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Negative enforcement of employment contracts in the sports industries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
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The right to the exclusive services of sports performers is a valuable asset, in team sports, to the clubs which employ them and, in individual sports, to the agents, managers and/or promoters who act for them. This is most visible in professional football's market for players’ services where leading performers are currently ‘sold’ for many millions of pounds. The notion of players as assets is often reflected in clubs’ accounts and enhances clubs’ overall value. Of those clubs which are owned by publicly quoted companies the securing (or loss) of a star player can crucially affect the share price of the controlling company. In a more general sense a player's value to his club is reflected in his capacity to attract larger attendances, an increased volume of pre-season ticket sales and enhanced merchandising and marketing opportunities.
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References
1 See discussion in Morrow ‘Recording the human resource of football players as accounting assets: establishing a methodology’ (1995) Irish Accounting Review 2 (1) p 115 Google Scholar and sources cited therein; see also ‘Touche Ross 1995 Football Survey’ Sport and the Law Journal 3 (2) p 36 (1995)Google Scholar.
2 In this context ‘contract jumping’ describes the situation where during the term of his contract a player enters into a second contract with a rival club, agent or manager in breach of a negative undertaking, express or implied, not to do so. It does not cover the situation where a player seeks to transfer his allegiance at the termination of his contract, although the acquisition of future services might affect an existing contract; see notes 100–107 and accompanying text.
3 See Baker, & St Langan, J Snell's Equity (London, 29th edn, 1990) p 593 Google Scholar; Hanbury, & Martin, Modern Equity (London, 14th edn, 1993) p 690 Google Scholar.
4 Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusrs (London, 7th edn, 1993) p 662 Google Scholar.
5 See De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430, 438 per Fry W.
6 See People v Lavender 48 NY 2d 334 (1979); American Broadcasting Companies Inc v Worf 52 NY 2d 394 (1981); Stevens ‘Involuntary Servitude by Injunction’ (1921) 6 Corn LQ 235.
7 Keane, Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (London, 1988) p 218.Google Scholar
8 CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 960, 969.
9 Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch 25.
10 [1972] Ch 305; see also Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SPA (1985) 3 ILT (ns) 73,125.
11 See Evening Standard Co Ltd v Henderson [1987] ICR 588 where an employer obtained an injunction preventing an employee from leaving without serving the required notice period; the employer undertook, inter alia, to allow the employee to work and to pay him even if he did not work during the period in question.
12 [1972] 1 All ER 960.
13 Ibid p 969.
14 See eg Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Equatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694 where the House of Lords refused to grant an injunction to prevent the termination of a time charter. A time charter is a contract for services and to grant an injunction was considered to be juristically no different from awarding a decree of specific performance.
15 For purposes of brevity the expressions ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ are used in a non-technical sense which applies both to contracts of service and contracts for services.
16 (1852) 1 De GM & G 604.
17 Negative covenants are usually expressly included in sports contracts, but in some instances courts have been prepared to imply such provisions; see further notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
18 Post-contract restrictions are potentially void under the restraint of trade doctrine; see Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch 413. In the light of the judgment in Case C-425/93, Bosmun v ASBL most post-contract restrictions are void as a matter of EC law. The Court of Justice held that association rules which required the payment of a transfer fee when, on the expiration of his contract, a player is engaged by a new club violated the bee movement of workers (art 48) provision of the Treaty of Rome. The Court of Justice also held that art 48 was violated by UEFA provisions which restricted the number of ‘foreign’ players a club could use in competitions organised by it (the ‘3+2 rule’). It is as yet unclear whether this decision is confined to the movement of players between member states or whether it also affects movements within a particular member state; see generally Seminar on the Bosmun Case (British Association for Sport and Law and FA Premier League, 1996); see also Bitel, After Bosman-They Think its All over Sport and the Law Jouml 4 (l) p 41 (1996)Google Scholar; Morris et al ‘EC Law and Professional Football: Bosman and its Implications’ (1996) 59 MLR 893. In his advisory opinion Advocate-General Lenz suggested that both the free movement of workers (art 48) and competition (art 85) provisions of the Treaty of Rome were violated by association rules which allow a football club to retain the registration of a former player thus preventing him from being engaged by a new club. The opinion also found the ‘3+2 rule’ to be in breach of the same provisions -provisional text of Advocate-General Lenz's conclusions, 20 September 1995; see also ‘The Bosman case’ Sport and the Law Journal 3 (2) p 3 (1995)Google Scholar. The decision will have a profound effect on the post-contract market for players’ services in Europe. However, Bosmun concerns post-contract restraints and it should not affect the transfer of players who are ‘in contract’ with their clubs; nor should it affect the question of restraining contract jumping which by definition arises during the term of the contract. In North America ‘free agency’ for athletes in the major leagues was secured through a combination of antitrust laws and collective bargaining between the major leagues and player associations; see Weiler & Roberts Sports andthe Law(St Paul, 1993) pp 65, 180–181.
