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Abortion and Distortion of Justice in the Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Bernard M. Dickens
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Extract

Opinions differ about whether the legality of induced abortion is the most divisive social issue of the present time, but all agree that it is a strong contender for that status. The argument about which form of legislation would lower or raise the incidence of abortion has an empirical dimension, but many of the opposing arguments concern values and ideologies. The value of human life and the respect to which it is entitled, represented in the sympathetic form of the human fetus, are pitted against the value of women's self-determination and well-being, and the respect and status that women enjoy as decision-makers over their bodies and destinies.

The very language in which different persuasions are expressed often resonates with values. The pro-life/pro-abortion distinction incorrectly suggests that those who favor women's choice prefer that it be made in favor of abortion, whereas the pro-choice/anti-choice distinction incorrectly suggests that opposition to abortion rests on hostility to self-determination rather than on the assertion of more positive values, notably the sanctity of human life at all stages of development. The practice adopted below will be to give protagonists of different views the descriptions they give themselves, namely pro-choice and pro-life, although the author will not attempt to conceal a personal pro-choice preference.

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , Winter 1989 , pp. 395 - 406
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1989

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