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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 November 2019
Twenty years after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, where are we in our understanding of the relationship between tort and human rights? This paper argues that we are not as far along in our understanding as we could be. The reason for that has been the methodology we used to understand the relationship, focused as it was around remedies, limitation and causation. This paper proposes a new approach, based around the right rather than the remedy. It aims to theorise one particular cause of action – the duty in Osman v United Kingdom – to exemplify this approach. For English lawyers, who have historically used the framework of the forms of action to understand our own law, it is argued that this a good way to comprehend the European jurisprudence.
I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for comments on the draft, and likewise to Miles Jackson and Leo Boonzaier. I had useful discussions about the ideas in here with Hayley Hooper and the participants of the SLS Annual Conference in 2016, and with the Oxford-Girona-Génova Conference in 2017.
1 (2000) 29 EHRR 245.
2 [2018] UKSC 11, [2018] 2 WLR 895.
3 [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] 2 WLR 595. A later Supreme Court decision confirmed Robinson’s status as the leading tort case on public authority liability: CN and GN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25, [2019] 2 WLR 1478 at [74].
4 This is not ultimately how the Supreme Court conceived of Robinson, but the courts below did so, and it was an issue in the case. The court said that Michael failed because it was a case of inaction, whereas the police in Robinson played an active part in the arrest of a suspect (even though it was the fleeing suspect who careened into Mrs Robinson). It is also true that DSD concerned the investigative duty, which is not the same as the Osman duty, as Lord Mance pointed out (at [151](iv)). However, the Osman duty formed a plank of Lord Hughes’ dissent, and the case is generally relevant to the relationship between tort and the HRA.
5 [1970] AC 1004.
6 Osman, above n 1, at [121].
7 Eg Mastromatteo v Italy (2002) ECHR 694 at [74], [78]; Kolyadenko v Russia (2013) 56 EHRR 2 at [216].
8 Eg Nolan, D ‘Negligence and human rights law: the case for separate development’ (2013) 76(2) MLR 286CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Woolf, Lord ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and remedies’ in Andenæs, M and Fairgrieve, D (eds) Judicial Review in International Perspective: Volume II (Kluwer 2000) p 432Google Scholar; the Privy Council in Maharaj v AG of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385; the Court of Appeal in Dobson v Thames Water Utilities [2009] EWCA Civ 28, [2009] 3 All ER 319 at [42].
9 They include: Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Law Com No 266, 2000; Scottish Law Com No 180, 2000) para 4.20; Stevens, RTorts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p 289CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cane, P ‘Tort law and public functions’ in Oberdiek, J (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p 148 at p 163CrossRefGoogle Scholar (although Cane puts the words ‘statutory tort’ in inverted commas); Varuhas, JNEDamages and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar; Bedford v Bedfordshire County Council [2013] EWHC 1717 (QB) at [26] per Jay J.
10 Lester, A and Pannick, D ‘The impact of the Human Rights Act on private law’ (2000) 116 LQR 380 at 382Google Scholar.
11 Eg du Bois, F ‘Human rights and the tort liability of public authorities’ (2011) 127 LQR 589Google Scholar; R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 WLR 673 at [19] per Lord Bingham. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the case of Huang v Home Secretary [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167 could also be said to support this view.
12 Lord Bingham in Smith/Van Colle, below n 41, and Lord Kerr in Michael, below n 39, are examples of people who hold the different-but-compatible view. Contrast N v Poole, above n 3, at [53], [62].
13 Eg Nolan, above n 8; Bagshaw, below n 50.
14 Eg Varuhas, above n 9.
15 N v Poole, above n 3, at [29].
16 Eg Stevens, above n 9.
17 DSD, above n 2, at [136].
18 Ibid, at [150].
19 Xenos, DThe Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2012) p 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; C deThan ‘Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) Journal of Criminal Law 165 at 178.
20 P Thielbörger ‘Positive obligations under the ECHR after the Stoicescu case’ (2012) European Yearbook on Human Rights 259 at 261.
21 VgT v Switzerland (2002) 34 EHRR 159 at [46].
22 Starmer, KEuropean Human Rights Law (London: LAG, 1999) ch 5Google Scholar.
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26 HRA 1998, s 8(3).
27 Fairgrieve, DState Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 1406, [2004] QB 1124 at [50], [55].
28 Nolan, above n 8, at 296.
29 Cane, above n 9, pp 164, 165.
30 Ibid, p 163.
31 HRA 1998, s 8(1).
32 ECHR, Art 41; Storey, D and Eicke, THuman Rights Damages: Principles and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001)Google Scholar para A2-001. Though, of course, it may also offer nothing in addition to a judgment in the applicant's favour.
33 Ibid.
34 Konig v Germany 2 EHRR 469 at [15].
35 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850 at, 855.
36 J Steele, ‘Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation?’ (2008) CLJ 606 at 608.
37 Anufrijeva, above n 27, at [53]. Arden makes a similar questionable presumption that ‘vindication is the very thing that the applicant wants’: M Arden ‘Human rights and civil wrongs’ [2010] PL 140 at 152.