19 See further notes 81–99 and accompanying text.
20 Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De GM & G 604 was accompanied by a related successful action for inducement to breach of contract against the rival who lured the employee; Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216. The leading modern English authority on the availability of negative injunctions, Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103 was an action for inducement to breach of contract against the rival manager; see discussion at notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
21 Meagher, , Gummow & Lehane Equity: Doctrine and Remedies (Sydney, 3rd edn, 1992) p 520 Google Scholar.
22 See Dublin Port & Docks Board v Britannia Dredging Co Ltd [1968] IR 136, 142 where an injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from breaching their negative obligation not to remove equipment from a site, citing Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De G M & G 604 and Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709.
23 [1936] 3 All ER 160.
24 See Hanbury, & Martin, Modern Equity (London, 14th edn, 1993) pp 773–774 Google Scholar.
25 [1967] 3 All ER 822.
26 See Leeds Cricket Football and Athletic Co Ltd v Craven Gilpin & Sons (1982) Ltd unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 28 January 1993 where an injunction was granted preventing the plaintiffs from obstructing the defendants' performance under a catering contract although it was in the nature of a joint venture, which required an element of mutual trust and confidence, negotiation and co-operation at management, or even board, level. The degree of trust and confidence required was stated to be a factor to consider in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction.
27 See however WEA Records Ltd v Glover unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 1 October 1986 where an interlocutory injunction enforcing a record agreement was granted; Garland J drew a distinction between a manager-group relationship and a record company-group relationship; whatever about the former he concluded that the latter did not involve the requisite degree of trust and confidence.
28 See Rely-a-Bell Burglar and Fire Alarm Co v Eider [1926] Ch 609 where the court refused an injunction to restrain breach of a covenant not to enter into any other employment. The terms of the negative undertaking were such that to have enforced it by means of an injunction would have prevented the defendant from working in any capacity. This, it may be argued, is quite different from a case like Warner Bros Pictures Znc v Nelson [1936] 3 All ER 160 where the defendant was restrained from working in u particular capacity; see Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts (London, 7th edn, 1993) p 576.
29 See also Lotus Cars Ltd v Jaguar Cars Ltd unreported, Chancery Division, 1 July 1982 where an injunction to restrain a sales director jumping from the plaintiffs to the defendants was refused, citing Page One Records Ltd v Britton [1967] 3 All ER 822. The court was satisfied that the effect of an injunction would be either to force the employee to perform his affirmative obligation or remain idle, since there were no other employers in the specialist car industry in Britain for whom he could work.
30 However, in Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1936] 3 All ER 160 the injunction was granted for up to three years. Negative injunctions of potentially much longer duration have been granted in commercial cases: see Evans Marshall & Co Ltdv Bertola SA [1973] 1 All ER 992 (14 years to run on contract); Leeds Cricket Football and Athletic Co Ltd v Craven Gilpn & Sons (1982) Ltd unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 28 January 1993 (nine years to run on contract).
31 In an early case Radford v Campbell (1890) 6 TLR 488 an application by Nottingham Forest for an injunction to restrain a player from playing for Blackburn Rovers was unsuccessful on the ground that the application was brought spitefully.
