Focusing on the independent and powerful pre–martial law Philippine Supreme Court, we investigate the impact of the establishment and breakdown of authoritarianism on the court's performance of the functions of conflict resolution, social control, and administration. We develop hypotheses concerning and models of the impacts of the onset, consolidation, and breakdown of martial law authoritarianism under Ferdinand Marcos on that court's handling of the three functions. Using Box-Jenkins time series analysis methods, we assess the impacts of the onset, consolidation, and breakdown of Marcos's authoritarianism on the Supreme Court's functional performance. In our analysis, authoritarianism had no impact on the Court's performance of the conflict resolution function; authoritarianism's onset increased and its breakdown decreased the Court's performance of the routine administrative function; and authoritarianism's onset decreased but its consolidation increased the Court's performance of the social control function.

A question intimated by some contemporary scholarship (but not yet fully explored) is how cultural practices that law both enables and limits might be related to new styles of politics and redefinitions of community. This query is first explored in the context of Queer Nation's response to the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which reduced homosexual identity to a single behavior. Queers' subsequent embrace of a cultural politics of “direct address” suggests that the transformation of identities and communities must be built from social and cultural practices that seek to redefine citizens' affiliations. While “turning away from the law” is one strategy for redefining political practice, the case of Karen Ulane—a transsexual who was fired after having sex reassignment surgery—suggests another: The articulation of a queer notion of “nonidentity” within the legal field may afford possibilities for destabilizing dominant legal classifications such as “sex” and “gender.”

One of the central controversies in the judicial behavior literature is the extent to which judges' ability to act according to their ideological preferences is affected by their location in the judicial hierarchy. Judges on intermediate appellate courts have different decisionmaking environments than high court judges. As a result, the goals of lower appellate court judges may differ from those of their superiors: the quest for legal accuracy may compete with the desire to pursue policy preferences. Analysis of the reversal rate of the U.S. circuit courts of appeals offers insight into the extent to which these judges balance the pressures of their own policy preferences with the desire to achieve the legally accurate result in cases they decide.

Criticisms of the civil jury, including charges that the jury is biased against business, have been central to debates over the litigation explosion and demands for tort reform. This article seeks to inform these ongoing controversies by examining tort jurors' accounts of how they reached decisions in cases with business parties. Interviews and questionnaire data showed that jurors were skeptical of plaintiff tort claims against businesses, organized their accounts more on the actions and motivations of plaintiffs than on the responsibilities of business, and spoke often of the litigation crisis and the importance of limiting awards.

This paper examines complaint processing in an attorney general's office of consumer protection. It describes how, in the implementation and routinization of a new statute, considerations external to the law or the individual case arise, transform, and begin to characterize law enforcement. The paper describes how the staff attempts to confine the office's work by creating statistical records of work done. These records are creations because the activities of the agency—investigation and resolution of consumer complaints—do not generate unambiguous criteria of completion. The office operates within practical criteria for determining when a case is finished. As the statistical records help to routinize the task of consumer protection, they become a source of bias, direction, and legitimation for law enforcement.

The Texas post-Furman death penalty statute restricts capital punishment to a limited category of murders. If the defendant is found guilty of one of these crimes, the jury must address two and sometimes three questions in the punishment phase of the trial. Affirmative answers to the questions by all jurors result in an automatic death sentence. A “no” answer to any question results in an automatic life sentence. One of the three questions is whether the defendant presents a continuing violent threat to society. From 1974 to 1988, niney-two capital murderers had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. These commutations allow a “natural experiment” to assess the predictions made by jurors that these individuals would present a future violent threat to society. Patterns of institutional and post-release behavior of this group were compared to similar patterns for defendants convicted of capital murder who were not predicted to be dangerous and who received life imprisonment over the same fifteen-year period. We found that although most capital offenders were model inmates, two commuted capital prisoners committed second murders, one while in prison and the other while in the community. We conclude with a discussion of the validity of current death statutes that require jurors to predict future dangerousness.

