hardmuth' v SA Agebel et Sociite’ de Droit Tchécoslouaque Enterprise Nationale Koh-I-Noor (1974) 47 ILR 31.

115. Valk v Kokes (1950) 17 ILR no 114, 357.

116. German nationality was not imposed on all inhabitants of Bohemia-Moravia; only, rather, on those of German ethnic origin. Inhabitants of Czech origin became citizens of the Protectorate: Lemkin, 1356.

117. German Nationality (Annexation of Crechoslouakia) Case, supra, n 99, 321: acquisition held effective.

118. SARL ‘Koh-I-Noor-L et C. Hardmuth’, supra, n 114: acquisition held ineffective.

119. Slovak National Internment Case (1986) 70 ILR 691.

120. Statement by Minister of State, HC Debs, Standing Committee A, col 15, 29 March 1990: ‘The issue of annexed territories should be cleared up, with particular attention to the Anschluss in Austria. Annexed territories do not present a real problem. They become part of the territory of the power that annexes them … At the time of the Anschluss, the annexed Austrian territory simply became part ofGermany for the purposes ofthe Bill… crimes committed in Austria against persons from the occupied territories … transported there would fall within thejurisdiction ofthe British courts’. This implies that all territories annexed prior to 1 September 1939 would be treated as ‘a part of Germany’. With respect to annexations post 1 September, it is not clear how this statement stands with the dictum ofthe IMT, infra, n 154, on the prohibition ofannexation ofoccupied territory durante bello.

121. Supra, nn 109-11; see, further, infra, nn 140-49.

122. Infra, nn 189-197 and accompanying text.

123. Supra, n 47.

124. Infra, nn 150-161 and accompanying text.

125. Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra, n 36.

126. On the position prior to 1945, see Greenwood, C.: ‘The Concept of War in Modern International Law’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 283, 284-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

127. Re Flesche (1949) 16 AD no 87, 266; Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 64; see also cases cited, ibid, 59; McNair, A. D.: ‘The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals’ (1925) 11 TGS 29, 30Google Scholar.

128. At least for Parties to the Hague Convention III of 1907; see further Lord McNair & A. D. Watts: The Legal Effects of War (1966) (4th edn) 7 n 3.

129. McNair, supra, n 127, 45; see also Oppenheim ii, 299 n 3; McNair & Watts, supra, n 128, 7-8.

130. Brownlie, 384-401; see also Y. Dinstein: War, Aggression and Self-Defence(1988), 11-21; Greenwood, supra, n 126, 286.

131. Oppenheim, ii, 202-3.

132. Cf Mc Nair and Watts, supra, n 128, 418. Brownlie, 400, arguing that ‘those parts of the laws of war which have a humanitarian basis should be given the widest possible application’ seems to accept this as a statement de lege ferenda.

133. Brownlie, 21 1 .

134. Re Krauch, supra, n 33. The decision in Re Weizsaecker, supra, n 75, confirms, by implication, that the application of the laws of war was dependent on the existence of a state of war.

135. Cf Brownlie, 211.

136. Ibid, 211; 389; 400. After direct German military rule commenced on 29 August 1943, Danish courts applied the laws and customs of war and, particularly, the Hague Regulations, to the occupation: Andersen v Christensen (1947) 14 AD no 124, 275; Statens Jordlousudualg v Petersen (1949) 16 AD no 189, 506; Re Kniest (1949) 16 AD no 190, 507; Re Hoffman (1949) 16 AD no 191, 508; Re Best (1950) 17 ILR no 146,434. See, further, Oppenheim, ii, 240.

137. Re Greiser(1946) 13 AD no 166, 387; N v B (1957) 24 ILR 941; B v T (1957) 24 ILR 962. See also McNair & Watts, supra, n 128, 5 n 2.