32 Chancery Division, 21 December 1979. The full judgment is not available either from LEXIS or the court office but it is discussed in detail in Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103, on which this analysis is based. The case is included both because of its direct relevance to sports cases and the fact that it has been cited in subsequent cases: see Low Cars Ltd v Jaguar Cars Ltd unreported, Chancery Division, 1 July 1982; Leeds Cricket Football and Athletic Co Ltd v Craven Gilpen & Sons (1982) Ltd unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 28 January 1993.
33 Quoted in Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103,112.
34 Ibid p 113.
35 [1989] 3 All ER 103.
36 Benn was not a defendant in these proceedings. Nevertheless, it was stated that an injunction would not issue against a third party who induces a breach of contract if its effect would be to compel performance by the athlete of the contract; [1989] 3 All ER 103,113. In essence, if the plaintiff would not succeed in proceedings against the athlete he would be equally unsuccessful in proceedings against the third party; see also Lotus Cars Ltd v Jaguar Cars Ltd unreported, Chancery Division, 1 July 1982. Injunctive proceedings against third parties who procure the breach of contract by an athlete are not unknown in North America; see New England Patriots Football Club Inc v University of Colorado 592 F 2d 1196 (1979); Professional Hockey Club Central Sports Club of the Army v Detroit Red Wings 787 F Supp 706 (1992).
37 [1989] 3 All ER 103, 114.
38 A feature of the relationship in this case was that the plaintiff acted as the boxer's manager and as a fight promoter, a dual role which, at the time, was permitted by the British Boxing Board of Control regulations. The court noted that this led to a potential conflict of interest with the plaintiff acting as the boxer's manager theoretically being required to negotiate with himself in his capacity as promoter; [1989] 3 All ER 103,116. This aspect of the boxer-manager/promoter relationship would later be condemned as being an unlawful restraint of trade; see Watson v Pruger [1991] 3 All ER 487.
39 See, however, Don King Productions Inc v Douglas 742F Supp 741, 769–770 (1990)Google Scholar where it was held that a boxer-promoter contract does not entail fiduciary duties; this conclusion was influenced in part by the fact that the boxer (and his manager) were less than enthusiastic about the promoter's efforts on their behalf. The manager had testified that ‘I am one of the only few people in the sport of boxing that ever had anything halfway decent to say about Don King that I know of.’ The court was satisfied that this did not reflect the level of trust and confidence necessary to found a fiduciary relationship.
40 But see Lotus Cars Ltd v Jaguar Curs Ltd unreported, Chancery Division, 1 July 1982 where Nourse J stated ‘I do not think that [the employee] could be put in that category of uniqueness which would apply to some figures, for example, in the entertainment or sporting worlds’; whilst obiter, these remarks suggest that injunctions might more readily be granted in sports cases.
41 While the court declined to draw the line between short- and long-term contracts it did note that the early cases did not disclose the granting of an injunction for a period exceeding 20 weeks. By the same token a two year period was considered to be long-term; [1989] 3 All ER 103,112.
42 The four principal team sports (baseball, ice hockey, American football and basketball) are organised in nation-wide leagues. The baseball, basketball and ice hockey leagues span the US and Canada.
43 See Barnes, Sports and the Law in Canada (Toronto, 2nd edn, 1988) pp 219–223 Google Scholar.
44 See Restatement (Second) on Contracts 367; Calamari, & Perillo, Contracts (St Paul, 3rd edn, 1987) pp 666–668 Google Scholar; Fridman, The Law of Contract (Toronto, 3rd edn, 1994) pp 791–792 Google Scholar.
45 (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 426; see also Edmonds v University of Waterloo 1991 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 1423.
46 An aggrieved player would retain his right to sue for damages; see Schultz v Los Angeles Dons 107 Cal App 2d 718 (1951) where damages were awarded to a player whose contract was wrongfully terminated by his club.
47 This is a form of guarantee that the player's salary will be paid even if he is dropped from the playing roster; see Berry, & Wong, Law and Business of the Sports Industries Vol 1 (New York, 1986) pp 260–261 Google Scholar.
