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Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Wendy E. Parmet
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Last July 26, amidst much fanfare, President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”). The Act, which President Bush aptly called “the world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities,” breaks new ground. Seeking to ensure the dignity and legal equality of an estimated 43 million disabled Americans, the Act is both broad and visionary. Regulating areas as diverse as transportation, employment, communications, health care and public accommodations, it suggests a new understanding on the part of Congress about the nature of discrimination. It also both answers and raises numerous questions about the role of law in the face of disease and disability.

The ADA is modeled upon many prior laws, most especially the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Included in the Rehabilitation Act are several provisions ancestral to the ADA. Secs. 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act place affirmative obligations on the federal government and its contractors to employ the disab1ed.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , Winter 1990 , pp. 331 - 344
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics

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References

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