1. The traits of bureaucratic judiciaries and their consequences are analysed in G Di Federico ‘The Italian Judicial Profession and Its Bureaucratic Setting’ (1976) 1 The Juridical Review 40; G Freddi Tensioni e conflitto nella magistratura (Bari: Laterza, 1978); and J H Merryman The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd edn, 1985).

2. See M Fabri, P M Langbroek and H Pauliat (eds) The Administration of Justice in Europe: Towards the Development of Quality Standards (Bologna: Research Institute on Judicial Systems (IRSIG-CNR), 2003); and, for similar trends in Eastern Europe, E Rekosh ‘Emerging Lessons from Reform Effort in Eastern Europe and Eurasia’ in Office of Democracy and Governance, Guidance for promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality (Washington: USAID, 2001) pp 53–71.

3. For a broader analysis of what follows see C Guarnieri and P Pederzoli The Power of Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4. G Rebuffa La funzione giudiziaria (Turin: Giappichelli, 1993).

5. For a recent assessment see R J Asensio (ed) El acceso a la funciòn judicial. Estudio comparado (Madrid: Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 2002).

6. Rebuffa, n 4 above, p 69.

7. G Freddi, n 2 above, p 62ff.

8. Merryman, n 1 above, p 102.

9. Rebuff a, n 4 above, pp 74–77.

10. L M Dìez Picazo ‘El sistema francès de acceso a la judiciatura: selecciòn y formaciòn inicial’ in Asensio (ed), above n 5.

11. Established in 1970 under the Ministry of Justice, the ENM inherited the functions of the National Centre for Judicial Studies founded in 1958: A Boigeol’ Histoire d'une revendication: I‘ècole de la magistrature 1945–1958’ (Paris: Cahiers du CRIV, n 7, 1989).

12. An analysis of different recruitment methods is provided by A Mestitz Selezione e formazione professionale dei magistrati e degli avvocati in Francia (Padua: CEDAM, 1990); and L M Dìez-Picazo ‘El sistema francès de acceso a la judiciatura: selecciòn y formaciòn inicial’ in Asensio, (ed), n 5 above, pp 41–56.

13. D S Clark ‘The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Recthsstaat’ (1988) 61 SCal LR 1795; P Pederzoli Selezione e formazione delle professioni legali in Germania (Padua: CEDAM, 1992); and P Pederzoli ‘El acceso a las profesiones legales en la República Federal de Alemania’ in Asensio (ed), n 5 above, pp 57–80.

14. The Deutsches Richtergesetz enacted in 1961. But Länder also have legislative competencies in this field.

15. Less than the half of the initial candidates are able to pass the two exams: P Pederzoli ‘El acceso a las profesiones legales en la Repùblica Federal de Alemania’ in Asensio (ed), n 13 above, pp 57–80.

16. Di Federico, n 1 above.

17. A constitutional provision exists for the direct appointment of experienced lawyers and law professors to the Court of Cassation, the highest ordinary court in the country. The relevant statute was only adopted in 1998, and a few judges have recently been appointed in this way: P Pederzoli ‘El sistema italiano de selecciòn de jueces. Situaciòn y perspectivas de futuro’ in Asensio (ed), n 5 above, pp 81–114.

18. Currently, a bill is being discussed in Parliament to institute a school in charge of continuing education for judges and prosecutors.

19. G Di Federico (ed) Preparazione professionale degli avvocati e dei magistrati: discussione su una ipotesi di riforma (Padua: CEDAM, 1987).

20. Asensio (ed), n 5 above.

21. The tension between these two dimensions and its implications for relations within the judiciary are analysed by G Freddi, n 2 above, who sees bureaucratic judiciaries as a typical example of ‘heteronomous organizations’.

22. For further details on the committees' composition and functioning see E Teubner Die Bestellung zum Berufsrichter in Bund und Länder (Köln: Carl Heynemann Verlag, 1984) pp 41–91; Clark, n 13 above; and T Gas ‘Les institutions de gestion et de discipline de la carrière des magistrats’ in T Renoux (ed) Les Conseils supérieurs de la magistrature en Europe (Paris: La Documentation francaise, 1999)pp 119–141.

23. Ministries of Labour participate in the committee for appointments for both federal labour and social security courts, while the Ministries of Justice sit in all other cases. Designation of the presidency of the committee also follows this same criterion.

24. Clark, n 13 above, at 1822–1829; D P Kommers ‘Autonomy versus Accountability: The German Judiciary’ in P H Russell and D M O'Brien (eds) Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001) pp 131–154 at p 141.

25. For an account of the parliamentary debate see E Teubner, n 22 above, p 30ff.

26. C Guarnieri Giustizia e politica: I nodi della Seconda Repubblica (Bologna: II Mulino, 2003) pp 94–100.

27. In Italy the President of the Republic does not enjoy the same broad prerogatives as the French President. As F Gerber Justice indépendante. Justice sur commande (Paris: PUF, 1990) p 209 points out, these bear a closer resemblance to the French President under the IV Republic.

28. From right to left on the ideological spectrum, the most important are: Magistratura democratica, Movimento per la giustizia, Unità per la costituzione, and Magistratura Indipendente.

29. Guarnieri, n 26 above, pp 106–114.

30. Di Federico (ed), n 19 above, pp 19–26.

31. G Di Federico ‘“Lottizzazioni correntizie” e “politicizzazione” del CSM: quali rimedi?’ (1990) Quaderni Costituzionali at 279–297; Rebuffa, n 4 above.