48 SPCs typically provide that the club may assign the right to the player's services to another club in the league; a ‘no trade’ clause deprives the club of the right to assign.
49 See eg standard NFL and USFL contracts in Yasser, Sports Law: Cases and Materiuls (Lanham, 1986) pp 253–277 Google Scholar and NBA Uniform Player Contract in Berry, & Wong, Law and Business of the Sports Industries Vol 1 (New York, 1986) pp 143–149 Google Scholar.
50 See Los Angeles Rams Football Club v Cannon 185F Supp 717 (1960)Google Scholar; Detroit Football Co v Robinson 186 F Supp 933 (1960)Google Scholar.
51 See discussion in Pachman ‘Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: a Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues raised by the Pete Rose Controversy’ (1990) 76 Va L Rev 1409. Currently, the office of baseball commissioner is vacant and the sport is managed by a group of team owners, on behalf of the league members; it is anticipated that the powers of the commissioner will be altered by the clubs in a new league agreement.
52 186 F Supp 933 (1960) (footnote omitted); see also Houston Oilers Inc v Neely 361 F 2d 36 (1966)Google Scholar. Equally memorable are the words of Rogers J in Chicago Cardinals Football Club Inc v Etcheveriy unreported, 26 June 1956 quoted in Robinson:'… in four or five, six or eight years, some day your passes are going to wobble in the air, you are not going to find that receiver. If you keep playing around here, with these professionals, and others, and jumping your contracts–you are alright this time…but some day your abilities will be such that [your club] won't even send a twice disbarred attorney from Dogpatch to help you. They sent some dandy ones this time.'
53 Berry, & Wong, Law and Business of the Sports Industries Vol 1 (New York, 1986) p 157 Google Scholar.
54 Ibid p 145.
55 A similar clause was contained in the contract in Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1936] 3 All ER 160, 167–168; Branson J held that it did not determine the matter since ‘parties cannot contract themselves out of the law’ but as a matter of evidence it assists on the question whether an injunction is more appropriate than damages; see also Detroit Football Co v Dublinski (1956) 4 DLR (2d) 688,710 (reversed on other grounds (1957) 7 DLR (2d) 9) and Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v Tri-tickets Inc 1991 Ont CJ LEXIS 1600.
56 434 F Supp 449 (1977).
57 202 Pa 210 (1902).
58 304 FSupp 1193 (1969).
59 453 F Supp 129, 145 (1974).
60 140 F Supp 365 (1955).
61 (1956) 4 DLR (2d) 688.
62 Eg Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems Znc v De Angelis unreported, Chancery Division, 21 December 1979 and Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103.
63 592 F2d 1196 (1979).
64 908 F 2d 1041 (1990).
65 202 Pa 210 (1902).
66 In fact the defendant was the first second baseman to be elected to the Hall of Fame; see Weiler, & Roberts, Sports and the Law (St Paul, 1993) p 72 Google Scholar.
67 348 SW 2d 37 (1961).
68 181 NE 2d 506 (1961).
69 140 F Supp 365 (1955).
70 Ibid p 366.
71 Ibid p 367.
72 Testimony was offered on behalf of the Cleveland Browns, who were parties to the action, that the players were ‘good’ but not specially skilled; ibid p 366.
73 See notes 92–95, 116 and accompanying text.
74 (1956) 4 DLR (2d) 688; the decision was reversed on other grounds (1957) 7 DLR (2d)9.
75 'See, however, Barnes, Sports and the Law in Canada (Toronto, 2nd edn, 1988) p 221 Google Scholar suggesting that the two leagues are now in competition given the extensive broadcasting of games throughout North America.
76 A similar position obtains in these islands. The Welsh and Irish leagues pose no threat to the Premiership but are threatened by it. Such is the gap in standards that the movement of specially skilled players operates predominantly in one direction. The Premiership's threat to its ‘rivals’ on the Celtic fringes is also evident in the rescheduling of League of Ireland matches to avoid clashes with televised Premiership games - it goes without saying that similar fixture difficulties are not experienced by the Premiership.
77 908 F 2d 1041 (1990).