This research note examines the relations between judicial preferences, institutional concerns, and litigation outcomes. I found that in litigation before the Israeli High Court of Justice, the “haves” enjoyed only a limited advantage over “have nots” in litigation outcomes. I also found that when “have nots” were represented by legal counsel, the “haves” did not come out ahead. Ideological propensities of judges and considerations of institutional autonomy can ameliorate, to some extent, the inherent inferiority of “have nots” in litigation. It was also found that the mechanisms that worked in favor of “have nots” operated not only in litigation that reached final judicial disposition but also when the litigation was disposed through out-of-court settlements.

Deterrence models generally predict compliance patterns based solely on the subjective probability and utility of outcomes associated with alternative actions. Yet recent work in behavioral decision theory suggests that compliance decisions may also be affected by how the risks of noncompliance are described and how the decisionmaker's preferences are expressed. We report five experiments that examine how the cognitive heuristics evoked by these descriptive and procedural variables affect tax compliance. Using tax decision problems involving how to choose a tax professional, whether to take a questionable deduction, and how to approach an impending tax audit, we find that taxpayer preferences are significantly influenced by descriptive and procedural variables that traditional expected utility models ignore. We discuss the implications of these results for (1) extending compliance theory to understand a broader range of compliance behavior and (2) utilizing cognitive heuristics to predict the consequences of various enforcement policies.

What influence do funders have on the development of civil rights legal mobilization? Fundraising is critical to the creation, operation, and survival of rights organizations. Yet, despite the importance of funding, there is little systematic attention in the law and social movements and cause lawyering literatures on the relationship between funders and grantees. This article recovers a forgotten history of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) campaign to protect black lives from lynchings and mob violence in the early twentieth century. I argue that funders engaged in a process of movement capture whereby they used their financial leverage to redirect the NAACP's agenda away from the issue of racial violence to a focus on education at a critical juncture in the civil rights movement. The findings in this article suggest that activists tread carefully as the interaction between funders and social movement organizations often creates gaps between what activists want and what funders think movements should do.

This paper examines the relationship between lynchings and executions of blacks in North Carolina and Georgia between 1882 and 1930 as well as before and after the political disenfranchisement of blacks in both states. The findings are used to assess two competing models of the relationship between these different types of lethal sanctioning. No supporting evidence is found for a “substitution model,” which predicts a negative relationship between lynchings and executions. The evidence for Georgia, especially for the pre-disenfranchisement period, does offer moderate support for the “conflict model,” which hypothesizes a positive association between lynchings and executions. Although the direction of the relationship between lynchings and executions was insensitive to disenfranchisement in both states, our analysis reveals that total lethal sanctioning (lynchings plus executions) did decline in Georgia after several restrictive voting statutes were implemented. No similar effect is observed for North Carolina.

Despite the paucity of research on the death penalty and gender discrimination, it is widely supposed that women murderers are chivalrously spared the death sentence. This supposition is fueled by the relatively small number of women who are condemned. This article argues that women are represented on contemporary U.S. death rows in numbers commensurate with the infrequency of female commission of those crimes which our society labels sufficiently reprehensible to merit capital punishment. Additionally, preliminary investigation suggests that death-sentenced women are more likely than death-sentenced men to have killed intimates, although the explanation for this disparity is not yet at hand. It is further argued, on the basis of a content analysis of state capital statutes, that there is a form of gender bias inimical to the interests of women in our capital punishment law: The death penalty is a dramatic symbol of the imputation of greater seriousness to economic and other predatory murder as compared with domestic murder.

This article explores the conditions which lead to variation in the degree to which law affects private negotiations? It is an extension and modification of Mnookin and Kornhauser's (1979) formulation that negotiations occur in the shadow of the law. Drawing on prior research on disputes, I hypothesize that this effect depends on the way a claim is framed (which in turn is affected by the claimant's gender), on the mode of attorney involvement, and on claimant use of informational networks. I examine these hypotheses by an analysis of a small sample of recently divorced men and women who were interviewed about the negotiations that led to their custody and child-support arrangements.