38 Greenfield, above n 11, at [19].
39 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732 at [125]; Greenfield, above n 11, at [19]; Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395 at [9]; Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 at [138].
40 DSD, above n 2, at [68].
41 Van Colle, above n 39, at [138]. See similarly Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962, [22] where Lord Scott said that ‘Article 2 [ECHR]… incorporated into our domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998, is at least equivalent to the constitutional rights for infringement of which vindicatory damages were awarded in [the Privy Council cases of] Ramanoop and Merson v Cartwright’.
42 Varuhas, above n 9, p 113.
43 Steele, above n 36, at 606.
44 Ibid, at 608.
45 Varuhas, above n 9, p 250.
46 Jarvis v Swan Tours [1972] 3 WLR 954.
47 Eg Van Der Leer v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 567 (‘frustration’); Olson v Sweden (No 2) (1994) 17 EHRR 134 (‘inconvenience’); Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277 (‘anxiety’).
48 Ashley, above n 41, at [22]; Merson v Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38. See also Arden, above n 37, at 152.
49 Steele, above n 36, at 608. See also Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70 at [367].
50 Bagshaw, R ‘Tort design and human rights thinking’ in Hoffman, D (ed) The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p 110 at p 115CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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52 Eg Nolan, above n 8; Bagshaw, above n 50.
53 du Bois, above n 11, at 598.
54 Ibid.
55 Wilberg, H ‘In defence of the omissions rule in public authority negligence claims’ (2011) 19 Torts LJ 159Google Scholar.
56 Collins, H ‘Utility and rights in common law reasoning: rebalancing private law through constitutionalization’ (2007) 30 Dalhousie Law Journal 1 at 4Google Scholar.
57 Ibid.
58 Robinson, above n 3, at [34], [37], [40], [50], [54], [69], [70], [83]. Contrast N v Poole, above n 3, at [28].
59 du Bois, above n 11, at 597.
60 Ibid, at 599.
61 Robinson, above n 3, at [32]; N v Poole, above n 3, at [26], [64]–[65], [75]; du Bois, above n 11, at 597.
62 Ibid, at 597.
63 Gardner, J ‘What is tort law for? Part 2. The place of distributive justice’ in Oberdiek, J (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)Google Scholar.
64 Ibid, p 341.
65 Eg Arden, above n 37, at 141; Nolan, above n 8, at 296.
66 For discussion, see H Quane ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of a “public authority” under the Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 106.
67 Costa, J ‘The European Court of Human Rights: consistency of its case-law and positive obligations’ (2008) 26 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 449 at 453CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
68 Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3.
69 Chowdury v Greece App no 21884/15 (ECHR, 30 March 2017) at [88]; LE v Greece App no 71545/12 (ECHR, 21 January 2016) at [66].
70 Storck v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 96; Jendrowski v Germany App no 30060/04 (ECHR, 14 April 2011) at [36].
71 Balmer-Schafroth v Switzerland (1998) 25 EHRR 598 at [40].
72 Osman, above n 1; Hajduova v Slovakia (2011) 53 EHRR 8 at [50].
73 Begheluri v Georgia App no 28490/02 (ECHR, 7 October 2014) at [160]; Karaahmed v Bulgaria App no 30587/13 (ECHR, 24 February 2015).
74 Özgür Gündem v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 49; Dink v Turkey App no 2668/07 (ECHR, 14 September 2010); Palomo Sánchez v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24 at [58]–[61].
75 Ouranio Toxo v Greece App no 74989/01 (ECHR, 20 October 2005) at [37], [43].
76 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation [2012] 2 AC 72; Savage v South Essex Partnership Foundation Trust [2009] 1 AC 681.
77 Webster v Ridgeway Foundation School [2010] EWHC 157 (QB).
78 Thomson v Scottish Ministers [2013] CSIH 63; Mastromatteo v Italy, above n 7.
79 Bedford, above n 9; Z v UK, above n 68; Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] 1 AC 874.
80 Sarjantson v Chief Constable of Humberside [2013] EWCA Civ 1252, [2014] QB 411 at [18].
81 Robinson, above n 3, at [44].
82 Oneryildiz v Turkey [2004] ECHR 657.
83 Milanovic v Serbia (2014) 58 EHRR 33.
84 Thomson v Scottish Ministers, above n 78; Mastromatteo v Italy, above n 7; Maiorano v Italy ECtHR, 15 December 2009.
85 Dordevic v Croatia [2013] MHLR 89 at [139].
86 Hajduova v Slovakia (2011) 53 EHRR 8.
87 See eg text to n 163 below.
88 DSD, above n 2, at [112]–[114]. DSD is less relevant to my positive project than my negative project because it did not concern the Osman duty in the main. It concerned the investigatory duty, which is separate, as Lord Mance pointed out.
89 Gardner, J ‘Wrongs and faults’ in Simester, A (ed) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.
90 AG of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop [2006] 1 AC 328 at [19].
91 Michael, above n 39, at [125].
92 Note that I am describing the structural features of the wrong. These allegations are not necessarily successful allegations. There is room for constraints upon the cause of action, such as defences and restrictions in the conditions under which the duty applies – the need for a ‘real and immediate’ risk (per Osman). I do not aim to justify the particular formulation of the Osman test here.
