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Medical Decision-making and the Right to Die after Cruzan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Abstract

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Type
Introduction
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1991

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References

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990). Indeed, an actual majority of the court—the four dissenters and Justice O'Connor in a separate concurrence—took the position that the constitution guarantees individuals freedom from interference with their choices about life-sustaining treatment. Since then, however, two of this group (Justices Brennan and Marshall) have left the court, and it is impossible to know how the Court would come down if it had to decide this issue, rather than merely assume the answer.Google Scholar
Id. at 2857. (O’Connor, J. concurring.)Google Scholar
It is notable that in denying Nancy Cruzan's parents the authority to direct cessation of her treatment, the Supreme Court of Missouri expressed the view that whenever life could be extended it should be, lest decisions be improperly based on “quality of life” judgments made by a surrogate decision-maker concerning a patient with nonlethal impairments. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)(en banc).Google Scholar