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Wrongful Life — Its Problems are Not Just Semantic: A Reply to Furrow

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2021

Sheila Taub
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Extract

In an article in the June, 1982 issue of this journal, Barry Furrow suggested that changing the name of the tort of “wrongful life” to “diminished life” would overcome the reluctance that many courts have shown to recognize its existence. Others have made similar suggestions, differing only in the names which they proposed as a replacement for “wrongful life.” It is my belief, however. that the problems that many courts and commentators have had with “wrongful life” are inherent in the nature of the action and will not be resolved by simply changing its name.

In the remainder of this article, 1 will employ the neutral term “X” to refer to any action brought by a child for having been born with some defect or handicap which could only have been prevented, given the current state of medical knowledge, by either aborting the child or preventing its conception. It is hoped that this device will avoid the danger of “semantic overload,” of which Professor Furrow wrote.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 10 , Issue 6 , October 1982 , pp. 208 - 215
Copyright
Copyright © 1982 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics

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References

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