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The Road to Moderation: The Significance of Webster for Legislation Restricting Abortion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Lynn D. Wardle
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One thing is certain about the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: It will stimulate state legislatures to enact more legislation regulating abortion. Justice Blackmun candidly described the main opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist (part majority, part plurality), as an “implicit invitation to every State to enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of conception.” For many pro-choice advocates, this is an ominous development; for some, it is extremely frightening. For most pro-life advocates, however, this is a hopeful result; some enthusiastically perceive the prospect to reenact the 19th century abortion prohibition. But the most passionate activists on both sides are mistaken; both those who are frightened about “dark ages” abortion prohibitions and those who are gloating about turning back the clock misunderstand the significance and holding of Webster. Webster is a victory for moderation; it signifies the revival of a long-term process of political give-and-take, public education and debate, and legislative compromise.

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Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , Winter 1989 , pp. 376 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1989

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References

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, No. 88–605, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).Google Scholar
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