78 See also Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club v Boston Celtics Corp 81 Civ 5263 (1981)Google Scholar where the plaintiff baseball team was granted an injunction restraining a player from jumping to the defendant basketball team. It might be argued that, by virtue of their playing different sports the two were not competitors; however, in a different sense they were competitors in the market for spectators and television deals; see North American Soccer League v National Football League 670 F 2d 1249 (1982) where the court spoke of the rival leagues as being in competition in the ‘general entertainment’ market. In News Ltd v Australian Rugby League Ltd, (1996) ATPR 41–466, Burchett J viewed rugby league in Australia as being part of a general sports market which embraced rugby union, Australian rules football, cricket, soccer and basketball.
79 American League Baseball Club of New York Inc. v Pasquel 63 NYS 2d 537 (1946).
80 592 F2d 1196 (1979).
81 See Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103,113: ‘By the absence or want of mutuality reference is made to the old-established rule that the court would not grant specific performance at the suit of a party where it could not do so at the suit of the other. We very much doubt whether want of mutuality alone would now be decisive in a case of the kind with which we are here concerned.’
82 The reserve clause in baseball (and later major league ice-hockey) was construed as conferring the club with a right of perpetual renewal; football and basketball, in contrast, construed the clause as allowing the exercise of the option once only; see Weiler, & Roberts, Sports and the Law (St Paul, 1993) p 77 Google Scholar.
83 American League Baseball Club of Chicago v Chase 149 NYS 6 (1914).
84 602 Pa 210 (1902).
85 215 F 168 (1914).
86 149 NYS 6 (1914).
87 276 F Supp. 618 (1967).
88 See notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
89 215 F 168 (1914).
90 See note 85 and accompanying text.
91 294 F Supp 979 (1969).
92 291 F 2d 471 (1961).
93 361 F 2d 36 (1966).
94 The court also appears to have been influenced by the facts surrounding the parties' negotiations-the defendant was a ‘bright young man’ who was ably advised by his father-in-law, and obtained considerable financial and additional commercial benefits from the deal. The case was not one where lack of mutuality existed. See also Boston Celtics Ltd Partnership v Shaw 908 F 2d 1041 (1990) where a plea of unclean hands based on the allegation that the plaintiffs took advantage of him at a ‘weak moment’ when he was homesick and depressed was rejected. The player was a college graduate, the contract with a few minor additions was in standard form, he read the contract before signing it and told the American consul in Rome (in whose presence it was signed) that he had read and understood the contract. Despite his supposed depression he managed in the space of one month to secure an offer which was improved from $3. 4 million to $5. 4 million, a factor which was also considered to be material.
95 See also Munchak Corp v Cunningham 457 F 2d 721 (1972) where the plaintiffs had agreed to pay the defendant if he did not play during his option year with his previous club; the defendant could not be compelled to perform the contract and accordingly had a right to sit out his option year.
96 592 F2d 1196 (1979).
97 Ibid p 1199.
98 304 FSupp 1193 (1969).
99 Barry was no stranger to the legal process, having been injuncted for one year at the suit of the Warriors in respect of the first contract jump; see Lemat Corp v Barry 275 Cal App 2d 671 (1969).
100 304 FSupp 1193 (1969).
101 Seen 99.
102 457 F 2d 721 (1972).
103 Seen 95.
104 513 SW 2d 102 (1974).
105 453 F Supp 129 (1974).
106 The court did suggest that there would be an adverse effect on the team if ‘several’ players signed futures contracts. This was somewhat speculative as the defendant was the only player to sign such a contract. However, had a number represented by the vague designation ‘several’ signed futures contracts the team ‘as a sort of delicate mechanism, the success of whose operation is dependent upon the coordination of various cohesive units’ would suffer; ibid p 137. This issue might have arisen in the Australian ‘Superleague’ case, News Ltd v Australian Rugby League Ltd. Burchett J granted orders forcing approximately 300 players who had signed for the Superleague after their ARL contracts had expired (or on their being released from them) back to the ARL; however the full Federal Court of Australia (1996) ATPR 41–521 discharged those orders on the grounds that the players in question were not parties to the proceedings. In a related Superleague case a negative injunction was granted to restrain contract jumping; see St George Rugby League Football Club v Brown and ors Supreme Court NSW, 14 December 1995.
