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Advance Directives: Where are We Heading after Cruzan?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Fenella Rouse
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Extract

On June 25, 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the first time in a right to refuse medical treatment case. The court's holding (by a majority of five of the nine justices) was essentially as follows: The right to liberty, which is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, encompasses a person's decision to reject life-sustaining treatment; competent people are entitled to reject life-support and states are therefore prohibited from preventing people from making that choice. States may, however, regulate the exercise of the right, to ensure that the decision to stop treatment is indeed what the patient would have wanted. Asking for “clear and convincing evidence” of an incompetent patient's wishes (which means a demonstration that the person herself deliberately and thoughtfully made the decision in advance, or perhaps formally appointed someone else to make that decision for her) is a legitimate form of regulation by the state: It furthers the quest for what the person would have wanted and protects incompetent individuals from decisions made by others which might be influenced by the others’ interest instead of being based solely on what the individual would have wanted.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , Winter 1990 , pp. 353 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics

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References

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