In 1982, a set of strict new countermeasures against drinking-driving went into effect in California. Interrupted time series analysis is used to investigate the effect that these countermeasures have had on fatal accident levels during the first postintervention year. The results do not indicate that a deterrent impact occurred among those accidents. Supplementary analyses of injury accidents during the first postintervention year and of fatality accidents during the first nine months of 1983 add important qualifications to this basic finding.

This essay takes the theme of the 1999 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, “The Legal Imagination: Taking on Cultural Studies,” as an occasion for trying to promote an engagement between sociological studies and cultural studies. It argues that mass mediated images are as powerful and pervasive as other social forces with which sociological studies is already engaged and that the time has come to move from the study of law on the books and in action to law in the image. This argument is developed by analyzing the significance of the ubiquitous presence of tropes of fatherhood in popular cultural iconography about law. Drawing on psychoanalysis, gender theory, and film studies, this essay presents a close reading of a single film, The Sweet Hereafter. This film exemplifies the ways in which fatherhood becomes one of the key terms through which law is mythologized and through which fantasies and anxieties about law are expressed. Exploring the imagination of law in and through mass medicated images, like those contained in The Sweet Hereafter, is an important and engaging new frontier for sociolegal studies.

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Sudan, this article illuminates the consequences of human rights educational workshops as a form of humanitarian assistance in war-ravaged areas. These projects are built on flawed assumptions about Sudanese politics and about the likelihood that human rights education empowers the war-ravaged poor. The beneficial impacts of human rights discourse stem from its side effects, which fulfill urgent and symbolic needs, and not from the core content of human rights. The case of an authoritarian regime exposes an alternative site of rights promotion, outside the established or struggling democracies where most literature on rights resides. Bridging the literature on rights in Western, democratic contexts and on human rights in Africa, this article argues that law is not enough—and is potentially dangerous—in the insecure and impoverished areas where the international aid community has been encouraging it to flourish.

The demise of the “upper court myth” (see Frank, 1969: 222-24) and the resultant realization of the importance of the “trial” court has spurred research into the dispositional processes of criminal courts. In the forefront of the results yielded by these efforts is a model of case disposition very different from the familiar Perry Mason courtroom interaction, a model predicated on negotiated dispositions rather than adversary combat, in short, a plea bargaining model.

Plea bargaining can be defined as the process by which the defendant relinquishes his right to go to trial in exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence. The pervasiveness of plea bargaining is suggested by the fact that roughly only 10% of all criminal cases go to trial.

In this article I examine the applied relevance of trial talk for rape shield legislation and attempts to evaluate the impact of such legal reforms. Using linguistic data from the Kennedy Smith rape trial, I argue that attempts to progressively implement rape shield have thus far failed and that research evaluating its impact has been more or less misguided because reformers and researchers have consistently failed to scrutinize empirically the interactional object to which rape shield legislation is applied: the language of evidence in testimony. Looking at the social construction of rape's legal facticity, I propose new methods of interpreting and evaluating legal reforms based on an understanding of language use and the performance of knowledge in context.

Apparently naive, but in fact not, is the question: What do lawyers do? Many scholars assume the central role of the lawyer is that of the advocate, but among lawyers working in law firms advocacy consumes little of their time. Similarly, the term lawyer provides hardly any meaning in itself. The research presented here is based on a participant-observation study of a corporate law firm. The central thesis proposed, in the light of case studies of the selling of shopping mall and the arranging of a bank loan, is that business lawyers are engaged in managing uncertainty for both their clients and themselves. Managing uncertainty is accomplished through interaction rather than appeals to the law.

I investigate whether the degree of intimacy between victims and defendants affects legal responses to violence and how this association has changed over time. Using data on homicides between 1974 and 1996, I examine court outcomes in more than 1,000 cases. I demonstrate that intimacy matters at three criminal justice stages: charging, mode of conviction, and sentencing. However, moving beyond the traditional conceptualization of intimacy, I show that defendants who kill intimates do not always receive the same treatment, nor are all defendants who kill nonintimates treated similarly. Finally, I show that criminal justice leniency toward intimate violence is less evident in recent years.