138. Doubt must attach to the status of Italian territory, and territories occupied by her, between 3 September and 13 October 1943 - respectively the dates of the signature of the Arinistice between Italy and the Allies, and the Italian declaratior. ofwar on Germany. As a matter of international law, an armistice constitutes merely a temporary suspension of hostilities and does not terminate a state of war: Oppenheim, ii, 546-56. Italian courts generally held that all Italian territory not liberated by the Allies was under German belligerent occupation, subject to the Hague Regulations, as from the date of the Armistice: see, eg Rainoldi v Ministero della Guerra ( 1946) 13 AD no 4, 6; Ferrovie dello Stato v SAGA ( 1946) 13 AD no 147, 357; Società Italiana per il Gas Mirabella (1948) 15 AD no 204, 606; Magnifica Communità di Fiemme u Soc Import Esport Legnami (1951) 18 ILR no 194, 629; Ligabue v Finanze (1952) 19 ILR no 137, 616; Fattor v Ministero Finanze (1952) 19 ILR no 134, 611. See, further, nn 169-71, infra, and accompanying text.

139. Hungary was occupied by German troops after 19 March 1944, declared war on Germany on 31 December 1944, and signed an Armistice, at Moscow, on 20 January 1945. A German court held Hungary retained its independence after the German occupation: Restitution of Household Effects belonging to Jews Deportedfrom Hungary (Germany) Case (1972) 44 ILR 301, 340-1. Some difficulty might also arise in the cases of Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria. Armistices were signed with these three, also at Moscow, on, respectively, 12 September, 19 September and 28 October 1944: Verzjil, supra, n 49, 478. Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria declared waron Germany on, respectively, 25 August 1944, 4 March 1945 and 8 September 1944. French courts reached conflicting decisions on the question of whether Rumanian nationals were enemy aliens: Pessis v Widow Grandjean (1950) 17 ILR no 68,237; Legendre u Neumann (1950) 17 ILR 239. On Finland, see Re List, supra, n 31,647-9.

140. Roberts, A.: ‘What is a Military Occupation?’ (1984) 55 BYIL 249 Google Scholar.

141. Re Lepore (1946) 13 AD no 146, 354, 355; see also Roberts, supra, n 140, 261-2. In its long title, the Act refers to ‘German-held territory’; this might be thought less to suggest the concept of belligerent occupation than occupation in its ordinary, literal sense. See, further, statement by Minister of State, infra, n 198.

142. Supra, n 75; Re Lanuin's Claim, supra, n 110. Cf L v N (Bulgarian Occupation of Greece) (1947) 14 AD no 110, 242, 243; see also Roberts, supra, n 140, 274-6.

143. Oppenheim, ii, 434. See also Re List, supra, n 31, 638: ‘ The question of criminality in many cases may well hinge on whether an invasion was in progress or an occupation complete’. Cf Occupation of Germany (Zurich) Care (1946) 13 AD no 86, 187.

144. Article 42.

145. Thus, during the course of an occupation, resistance from the inhabitants might be such that, as a matter of fact, the occupier could no longer be said to satisfy the criteria in article 42 of the Hague Regulations. See Re List, supra, n 31, 638-9; Re Ohlendorf supra, n 23, 662; Trial of Karl Bauer, in Friedman, supra, n 44, 1577-80; Roberts, supra, n 140, 259-60.

146. Customary international law has long drawn a distinction, based on the principles of humanity and chivalry, between combatants and non-combatants. The former principle requires that belligerents use only such kind and degree of violence as is necessary for the purpose of overpowering their opponents. The latter, in introducing an element of fairness into war, requires that consideration be shown to the wounded, prisoners of war and civilians: Oppenheim, ii, 227. Killing civilians would, in most circumstances, constitute a violation of these principles.

147. The conventional international law of war is largely based on the principles discussed, supra, n 146. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is present in numerous conventions: Oppenheim, ii, 227-30.

148. Supra, n 28; see also Oppenheim, ii, 346.

149. Emphasis added. In Public Prosecutor v Menten (1977-81) 75 ILR 331, the Netherlands Supreme Court had to deal with the accused's argument that, since the territory in which he was allegedly involved in the massacre ofcivilians was, at the time, in ‘no man's land’, it was not ‘occupied’ within the meaning of art 42. The fact that the Supreme Court in concluding, at 364, that in that territory ‘the local population was factually subject to the authority of the German occupiers’ felt constrained first to undertake a detailed examination of the evidence dealing with the military situation in the area, supports this argument. See, further, supra, n 145.

150. Supra, n 48.

151. This rule derives from the nineteenth century and is implicit in Title III of the Hague Regulations. See, generally, and on the previous practice, Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 167; Oppenheim, ii, 432-3; Jennings, R. Y.: The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), 52 Google Scholar. Cf von Knieriem, supra, n 22, 323-32.

152. Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 166.

153. Ottoman Debt Arbitration ( 1925-26) 3 AD no 360, 472; Schwarzenberger, supra, n 32, 169-70; Oppenheim, ii, 433-4, n 5; Verzjil, supra, n 49, 171-2. Cf the wartime decision by the German Supreme Court in K v K (Polish Nationality Case) (1941-42) 10 AD no 190, 581.

154. Nuremberg Judgment, 65: ‘… it is unnecessary… to decide whether this doctrine of subjugation… has any application where the subjugation is the result of the crime of aggressive war. The doctrine was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting to restore the occupied territories to their true owners, and… therefore, the doctrine could not apply to any territories occupied after 1 September. 1939'. On the position ofarmies in the field and the status, generally, of the governments in exile in London during the Second World War, see Oppenheimer, supra, n 93.

155. Re Altstötter (Justice Trial) (1947) 14 AD no 126, 278, 287; Re Greifelt (1948) 15 AD no 216, 653, 655; Re Krauch, supra, n 33, 672.

156. On Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet, see Bindels v Administration des Finances (1947) 14 AD no 17, 45; Deneffe v Administration des Finances (1948) 15 AD no 22, 60.

157. On Alsace-Lorraine, see Re Wagner (1946) 13 AD no 165, 385; Société Grand Marché v City of Metz (1954) 21 ILR 484.

158. On Danzig, see Re Krüger (1951) 18 ILR no 68, 258; Re Wetzel (1957) 24 ILR 434; cf Re Nix (1951) 18 ILR no 69, 260, infra, n. 163. On Luxembourg, see Huby Frères of Echternach v Racké (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 123, 226.

159. Supra, n 137.

160. LM v Swiss Banks (1948) 15 AD no 177, 536.

161. Supra, n 120.

162. For decisions of Belgian courts on Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet, see Krott v Merkens (1946) 13 AD no 148, 358; Bourseaux v Krantz (1948) 15 AD no 17 1, 526; Mommer v Renerken (1953) 20 ILR 648; for decisions of French courts on Alsace-Lorraine, see 2 v K (1951) 18I LR no 183, 608; Bour v Bour(1951) 18 ILR 609; for Polish decisions, see Re Willof Wincenty K (1957) 24 ILR 960; Re Will of Jizef K (1957) 24 ILR 966; Re Will of Stefan J( 1957) 24 ILR 970; Re Will of Jan M (1957) 24 ILR 971; see also, on Poland, Status of Occupied Poland Case (1981) 61 ILR 674 (Germany).

163. In holding, in Re Nix, supra, n 158, that they had, the council for Restoration of Legal Rights departed from its decision in Re Knüger, supra, n 158. In Re Wetzel, supra, n 158, the Judicial Division of the Council finally decided they had not; cf US ex rel Zeller v Watkins (1948) 15 AD no 51, 206. It might be noted that the Netherlands decisions seem to concede the extinction of Danzig as a state, the annexation not falling foul of the customary prohibition on premature annexation durante bello, since Danzig's capacity to continue hostilities was completely extinguished. The position ofDanzig thus seems directly in point on the question the IMT eschewed answering, supra, n 154, viz whether the doctrine of subjugation applied where the subjugation was the result of the crime of aggressive war.

164. Kozuh v LiffStato Civile di Milano (1952) 19 ILR 322.

165. Acquisition of German Nationality Case (1980) 57 ILR 306.

166. Supra, nn 5C-51.

167. For historical background, see Lemkin, 252-60; 606-27; Sereni, A. P.: ‘The Status of Croatia under International Law’ (1941) 35 Am Pol Sc Rev 1144 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Toynbee & Toynbee, supra, n 49, 648-55. On the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, see, supra, nn 103-119 and accompanying text.