107 See also Don King Productions Inc v Douglas 742 F Supp 741 (1990) where the second contract contained a condition precedent that the boxer would obtain a release from the first contract or a judicial declaration that it is invalid. By ‘crafty lawyering’ (at 772) the rival promoters, in essence, made performance conditional on advance judicial clearance and thus sought to protect themselves from liability for inducement to breach of contract. It was stated that this device might have an immunising effect but, for other reasons, this would not be so in the present case.
108 149 NYS 6 (1914).
109 See n 83 and accompanying text.
110 The restrictive environment established by professional ice hockey was examined in Boston Professional Hockey Association v Cheevers 348 F Supp 261 (1972), vacated and remanded 472 F 2d 127 (1972).
111 513 SW 2d 102 (1974).
112 149 NYS 6 (1914).
113 348 F Supp 261 (1972).
114 See n 140–141 and accompanying text.
115 See eg Madison Square Garden Corporation v Braddock 19 F Supp 392 (1937); see generally Weistart, & Lowell, The Law of sports (Charlottesville, 1979) pp 355–358 Google Scholar.
116 Weiler, & Roberts, Sports and the Law (St Paul, 1993) p 90 Google Scholar. The cases in question are Los Angeles Rams Football Club v Cannon 185 F Supp 717 (1960); Detroit Football Co v Robinson 186 F Supp 933 (1960); New York Football Giants Inc v Los Angeles Chargers Football Club Inc 291 F 2d 471 (1961); Houston Oilers Inc v Neely 361 F 2d 36 (1966). But see Dallas Cowboys v Harris 348 SW 2d 37 (1961) where an injunction was granted to an established NFL club preventing the defendant from playing in the fledgling AFL.
117 276 F Supp 618 (1967).
118 453 F Supp 129,147 (1974).
119 In American League Baseball Club of Chicago v Chase 149 NYS 6 (1914) it was held that antitrust laws did not apply. Baseball's exemption from antitrust laws was established by the US Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Inc v National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs 259 US 200 (1922) and has been repeatedly confirmed, but is accepted as being anomalous; see eg Flood v Kuhn 407 US 258 (1972). The application of antitrust laws to other sports has been achieved through a number of decisions: Radovich v National Football League 352 US 445 (1957)Google Scholar (foothall); Washington Professional Basketball Corp v National Basketball Association 147 F Supp 154 (1956) (basketball); Philadelphia World Hockey Club Inc v Philadelphia Hockey Club Inc 351 F Supp 462 (1972) (ice hockey); United States v International Boxing Club of New York lnc 348 US 236 (1955) (professional boxing); Blalockv Ladies Professional Golf Association 359 F Supp 1260 (1973) (golf); Gunter Harz Sports Inc v United States Tennis Association 665 F 2d (1981) (tennis). These can be compared with the application of restraint of trade doctrine to sports in these islands: Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch 413 (football); Nugle v Fielden [1966] 2 QB 633 (horse racing); Greigv Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 (cricket); Macken v O'Reil Zy [1979] ILRM 79 (show jumping); Watson v Prager [1991] 3 All ER 487 (professional boxing); Newport AFC v Football Association of Wales [1995] 2 All ER 87 (football); see also Case C-415/93, Bosman v ASBL at n 18.
120 See Detroit Football Co v Dublinski (1956) 4 DLR (2d) 688,708 where it was stated that the reasonableness of a restraint during the term of the contract is a factor which may be considered when deciding whether to grant an injunction; part of the analysis in that case was conducted in restraint of trade terms.
121 (1852) 1 De GM & G 604.
122 [1936] 3 All ER 160.
123 See n 28 and accompanying text.
124 [1967] 3 All ER 822.
125 Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103,114.