32. Institutions with magistrates as advisors or as pro-tempore staff include Parliament, the central government (especially the Ministry of Justice), the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, regional and provincial governments, as well as a range of administrative agencies. Judges also serve as arbiters in economic disputes, involving them in decisions with considerable financial consequences; F Zannotti Le attività extragiudiziarie dei magistrati ordinari (Padua: CEDAM, 1981).

33. For a detailed analysis of the Italian case see Guarnieri, n 26 above. The extensive use of the media by the Italian judiciary is discussed in P P Giglioli ‘Political Corruption and the Media: the Tangentopoli Affair’ (1996) 149 Int Social Science J 381. For a comparative assessment see V Pujas and M Rhodes ‘Party Finance and Political Scandals in Italy, Spain and France’ (1999) 22 West European Politics 41.

34. L M Díez-Picazo Regimen constitucional del poder judicial (Madrid: Civitas, 1991); P Magalhaes, C Guarnieri and G Kaminis ‘Democratic Consolidation, Judicial Reform and the Judicialisation of Politics in Southern Europe’ in N Diamandouros, R Gunther and G Pasquino (eds) Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

35. Clearly stated in the text of the Ley organica 6/1985 (Organización del poder judicial, 1991) pp 28–29).

36. Although it turned down a legal challenge to these reforms, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal expressed concerns about an appointment mechanism that could produce a ‘partisan logic’ in the Higher Council's decision making. P Magalhaes et al ‘Democratic Consolidation. Judicial Reform and the Judicialisation of Politics in Southern Europe’, in Diamandouros, Gunther and Pasquino (eds), n 34 above.

37. The Spanish judiciary is also divided into different groups: the Asociaciòn Profesional de la Magistratura, a conservative group with the support of most judges; the Francisco de Vitoria, a centrist group; and Juces para la Democracia, on the left.

38. Under the authoritarian regime, the Higher Council (which dates back to the foundation of the Republic in 1910) was retained, although its internal structure was changed, with the executive appointing all its members. Efforts to bring the judiciary under the full control of the regime were made even clearer in a 1933 constitutional provision that established special tribunals and placed the power to appoint and promote judges in the hands of the Minister of Justice.

39. Magalhaes et al, n 34 above.

40. Under the 1946 Constitution the Higher Council consisted of 14 members: the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice (acting as president and vice-president respectively), six lay members directly elected by the National Assembly, four judges elected by their peers, and two representatives of the legal profession appointed by the President of the Republic.

41. R Perrot Institutions judiciaires (Paris: Montchretiens, 5th edn, 1993) p 42.

42. As specified in the loi organique nn 94–100 of 5 February 1994. In France there are three judicial groups: the Syndicat de la Magistrature, on the left; the Union syndicate des Magistrats, a centrist group, the most important; and the Association Professionnelle des Magistrats, more conservative. In January 2000 a proposal by the Jospin government to reform the Council - and to reduce the power of the executive - broke down mainly because of the opposition of the Gaullist party.

43. Although the Jospin government (1997–2002) declared to be bound by the CSM advice also for prosecutorial appointments, the practice has not been followed by the new rightist government led by Raffarin.

44. Perrot, n 41 above, pp 354–355; T S Renoux and A Roux L'administration de la justice en France (Paris: PUF, 1994) pp 67–85; A Bancaud and Ph Robert ‘La place de la justice en France: un avenir incertain’ in Ph Robert and A Cottino (eds) Les mutations de la justice (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001) pp 161–234.

45. E Bloch ‘Faire carrière sous la Ve République?’ (1981) 16 Pouvoirs 98 refers (at 101) to this as the ‘royal path’, where a figurative red carpet unrolls in front of magistrates who attempt to remove themselves ‘as far as possible from courtrooms’. See also A Garapon Le gardien des promesses (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1996) p 47; and A Boigeol La magistrature ‘hors les murs’. Analyse de la mobilité extra-professionnelle des magistrats (Paris: IHTP-CNRS, 1998).

46. C Charle’ Etat et magistrats. Lesonginesd'une crise prolongkée (1993) 96–97 Acte de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 39 at 43. In France, until the beginning of the twentieth century, three-quarters of judges on the Court of Cassation had spent most of their career as prosecutors. Today, however, it appears that the French Ministry of Justice tends to support the promotion of magistrates with experience in both the prosecution and the judiciary: J L Bodiguel Les magistrats un corps sans ame? (Paris: PUF, 1991) p 111.

47. G Di Federico ‘Judicial Independence in Italy: A Critical Overview in a (Non-systematic) Perspective’ in Office of Democracy and Governance, n 2 above, pp 83–99.

48. Merry man, n 1 above.

49. D Soulez-Larivière Du cirque médiatico-judiciaire et des moyens d’ en sortir (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993); Giglioli, n 33 above.

50. Garapon, n 45 above, 1996.

51. Di Federico, n 31 above; Rebuffa, n 4 above.

52. In England political influence is balanced by the role the Bar and the senior judiciary play in judicial appointments. In the United States politics plays a more overt role since judicial appointments are normally in the hands of politicians or the electorate.

53. It is obvious that in countries like France and Italy, where judges and prosecutors form a unified corps, greater potential exists for unrestrained judicial power. This possibility is stronger in Italy where guarantees of independence have been extended to prosecutors.

54. Obviously, where judges possess a high degree of independence and are free from hierarchical controls, it is extremely important to identify their reference groups and judges' conceptions of their role.

55. Garapon, n 45 above; Guarnieri, n 26 above.