168. Marek, 113; Crawford, supra, n 50, 59.

169. On the position in those territories nominally allied to Germany, yet nevertheless occupied by German forces, see, supra, nn 138-39. On the Arrow Cross government under Szalasi in Hungary, see Calvocoressi, supra, n 48, 509-10; on Mussolini's short-lived Italian Social Republic and events in Romania, see, ibid, at 272

170. On the status of the Italian Social Republic, see: eg Rainoldi v Ministero della Guerra, supra, n 138; Re Lepore, supra, n 141; Weber v Credit0 Italiano (1946) 13 AD no 163, 381; Ministry of War v Colorni and Fattori (1948) 15 AD no 182, 553; Maltoni v Companini (1948) 15 AD no 210,614; see also cases cited, supra, n 138. On the status of the Quisling government in Norway, see Randsjordsbruket and Jevnaker Kommune v Viul Tresliperi (1951) 18 ILR no 199, 635; Norges Bank (Bank of Norway) v Polski Komitet Azotowy (1951) 18 ILR no 210, 684. On the status of occupation governments in Greece, see Re G, supra, n 50; Greco-German Institute of Biology (Greece) Case (1948) 15 AD no 185, 561. On the status of Croatia, see Miletich v CIA General de Comtrucciones SA ( 1943-45) 12 AD no 163, 456; Socony Vacuum Oil Company Claim [1954] 21 ILR 55; Popp Claim (1954) 21 ILR 63; Versic Claim (1954) 21 ILR 63; Postal ,4dministration of Portugal v Postal Administration of Yugoslavia (1956) 23 ILR 591.

171. On Greece, see Marika Eliadi Maternity Home Case (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 152, 275; Re GD (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 153, 276: Re Law 900 of 1943 (1943-45) 12 AD no 152, 441; see, further, Editor's Notes at (1943-45) 12 AD 440; 442; (1948) 15 AD 562. On Italy, see cases cited in Editor's Note at (1946) 13 AD 9.

172. HC Debs, Standing Committee A, cols 10-15, 29 March 1990. See also von Knieriem, supra, n 22, 321-3; Toynbee & Toynbee, supra, n 49, 338-434.

173. Supra, nn 135-36.

174. Supra, nn 164-65.

175. The Inquiry did not look at many cases in great detail and there are still a large number uninvestigated. It may thus be that, on further investigation, allegations relating to ‘murder, etc’ committed in other territories acquired by Germany will surface. Since Part II of the Report is not to be published it is difficult to be precise on this point.

176. Report, paras 2.11-2.27.

177. German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression, 23 August 1939; German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, 28 September 1939. For texts, see Toynbee, A. (ed): Documents on Infernational Affairs 1939-46: Vol I (1951), 408 Google Scholar; R. J. Sontag & J. S. Beddie (eds): Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-41 ( 1948) passim. In September 1940 Soviet nationality was extended to former nationals ofthe Baltic states. On the historical background, see Lemkin, 11 7-24; 300-12; A. Sprudzs & A. Rusis (eds): Res Baltica (1968) passim; A. Spekke: History of Latvia; An Outline (1951); Laserson, M.: ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (1944) 37 AJIL 233 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; USA v Kunus (1983) 571 F Supp 1104.

178. The Netherlands recognised the annexation de jure in 1942: Kling v Lesser and Rotterdamsche Bank (1955) 22 ILR 101; see also Poortensdijk Ltd v Soviet Republic of Latvia (1919-42) 11 AD (supp) no 75, 142.

179. HC Debs, vol 31, Written Answers, col 249, 15 April 1988. Cf Re the Estate of Pikelny (1955) 22 ILR97; for comment, see Lyons, A. B.: ‘The Case ofFeivel Pikelny’ (1955-56) 32 BYIL 288 Google Scholar.

180. HC Debs, vol 162, Written Answers, cols 323-24, 29 November 1989.

181. (1946) AD no 14, 34-5; Lithuanian Nationals (Germany) Case (1948) 15 AD no 17, 48; see also Republic of Latvia Case (1955) 22 ILR 230.

182. Pulenciks v Augustouskis, supra, n 85; cf Osis v Minister of Justice (1951) 18 ILR no 90,300.

183. Gerbaud v Meden (1951) 18 ILR no 82, 288.

184. Kling v Lesser and Rotterdamsche Bank, supra, n 178.

185. Report, paras 2.28-2.45; see also Toynbee & Toynbee, supra, n 49,568-75; 632-48.

186. Notwithstanding the establishment of various forms of indigenous administration as, for example, the Byelorussian Central Council: Dallin, supra, n 49. On ‘puppet’ governments, see supra, nn 166-74 and accompanying text.