126 Treitel, The Luw of Contruct (London, 9th edn, 1995) pp 938–939 Google Scholar.
127 See eg Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103, 115 where the court rejected the suggestion that an injunction would not be compulsive because Nigel Benn could have obtained employment as a security guard; but the court confused the question of alternative employment with the possibility of acquiring another manager.
128 Treitel, The Law of Contract (London, 9th edn, 1995) p 938 Google Scholar.
129 In practice, it often transpires that the athlete is presented with an opportunity to practice his profession; see notes 145–146 and accompanying text. However, this depends on events which occur after relief is granted and, from the perspective of the court granting relief, the assumption must be that the athlete could be required to sit out for the duration of the injunction.
130 See notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
131 See notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
132 See Detroit Football Co v Dublinski (1957) 7 DLR (2d) 9 where damages were awarded which amounted to the net cost of replacing the player; it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim for other losses such as the time and effort invested in developing the player to his current level of expertise, but no award was made on this head since there was an absence of supporting evidence. See also Hawkins v Rogers (1951) 85 ILTR 129 where damages were awarded and assessed in respect of the wrongful withdrawal from three classic races of a racehorse which had been sold with its ‘engagements’; see also Chplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 where damages were awarded for the loss of the opportunity to participate in a beauty contest.
133 The same point could be made with regard to key personnel in the non-sporting world, but that is beyond the scope of this essay; but recall the remarks of Nourse J at n 40.
134 See n 40, 129 and accompanying text.
135 See n 5–6 and accompanying text.
136 See American League Baseball Club of Chicago v Chase 149 NYS 6 (1914); see also n 83, 108–110 and accompanying text.
137 See n 81–88 and accompanying text.
138 See n 7 and accompanying text.
139 [1972] 1 All ER 960, 969–970.
140 See n 129 and accompanying text.
141 See Collier v Sunday Reference Publishing Co [1940] 2 KB 647; Marbe v George Edwardes (Duly's Theatre) Ltd [1928] 1 KB 269; Clayton & Waller v Oliver [1930] AC 209; Breach v Epsylon Industries Ltd [1976] ICR 316.
142 A similar undertaking was given by the employer in Evening Standard Co Ltd v Henderson [1987] ICR 588.
143 It would appear, however, that North American courts are reluctant to order partial enforcement of lengthy restraints by granting injunctions of shorter duration; see n 115 and accompanying text.
144 In Creig v Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449 the public interest in being able to watch leading cricketers in test matches was cited as one reason, amongst a number of others, for holding a two year ban on players who ‘defected’ to a rival organisation to be an unlawful restraint of trade. The ban in that case applied to 60 or so of the world's leading players and thus, if operable, would have considerably diminished first class cricket in England. Is this element of public interest to be considered in relation to individual cases of contract jumping? Apart from other factors such as its overbroad nature, a feature of the ban in Creig v Insole was that it was a response to the players' signing for the rival organisation when they were contractually free to do so, thus bringing it closer to the case of a contract for future services; compare the North American position at notes 100–107 and accompanying text.
145 Several years after the decision in Warren v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103 Nigel Bern resumed a manager-boxer relationship with the plaintiff, see Independent on Sunday (Sport section p 10) 16 July 1995.
146 Some time after the decision in Boston Celtics Ltd. Partnership v Shaw 908 F 2d 1041 (1990) the plaintiffs traded the defendant to Miami Heat for one of the latter's dissatisfied players; see Weiler, & Roberts, , Sports and the Law (St Paul, 1993) p 84 Google Scholar.
147 See n 52 and accompanying text.
148 It is reported that a charter of conduct which is expected will be signed by all Premiership football clubs will prohibit, inter alia, the making of ‘illegal’ approaches to each other's employees; see Independent on Sunday (Sport section p 3) 16 July 1995.
149 See New England Patriots Football Club Inc v University of Colorado 592 F 2d 1196(1979).
150 In June 1995 Luton Town are reported to have obtained a temporary injunction restraining their former manager, David Pleat, from taking up employment with Sheffield Wednesday; see The Guardian 17 June 1995, p 19. The injunction was later lifted by consent and it appears that a compensation settlement was reached between the clubs; see The Guardian 28 June 1995, p 24.
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