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Rejoinder-a plea for excuses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

William Wilson*
Affiliation:
Brunel University

Extract

Professor Williams calls me a malcontent. I believe I have an excuse. The law of murder does not do what it should do. Present doctrine allows some who do not deserve the stigma of murder to be convicted, and allows others who do deserve the stigma to avoid it. This, in my view, is a failure of justice - of fairness. It is the result of judges, academics, and others believing that problems in the real world cannot be resolved by internally consistent legal rules. They are pragmatists. My plea for rationality in murder is nothing more pretentious than a repudiation of such pragmatism. It is a plea that the substantive purposes of the law of murder should find expression in formally rational doctrine.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1991

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References

1. 62 Harvard Law Review 616.

2. The paradox is that until the box is opened Schröinger's cat is not a cat at all. It is a ‘perhaps’ cat. See P. Davies, God and the New Physics, for an account.

3. Cf R v Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422.

4. 10 LS 320.

5. R v Cunningham [1981] 2 All ER 863.