187. Supra, n 145.

188. Parts of Polish Byelorussia, occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939, were subsequently annexed by the USSR: Report, para 2.30. Under the German-Rumanian Agreement of Tiraspol of 30 August 1941, a sizeable strip of Ukrainian territory to the north of Odessa was transferred by Germany to Rumania: Dallin, supra, n 49, 90. See also Graham, M. W.: ‘The Legal Status of the Bukovina and Bessarabia’ (1944) 38 AJIL 667.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

189. See, generally, Brownlie, supra, n 43,43-7; Collier, J. G.: ‘Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 924 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

190. Trendtex Trading Corpn v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529, 553, per Lord Denning MR; J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1989] 1 Ch 72, 207, per Nourse LJ; 179, per Kerr LJ.

191. Brownlie, supra, n 43, 43-7; and cases cited therein. It would seem the position in Scotland is the same.

192. At least in cases where the previous decision gives effect to rules of customary international law that have not since become obsolete: Trendtcx Trading Corpn v Central Bank of Nigeria, supra, n 190; Brownlie, supra, n 43, 44.

193. Facts of state on which the courts have sought guidance from the executive include recognition of the existence of a state of war between the United Kingdom and another state; or between two other states; and whether particular territory is recognised as being under the sovereignty of a particular state: McNair & Watts, supra, n 128, 34-45; Mann, F. A.: ‘Judiciary and Executive in Foreign Affairs’ (1943) 29 TGS 143, 148-9Google Scholar; Mann, supra, n 82, 2 22-46; Oppenheim, i, 765-6. Nor is there any reason why a court should not seek information from a foreign government: Stafford Allen & Sons Ltd v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [I9561 Lloyd's LR 104. Such evidence, while entitled to considerable weight, is not conclusive: Baccus SRI v Servicio Nacional del Trigo [1956] 3 All ER 715. See, generally, Lyons, A. B.: ‘The Foreign Office Certificate: Some Recent Tendencies’ (1957) BYIL 302 Google Scholar.

194. Or by statements made to the court by the Attorney General: Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433. See, generally, Mann, supra, n 193; Mann, supra, n 82; Lauterpacht, H.: ‘The Form of Foreign Office Certificates’ (1939) 20 BYIL 125 Google Scholar; Lyons, A. B.: ‘The Conclusiveness of the Foreign Office Certificate’ (1946) 23 BYIL 240 Google Scholar; Lyons, supra, n 193.

195. Even in the face ofcontradictory evidence: Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner [1965] 1 All ER 300, 324. This is in accordance with the policy that executive and judiciary speak with one voice: Taylor v Barclay (1828) 2 Sim 213, 22l, per Shadwell J. However, this assumes that the certificate is comprehensible as to the information given therein: Gur Corpn v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd [1987] 1 QB 599, 625, per Nourse LJ. In case of doubt or ambiguity, the court would have to have recourse to other sources of evidence: Lauterpacht. supra, n 194, 127-8.

196. Although practice is not entirely clear, it seems the better view that questions of law are not to be decided by certificate, but are properly matters for judicial decision: Luther v Sagor & Co [1921] 1 KB 456, 461; Mann, supra, n 193, 153 n 68; Mann, supra, n 82, 51.

197. In Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe v Bantham Steamship Co [1939] 2 KB 544, 546, the Foreign Office stated, on the existence of a state of war between China and Japan, that ‘the current situation… is indeterminate and anomalous’. Lauterpacht, supra, n 194, 126, states that it is ‘the duty ofthe Secretary of state to inform the court of the facts, and if the facts are complicated and unprecedented, his statement cannot be an example of lucidity’. The German territorial acquisitions surely give rise to situations no less ‘indeterminate and anomalous’, involving facts both ‘complicated and unprecedented’.

198. In Parliament it was argued that ‘or under German control’ should be added to clause I after ‘… occupation’. This would have clear benefits in obviating many of the problems discussed above on the meaning of ‘occupation’: HC Debs, Standing Committee A, cols 9-19, 29 March 1990. The government's view, in rejecting this proposed amendment, was that the meaning of the term ‘occupation’ would not give rise to any practical difficulties: ‘If the German force, or those organisations that acted as their agents, were sufficiently in control of a parcel of territory … that territory would count as being occupied by the Germans …’; statement by Minister of state, ibid, cols 15-16.

199. Supra, n 28.

200. Supra, n 2.