93 Tasioulas argues that human rights in morality have no necessary connection either with the state or with law: ‘Towards a philosophy of human rights’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 1 at 2, 24. See also O'Neill, O ‘Agents of justice’ (2001) 32 Metaphilosophy 180CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Mavronicola counters that human rights are conceivably violable by non-state agents in morality, but not in law: ‘Is the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment absolute in human rights law? A reply to Steven Greer’ (2017) HRLR 479 at 488. The literature on the philosophical foundations of human rights in general is extensive and cannot be treated adequately here. See Cruft, R et al. (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a sample.
94 Eg Bankovic v Belgium [2001] ECHR 890 at [57]. See further, Report of the International Law Commission A/56/10 (2001) Draft Articles.
95 (2003) 37 EHRR 38.
96 Ibid, at [41]. See commentary by Quane, above n 66, at 113.
97 My account here treats the outcome as probative. There are implications to that which have not been tested in case law: what would happen if the claimant successfully warded off an attacker? Since it is the state's wrong that is at play, my view implies that the claimant need not show that she was injured or seriously injured. She would simply not recover (much) for personal injury. This is supported by cases where declarative relief is awarded when the claimant is no worse off after the violation, eg R (Wilkinson) v IRC [2005] 1 WLR 1718 at [24]–[28]; A v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 29 at [252]; Abdi v UK (2013) 57 EHRR 16 at [91]; Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2015] 3 WLR 1003 at [89]. For a similar view, see Lavrysen, L ‘Causation and positive obligations under the ECHR’ (2018) 18 HRLR 705 at 708Google Scholar.
98 Mavronicola, above n 93, at 488.
99 Oneryildiz, above n 82 at [89]–[90].
100 Seibert-Fohr, AProsecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tulkens, F ‘The paradoxical relationship between criminal law and human rights’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Law 577Google Scholar; Lazarus, L ‘Positive obligations and criminal justice: duties to protect or coerce?’ in Zedner, L and Roberts, JV (eds) Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.
101 Michael, above n 39, at [112].
102 Ibid, at [113]; cf N v Poole, above n 3, at [29].
103 See eg Crawford, JState Responsibility: The General Part (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Taggart, M ‘The nature and functions of the state’ in Cane, P and Tushnet, M (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 105Google Scholar.
104 For a sample of the commentary on this question see D Oliver ‘Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] PL 329; Craig, P ‘Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review’ (2002) 118 LQR 551Google Scholar.
105 Eg Aston Cantlow v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546.
106 Eg Appleby, above n 95.
107 For an account of how rights can generate ‘dynamic’ duties which may require different acts of governance depending on the situation and the type of right at issue see J Waldron ‘Rights in conflict’ (1989) Ethics 503.
108 The State represented by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security v NN (case no 2012/1900, decision of 25 April 2013).
109 Eg Bevacqua v Bulgaria App no 71127/01 (ECHR, 12 June 2008); Kalucza v Hungary App no 57693/10 (ECHR, 24 April 2012); Valiuliene v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECHR, 26 March 2013).
110 This argument is actually deployed in cases. It is sometimes raised explicitly in relation to liability and sometimes less explicitly in relation to causation. An example of it being raised explicitly is in Kalucza v Hungary, above n 109, where the state argued a domestic violence claim was inadmissible because the claimant had not pursued domestic remedies. It argued that although she had submitted criminal complaints, some were discontinued. The respondent attempted thereby to place the responsibility for the act of governance – prosecution – onto the claimant. An example of the point being raised less explicitly, in relation to causation, appears in Michael, see text to n 155 below.
111 Collins, above n 56, at 1.
112 N v Poole, above n 3, was less impressed with the act/omissions distinction and instead preferred the harming/benefiting distinction (see paras [28]–[29], [74], [76]). Although the discussion herein treats them as related, it does not treat them as collapsible into one another.
113 Hoffmann, Lord ‘Human rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159 at 163, 166CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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115 O'Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188 at 193. In Cowan v Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary [2002] HLR 44 at [41], Keene LJ held police officers had no duty to prevent a (non-arrestable) offence. Compare Rice v Connolly [1996] 2 QB 414 at 419 that a police constable must ‘take all steps… necessary… for preventing crime’.
116 du Bois, above n 11, at 595. Similarly, Cane, above n 9, p 151.
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121 du Bois, above n 11, at 593.
122 R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State [2005] UKHL 66, [2006] 1 AC 396, at [92]. See also [53] and [77].
123 Robinson, above n 3, at [34]; N v Poole, above n 3, at [26], [64]–[65], [75].
124 See eg Nolan, above n 8, at 303.
125 Michael, above n 39, at [181].
126 Mowbray, above n 23, p 221.
127 van Dijk, P ‘“Positive obligations” implied in the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Castermans-Holleman, M et al. (eds) The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century (London: Kluwer, 1998) p 22Google Scholar; Quane, above n 66, at 114.
128 Eg Z v UK, above n 68, at [73].
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131 Shue, above n 117, p 166.
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157 Ibid, at [197].
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