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A Procrustean Approach to Informed Consent: The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2021

Extract

One of the central dilemmas in contemporary medical practice is determining how much information a patient needs to make an informed choice of medical care alternatives. On June 1, 1982, Texas began an experiment that requires specific information to be given to patients about to undergo selected medical procedures. The objective of this uniform disclosure is to reduce the threat of medical malpractice lawsuits based on a failure of informed consent. While this is of benefit to physicians, it is unclear whether patients’ needs for information, like the unfortunate guests of Procrustus, will be cut and stretched to fit an inflexible standard. This article reviews the antecedents of this approach to informed consent, the legal and philosophical problems involved in uniform disclosure standards, and the practical problems that uniform disclosure standards pose for health care providers.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1982 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics

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References

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